

59<sup>th</sup> GEF Council  
December 7-10, 2020  
Virtual Meeting

Agenda Item 09

## **EVALUATION OF GEF SUPPORT IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS**

(Prepared by the Independent Evaluation Office of the GEF)

### **Recommended Council Decision**

The Council, having reviewed document GEF/E/C.59/01, Evaluation of GEF Support in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, and the Management Response, endorses the following recommendations:

1. The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks.
2. To improve conflict-sensitive programming while also providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.
3. To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance.
4. The current GEF Environmental and Social Safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.
5. The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS.....	VI
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	VI
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Problem description.....	1
1.2 Structure of the evaluation.....	3
1.3 Linkages between environment, fragility, and conflict.....	4
1.4 Environmental interventions, conflict, and fragility .....	8
1.5 Growing attention to conflict sensitivity .....	10
1.6 Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and conflict .....	12
1.7 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), conflict, and peace .....	14
1.8 Implementing Agency policies, safeguards, and toolkits.....	17
1.9 GEF objectives and theory of change .....	22
1.10 GEF interventions and conflict.....	25
1.11 Methodology.....	31
2. GEF INTERVENTIONS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS.....	32
2.1 Methodology.....	33
2.2 Prevalence of fragile and conflict-affected situations in the GEF portfolio.....	34
2.3 Statistical analysis of project results vis-à-vis fragility.....	42
2.4 Statistical analysis of project results vis-à-vis conflict .....	45
2.5 Conclusions .....	47
3. FINDINGS: ANALYSIS OF GEF INTERVENTIONS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS .....	48
3.1 Key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects .....	48
3.2 Impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects .....	57
3.3 Typology of conflict-sensitive GEF programming approaches.....	65
3.4 Conflict-sensitive programming across the project life cycle .....	81
3.4.1 Project design.....	81
3.4.2 Implementation .....	89
3.4.3 Project closure .....	96
3.4.4 Evaluation and learning .....	97
3.5 Cross-cutting issues.....	99
3.5.1 Human rights.....	99
3.5.2 Indigenous peoples .....	100

3.5.3	Gender.....	101
3.5.4	Private sector .....	102
3.5.5	The COVID-19 pandemic.....	103
4.	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	104
	ANNEX A: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION EXPANDING UPON THE RECOMMENDATIONS .....	106
	ANNEX B: WORKS CITED .....	115
	ANNEX C: LIST OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS EXAMINED.....	145
	ANNEX D: LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS.....	155
	ANNEX E: FRAGILITY OF STATES RECEIVING GEF FUNDING .....	160
	ANNEX F: SITUATION-LEVEL TEXTUAL REVIEW TALLIES.....	185
	ANNEX G: RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT IN SELECTED GEF PROJECTS .....	187
	ANNEX H: GEF REGIONAL STATISTICS RESULTS .....	194
	ANNEX I: EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMING .....	206
	ANNEX J: LINKAGES BETWEEN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING .....	211

## **LISTS OF FIGURES, TABLES, AND BOXES**

### **FIGURES**

Figure 1.1: Environmental Risks and Opportunities across the Conflict Life Cycle.....	5
Figure 1.2: Linkages between the Sustainable Development Goals and Environmental Peacebuilding....	16
Figure 1.3: General Framework for GEF Theory of Change.....	23
Figure 1.4: Conflict Hotspots and Location of GEF Projects and GEF-Supported Protected Areas (1989-2020).....	26
Figure 1.5: GEF Case Study Situations and Conflict (1989-2020) .....	32
Figure 2.1: Fragility of Countries and Territories Receiving GEF Funding (2006-2020) .....	35
Figure 2.2: GEF Investments in Situations Affected by Major Armed Conflict (GEF 1-6) .....	37
Figure 2.3: Projects by Conflict Status for Each GEF Replenishment .....	41
Figure 3.1: Key Pathways by which Conflict and Fragility Affect GEF Projects .....	48
Figure 3.2: Deforestation in the Parrot’s Beak Region of Guinea (1974 and 2002) .....	56
Figure 3.3: Typology of Conflict-Sensitive Strategies in GEF Projects.....	66

## TABLES

Table 2.1: GEF Projects across Focal Areas (1991-2019) .....	42
Table 2.2: Types of GEF Projects and Conflict Status (1991-2019) .....	42
Table 2.3: Impacts of Fragility on TER Binary Scores for Country-Level GEF Projects (1991-2019) .....	44
Table 2.4: Effect of Country Fragility on TER Binary Outcome Variables (Warning Baseline) .....	45
Table 2.5: Effect of Country Fragility on Likelihood of Project Cancellation (Warning Baseline) .....	45
Table D.1 Table Comparing Listing of Countries in the Harmonized List and the Fragile States Index ...	162
Table D.2 Fragility Designations for Countries and Territories Receiving GEF Funding, per the World Bank's List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected situations (2006–20) .....	163
Table D.3 Fragility Designations for Countries and Territories Receiving GEF Funding Per the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (2006-2020) .....	176
Table G.1: Terminal Evaluation Report Results for the Africa Region .....	197
Table G.2: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Africa Region .....	199
Table G.3: TER Results for the Asia Region .....	199
Table G.4: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Asia Region .....	201
Table G.5: TER Results for the Europe and Central Asia Region .....	202
Table G.6: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Europe and Central Asia Region .....	204
Table G.7: TER Results for the Latin America and Caribbean Region .....	204
Table G.8: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Latin America and Caribbean Region .....	206

## BOXES

Box 1.1: Definitions of Key Terms .....	3
Box 1.2: Conflict-Sensitive Strategies, Policies, and Toolkits of Implementing Agencies .....	17
Box 2.1: GEF Catalytic Funding in Conflict-Affected Situations – The Case of Liberia .....	38
Box 3.1: Lessons Learned by Implementing Agencies .....	76
Box 3.2: Learning from the Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity Project (GEF 398) .....	79
Box 3.3: Engaging Customary Approaches for Conservation and Conflict Management—Hima in Lebanon.....	86

## ABBREVIATIONS

AfDB	African Development Bank	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ADB	Asian Development Bank	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
BOAD	West African Development Bank	UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
COP	Conference of the Parties		
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network		
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)		
ELI	Environmental Law Institute		
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations		
GEF	Global Environment Facility		
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office (of the GEF)		
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development		
IGCP	International Gorilla Conservation Program		
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development		
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature		
IW: LEARN	International Waters Learning Exchange and Resource Network		
M&E	monitoring and evaluation		
MEA	multilateral environmental agreement		
NGO	nongovernmental organization		
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment		
PMIS	Project Management Information System		
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo		
RAPTA	Resilience, Adaptation Pathways and Transformation Approach		
ROI	return on investment		
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals		
STAP	Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel		
TER	Terminal Evaluation Report		
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme		
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification		

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1. Conflict and fragility affect environmental programming—and programming of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)—in diverse ways.** The environment can interact with conflict across the conflict lifecycle, because natural resources can act as a source of grievances, provide revenues to rebel groups during conflict, and can act as a mutual starting point during peace negotiations. Environmental interventions also interact with conflict and fragility in multiple ways. Challenges associated with security threats to project staff, hiring staff, and accessing project sites can undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of an intervention, and environmental interventions themselves can aggravate tensions or conflict. Recognizing both the potential effects of conflict and fragility on environmental projects and the effects of environmental projects on conflict and fragility, a growing number of institutions—including GEF Agencies—have adopted conflict-sensitive measures to manage risks associated with conflict and fragility.
- 2. The GEF has funded thousands of interventions in areas experiencing armed conflict or fragility; more than one-third of its global portfolio is invested in countries affected by major armed conflict.** The prevalence of conflict and fragility in GEF-target countries suggests that conflict and fragility should be considered essential contextual factors affecting the GEF’s ability to achieve large-scale, sustainable impacts and initiate fundamental change.
- 3. Despite its substantial investment in programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations and the multiple effects of those situations on GEF interventions, the GEF does not yet have a definition, policy, or procedures for designing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** Literature on conflict-sensitive programming emphasizes the importance of institutional instruments in providing normative direction and practical guidance. Without such institutional statements, efforts to be more conflict sensitive will remain ad hoc and uneven and continue to expose the GEF to institutional risk that could otherwise be managed.
- 4. Several evaluations by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office—including those on GEF support to land degradation, mainstreaming biodiversity, and Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—have provided evaluative evidence on how conflict and fragile situations affect the outcomes and sustainability of GEF support.** These evaluations have emphasized that fragile and conflict-affected states should be given due consideration in project design. Even though fragility and conflict are a key factor influencing project delivery and performance, there has not been an independent assessment of GEF interventions in such situations. This is the first such evaluation conducted by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office to look at this topic across the GEF portfolio.
- 5. This evaluation assesses the impacts of conflict and fragility on the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of GEF interventions at the global scale, the country and regional levels, and the individual project level.** This report analyzes how conflict and fragility affect GEF project outcomes at these three scales, determines the extent to which GEF-supported projects consider the broader conflict content in their design and implementation, and assesses whether consideration of these factors affects project

outcomes. Based on these findings, it offers recommendations for improving conflict sensitivity in GEF-sponsored projects.

## FINDINGS

6. **The majority of GEF projects are in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** As of July 2020, GEF has invested over \$4.0 billion in countries affected by major armed conflict, accounting for 29 percent of its global portfolio. In total, 45 percent of GEF investments have been in projects implemented in at least one conflict-affected country. Of all GEF-funded projects, 33 percent have been implemented in countries affected by major armed conflict (i.e., conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths), 11 percent in mixed contexts. Fragility is even more widespread: 88.3 percent of GEF’s country-level projects were in fragile situations, categorized as either “alert” (very fragile) or “warning” (of concern).
7. **There is a statistically significant impact of major armed conflict on the likelihood that a project will be cancelled and dropped; this relationship is also seen for fragility.** Moreover, at all scales of implementation, the country’s conflict status had a statistically significant impact on the duration of a project’s delays.
8. **A country’s fragility classification is associated with a negative and statistically significant impact on project outcomes, sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, implementation quality, and execution quality.** The most significant impacts were for projects in countries classified as “alert” (i.e., very fragile). For “stable” vis-à-vis “warning” classifications, the sustainability and M&E implementation ratings were statistically affected by fragility.
9. **The conflict context of a project’s country also had a statistically significant impact on the Terminal Evaluation Report (TER) ratings.** Globally, the presence of major armed conflict in a project country correlates with a lower score for sustainability. This suggests that projects taking place in conflict-affected sites are on average less sustainable than projects taking place in non-conflict contexts. At the regional level, statistical analysis reveals that major armed conflict can have a statistically significant impact on the sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, and overall ratings of a project—although results varied by region.
10. **Conflict and fragility affect GEF projects through five key pathways: physical insecurity, social conflict, economic drivers, political fragility and weak governance, and coping strategies.** Issues related to physical insecurity include difficulties in accessing sites because of the potential targeting of project staff and partners and because of the risks associated with unexploded ordinance. Physical insecurity has made it difficult to hire staff, undertake planned activities, and carry out evaluations. Social conflicts and mistrust between and within local communities and government institutions often affect the performance of GEF projects. Social conflicts relating to land tenure are particularly common. The macro- and microeconomic consequences of conflict and fragility can affect GEF project implementation in various ways, from competing over resource extraction (often illicit) to currency depreciation. Political fragility, weak governance, and limited institutional capacity have impacted GEF



project implementation and sustainability. Limited government capacity can make it difficult to enforce policies, presenting barriers to project execution, while political instability can harm project sustainability. Changes in natural resources driven by coping strategies can generate social tensions and instability that can affect projects, as can influxes of refugees and climatic stressors.

**11. Conflict and fragility affect project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.** Armed conflict and fragility can shift the focus and priorities of a state and community away from environmental and other initiatives that require cooperation, and toward efforts that directly affect conflict dynamics or provide relief. At the same time, conflict can enhance the relevance of GEF projects, particularly those designed to be conflict sensitive that address livelihoods, food security, cooperation, and basic services. Conflict and fragility can also undermine the effectiveness of GEF projects by blocking access to target sites, creating security risks for project staff, and in extreme cases, causing them to be cancelled or dropped. The efficiency of projects can also be affected by conflict and fragility; for example, by requiring project restructuring, delays, or additional costs for security. Finally, project sustainability is undermined by conflict and fragility, particularly by sociopolitical instability and outbreaks of violence.

**12. Despite the risks and effects of conflict and fragility on GEF projects, the GEF has so far not developed conflict-sensitive safeguards, policies, and guidance necessary to systematically manage those risks.** GEF Implementing Agencies and projects have innovated a variety of approaches, but these are either implemented only by the particular projects or by the Agencies. As a result, many GEF projects continue to not be conflict-sensitive or to reinvent approaches without the benefit of learning from past experiences.

**13. Notwithstanding the absence of direction from the GEF, GEF projects have innovated and employed five conflict-sensitive strategies to manage risks posed by conflict and fragility: acknowledgement, avoidance, mitigation, peacebuilding, and learning.** Many projects have acknowledged the presence of armed violence and insecurity in the project area but do not articulate any strategies to manage conflict-related risks. A growing number of projects both acknowledge risks associated with conflict (and to a lesser extent fragility), and then propose measures to manage those risks. To reduce the level of risk that conflict poses to a project, some projects deliberately focused on areas that were unaffected by conflict. This reduces the risk to the project, albeit with the potential implication that the areas most needing assistance are not addressed. Other projects employed mitigation strategies such as capacity building, monitoring the security situation, participatory approaches, dispute resolution mechanisms, partnerships with local communities, and adaptive management approaches. A small but growing number of projects actively embraced the peacebuilding opportunities presented by the conflict or fragile situation through methods such as promoting heightened political will, rebuilding livelihoods, and reintegrating ex-combatants and displaced persons. Many GEF projects implemented in fragile and conflict-affected settings also learn from both their own experiences and from other programming.

**14. Although conflict and fragility pose risks to GEF projects, to date, identification of conflict-related risks has not been consistent, and identification of fragility-related risks to GEF projects has been almost nonexistent.** 59 of 62 projects in conflict affected countries

reviewed identified various risks and 56 proposed initial measures to manage risk. Only 39 of these projects identified conflict as a risk, even though all 62 projects were situated in a country with an ongoing or past major armed conflict, and less than half of these projects proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks. None of the 62 projects reviewed mentioned fragility. It is difficult to plan for or manage risks that are not identified.

**15. The COVID-19 pandemic reinforces the need for substantively and financially adaptive approaches to GEF programming.** The widespread repercussions of COVID-19 have halted development efforts and reversed decades of progress toward more sustainable development. COVID-19 can undermine conflict resolution and crisis management mechanisms, erode social order, and overwhelm already overextended public health systems. Reforming the GEF rules and procedures to allow for more adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations can make GEF programming more resilient in pandemics and other crises. Several key informants working in fragile and conflict-affected countries noted that while the country had fewer resources to cope with the pandemic, the ability and disposition to navigate compounding crises that had been developed working in the fragile and conflict-affected settings may have improved the ability of projects to navigate the pandemic.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

***Recommendation 1: The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks. The GEF should use the project review process to integrate consideration of fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Project reviews provide an opportunity for the GEF to identify risks that could affect project success and for proposing measures to mitigate those risks. This would help ensure that recognizing and addressing such risks is more consistent.***

***Recommendation 2: To improve conflict-sensitive programming while also providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming. This guidance could address measures across the programming lifecycle, from design to implementation and closure. GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw upon both the commonalities and innovations of the guidance that has been developed by 10 Agencies.***

***Recommendation 3: To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance. These platforms are designed to effectively foster learning and exchange, build capacity, and provide specialized assistance. Since conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue, lessons learned should be exchanged on existing knowledge platforms supported through programs such as the Integrated Approach Pilots, Impact Programs, Global Wildlife Program, and planetGOLD, among others, as well as on the online GEF Portal.***

***Recommendation 4: The current GEF Environmental and Social Safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.*** At least 11 GEF Agencies have incorporated consideration of conflict and fragility into their respective safeguards. The GEF has adopted Environmental and Social Safeguards that seek to minimize potentially adverse environmental and social impacts from projects. However, these safeguards mention conflict only once and lack a holistic recognition of the way that conflicts might be linked to the environment and natural resources. As it has done when updating safeguards regarding gender, the GEF could consider the more detailed provisions incorporated by Agencies as it considers whether and how to expand its safeguards to more effectively address conflict sensitivity.

***Recommendation 5: The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations.*** The circumstances on the ground in these situations can change rapidly. Yet, GEF policies and procedures can make it difficult to adjust projects to adapt in a timely manner. Incorporating adaptive management into GEF policies and procedures could provide a more flexible and adaptive environment, enabling projects to adapt more quickly and more efficiently to changes resulting from conflict or fragility, as well as other difficult situations.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Problem description

**1. The environment, fragility, and conflict are often intertwined, and attention to these linkages and their implications for peace and conflict is essential to effective programming.**

Environmental organizations have increasingly recognized how their projects are often affected by peace and conflict dynamics and vice versa. Since its inception, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has funded thousands of interventions in areas that have been or are currently affected by armed conflict and fragility. The GEF’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) noted that 77 countries, accounting for over-half of GEF recipients, had experienced armed conflict since 1991.<sup>1</sup> More than \$4 billion, accounting for more than one-third of GEF’s global portfolio, has been invested in countries affected by major armed conflict, and more than one-third of “GEF members (64 countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while major armed conflict was ongoing.”<sup>2</sup> As such, a substantial portion of the GEF portfolio is exposed to conflict-related risks. Even more are affected by fragility.<sup>3</sup>

2. Several evaluations by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office—including on GEF support to land degradation,<sup>4</sup> mainstreaming biodiversity,<sup>5</sup> and Least Developed Countries (LDCs)<sup>6</sup>—have provided evaluative evidence on how conflict and fragile situations affect the outcomes and sustainability of GEF support. These evaluations have emphasized that fragile and conflict-affected states should be given due consideration in project design. Despite being a key factor influencing project delivery and performance, there has not been an independent assessment of GEF interventions in conflict and fragile situations. This is the first such evaluation conducted by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office that looks at this topic across the GEF portfolio.

**3. Despite the GEF’s substantial investment in programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations and the multiple effects of those situations on GEF interventions, the GEF does not yet have a definition, policy, or procedures for designing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations.**<sup>7</sup>

Literature on conflict-sensitive programming emphasizes the importance of institutional instruments in providing normative direction and practical guidance.<sup>8</sup> Policies provide clarity of direction, protocols steer practices pursuant to policy, and safeguards provide enforceable protections. Without such institutional statements, efforts to be more conflict sensitive will remain ad hoc and uneven and will continue to expose the GEF to institutional risk that could otherwise be managed. Nevertheless, a 2018 report produced by STAP concluded that the organization “does not appear to have addressed

---

<sup>1</sup> GEF STAP 2018, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Morrow 2018, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> See paras. 91-94.

<sup>4</sup> GEF IEO 2017b, p. 26.

<sup>5</sup> GEF IEO 2019b.

<sup>6</sup> GEF IEO 2020, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup> GEF IEO 2018a.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., UNDP and UNEP 2015, p. 7; International Alert et al. 2004, ch. 1, p. 7.

environmental security in an integrated manner across its program areas.”<sup>9</sup> As a result, interventions in fragile and conflict-affected areas may be exposed to risks that are not adequately taken into account or mitigated.

4. **In the absence of a formal definition, policy, and procedures, individual projects and some GEF Implementing Agencies have started to account for fragile and conflict-affected contexts in their design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).** As the GEF continues to support interventions in a range of fragile and conflict-affected situations, the partnership can learn from current and past approaches to designing and implementing projects and programs in such situations and can identify ways to better manage the particular risks in these areas. Experience with diverse conservation organizations suggests that managing conflict-related risks would make GEF interventions more effective in meeting the interventions’ conservation objectives.<sup>10</sup>

5. This evaluation aims to assess GEF projects and programs in fragile and conflict-affected situations—in short, to determine whether and how GEF interventions are conflict sensitive, and the implications thereof. This evaluation surveys the guidance from relevant Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with respect to conflict; examines the design, implementation, and M&E of GEF-funded projects and programs, focusing on interventions since 2002 (the start of GEF-3) in seven situations affected by conflict and fragility; assesses the implications of projects and programs’ degree of conflict sensitivity by considering how the performance and outcomes may have been influenced by the conflict context; and, with reference to international best practice, identify recommendations for improving future GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations.

6. **This evaluation seeks to answer four questions:**

- (a) **Does the conflict or fragile context affect the outcomes of GEF-supported projects?**
- (b) **To what extent do GEF-supported projects take into account the conflict or fragile context in their design and implementation?**
- (c) **Does consideration of the conflict or fragile context (or the failure to consider it) affect project outcomes?**
- (d) **What conflict-sensitive measures could the GEF, Implementing Agencies, and partners adopt to improve the performance and outcomes of GEF-supported interventions?**

---

<sup>9</sup> GEF STAP 2018, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> CI 2017; Hammill et al. 2009.

7. Policies, guidance, and analyses on conflict-sensitive programming variously address “conflict-affected,” “fragile,” and “violent” “situations” and “countries.” There are many dimensions to conflict-affected and fragile situations, and there are diverse articulations of conflict and fragility. This evaluation will follow well-established framings and definitions for the key terms (box 1.1).

### Box 1.1: Definitions of Key Terms

For purposes of this analysis, we use the following definitions of the key terms unless otherwise indicated:

**Conflict-affected** refers to contexts that are experiencing or have experienced **armed conflict**, which is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” (UCDP n.d.)

**Major armed conflict** is an armed conflict in which there is at least 1,000 battle deaths overall. (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008)

**Fragility** is “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.” (OECD 2106)

**Conflict sensitivity** refers to “conflict sensitivity refers to the capacity of an organization to: (i) understand the context in which it operates; (ii) understand the interaction between the organization's interventions and the context; and (iii) act upon these understandings to avoid negative impacts (do no harm) and maximize positive impacts”. (UNFTPA 2020)

**State** refers to a UN Member State.

**Situation** refers to a location, and may include a State, a subnational area, an area that includes portions of two or more States, or an area that includes multiple States.

## 1.2 Structure of the evaluation

8. **This evaluation is divided into four chapters. This introductory chapter surveys the linkages** between environmental programming, conflict, and peace, as well as the emergence of conflict-sensitive programming; examines how multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and the SDGs address conflict; and then reviews the linkages between the GEF theory of change, focal areas, impact programs, and fragility and conflict. The second chapter of this evaluation presents the results of a portfolio review of GEF interventions in conflict-affected situations. The third chapter presents findings of in-depth research into GEF programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility. This chapter presents findings along four key lines: (1) key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects; (2) the resulting effects of conflict and fragility on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of GEF projects; (3) the various ways that GEF projects are seeking to be more conflict-sensitive; and

(4) entry points for conflict sensitivity in the GEF project cycle. In addition to the specific recommendations for improving conflict sensitivity in GEF projects presented in the third chapter, the final chapter presents five overarching recommendations for improving conflict sensitivity of GEF projects.

### **1.3 Linkages between environment, fragility, and conflict**

9. **A large and growing body of academic and practitioner literature establishes the diverse connections between the environment and peace, conflict, and security.**<sup>11</sup> This literature addresses the relationship across the conflict life cycle, including the environmental causes of conflict, environmental impacts of armed conflict, financing and environmental drivers of conflict, environmental factors in the negotiation and conclusion of peace agreements ending conflict, and environmental dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding (figure 1.1). It also addresses the potential for the conflict context to affect the successful realization of environmental initiatives.<sup>12</sup> In any year from 1946 to 2008, at least 40 percent of all intrastate conflicts were linked to natural resources, and in some years the share was as high as 65 percent.<sup>13</sup> Conflicts that are linked to natural resources are more likely to relapse than other conflicts, and they do so twice as quickly; this is particularly true for conflicts related to the allocation of land and high-value natural resources such as minerals, oil, and gas.<sup>14</sup>

10. **Conflict and fragility are widespread, and they have been worsening.** With increased internal armed conflict and the proliferation of non-state armed groups, the world is experiencing its highest rate of violent conflicts in 30 years.<sup>15</sup> Morrow found that “about 20 percent of conflict-affected GEF recipient countries experienced more than 20 years of conflict including Turkey, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Uganda and the Russian Federation.”<sup>16</sup> Fragility—like conflict—is often persistent and pernicious, with almost 30 States experiencing chronic fragility in the past decade.<sup>17</sup> The World Bank has projected that “By 2030, more than half of the world’s extreme poor will live in countries characterized by fragility, conflict, and violence.”<sup>18</sup>

11. **Competition for valuable or scarce natural resources can be a contributing cause of conflict.** Competition for control over valuable natural resources and their benefits can lead to reduced economic, political, and social performance; this is known as the “resource curse.”<sup>19</sup> Many have also argued that competition over scarce natural resources, such as land and water, can drive conflict.<sup>20</sup> Serious pollution and other burdens resulting from natural resource extraction and processing can also drive conflict. For example, in Bougainville, Papua New

---

<sup>11</sup> E.g., CI 2017; Rüttinger et al. 2015; Hammill et al. 2009; UNEP 2009; UN OCHA 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Bruch et al. 2019.

<sup>13</sup> Rustad and Binningsbø 2010.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank Group 2020a, p. 2; see also ACLED 2018.

<sup>16</sup> Morrow 2018, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> OECD 2018, box 1.1.

<sup>18</sup> World Bank Group 2020a, p. 2.


<sup>19</sup> E.g., Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Ross 2004; Collier and Venables 2011; Ross 2015.

<sup>20</sup> E.g., Westing 1986; Elliott 1991; Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994.

Guinea, the lack of benefit sharing and severe water pollution from the Panguna gold and copper mine drove a secessionist movement that escalated to civil war.<sup>21</sup>

12. **Climate change is widely considered to be a conflict risk multiplier and conflict accelerator.**<sup>22</sup> Climate change degrades natural capital and livelihood assets, damages infrastructure, weakens food security, threatens lives, and can drive migration.<sup>23</sup> As such, climate change can increase fragility and aggravate tensions.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, increases in temperature have been shown to measurably increase both interpersonal conflict and intergroup conflict.<sup>25</sup> The World Bank estimated that “Under the pessimistic reference scenario, ... the number of climate migrants could reach more than 143 million by 2050.”<sup>26</sup> There is also evidence that climate change may directly amplify the effects of conflict. Somalia, for example, experiences a “double exposure” to both climate-induced environmental impacts and protracted conflict, which together have caused the displacement of over 2.6 million people within the country and further entrenched drivers of conflict.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, in Gaza, analyses have highlighted how predicted changes in climate risks can amplify the effects of conflict.<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 1.1: Environmental Risks and Opportunities across the Conflict Life Cycle**



Source: Bruch et al. 2019.

<sup>21</sup> Regan 2017.

<sup>22</sup> E.g., GEF STAP 2018, p. 8; CNA Military Advisory Board 2007, p. 44; CNA 2014; CI 2017; Nordås & Gleditsch 2007; National Research Council 2013.

<sup>23</sup> Adger et al. 2015; Rüttinger et al. 2015; Rigaud et al. 2018; UN OCHA 2009.

<sup>24</sup> UN OCHA 2009; Rüttinger et al. 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Burke et al. 2015.

<sup>26</sup> Rigaud et al. 2018, p. 110.

<sup>27</sup> Krampe 2019, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> Mason et al. 2011.



**13. Recognizing that poor environmental governance and fragility can underpin grievances, conflict prevention increasingly focuses on improving environmental governance and social resilience.** Research has shown that the risk of conflict relapse in countries with good governance drops rapidly after conflict, while countries characterized by poor governance are substantially more vulnerable to conflict relapse.<sup>29</sup> In a World Bank background paper, Barbara F. Walter noted:

Of the 103 countries that experienced some form of civil war between 1945-2009 (from minor to major conflict), only 44 avoided a subsequent return to civil war. That means that 57 percent of all countries that suffered from one civil war during this time period experienced at least one conflict thereafter. This confirms what Collier and Sambanis (2002) have called the “conflict trap;” once a country experiences one civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence.<sup>30</sup>

Efforts to prevent conflicts related to natural resources often emphasize transparency (e.g., the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative),<sup>31</sup> equity (e.g., benefit sharing),<sup>32</sup> and other good governance principles. In resilience-based framings, environmental governance, sustainable livelihoods, institutional capacity, and strong community relationships all contribute to the social resilience that can prevent conflict.<sup>33</sup>

**14. Armed conflict causes environmental damage and degradation through three main pathways: targeting, coping strategies, and the breakdown of environmental governance.** Targeting of the environment includes, for example, scorched-earth tactics (such as poisoning wells or leveling forests to remove cover); the use of particular weapons; and the release of chemicals and waste from the bombing of industrial sites and infrastructure, creating environmental hotspots.<sup>34</sup> Examples include the devastating impacts of the use of Agent Orange on plant and animal life during the Vietnam War<sup>35</sup> and the widely documented increase in animal poaching that occurs in times of war.<sup>36</sup> During conflict, people often liquidate natural assets, flee to camps or other settlements, and otherwise adopt new strategies to cope—all of which have environmental implications.<sup>37</sup> Conflicts also disrupt state institutions, policy coordination, and social relationships between resource users, undermining environmental governance and leading to a proliferation of illegal and criminal exploitation of natural resources and the loss of land tenure security.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> Hegre and Nygård 2015.

<sup>30</sup> Walter 2010, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Sovacool et al. 2016; Epremian, Lujala, and Bruch 2016.

<sup>32</sup> Binningsbø and Rustad 2012.

<sup>33</sup> UNEP 2014; Rüttinger et al. 2015.

<sup>34</sup> E.g., Westing and Pfeiffer 1972; Austin and Bruch 2000; Zierler 2011; Certini et al. 2013.

<sup>35</sup> Westing 1971; Westing 1976; Zierler 2011.

<sup>36</sup> Daskin and Pringle 2018.

<sup>37</sup> E.g., UNEP 2009.

<sup>38</sup> UNEP 2009; Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols 2016.

15. **Natural resources often provide financing necessary to sustain conflict.** Since 1990, at least 35 major armed conflicts<sup>39</sup> have been financed in part through the extraction, trade, or illicit taxation of conflict resources ranging from diamonds and gold, to timber and charcoal, to bananas and coca.<sup>40</sup>

16. **Conflict resources and other natural resource dynamics can transform the conflict narrative.** Rather than being a civilian object protected by international law, conflict resources become a military objective that might be attacked, seized, or destroyed to deprive the other side of their benefits.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, once conflict resources take root in a conflict economy, it can be difficult to control extraction and trade in these resources, even after the conflict has ended.

17. **Increasingly, peace negotiations and the resulting peace agreements have incorporated provisions related to natural resources and the environment more broadly.** Historically, less than one in six peace agreements addressed natural resources or the environment.<sup>42</sup> From 1989 to 2004, this share rose to just over one-half of peace agreements.<sup>43</sup> And since 2005, all major peace agreements contain such provisions (and often multiple provisions). There are four primary reasons that parties to a peace agreement decide to include provisions related to natural resources and the environment: (1) grievances over natural resources were a contributing cause of conflict (as in Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan); (2) natural resource revenues helped finance conflict (as in Angola, Cambodia, and Liberia); (3) natural resources were damaged by the conflict (as in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo); and (4) the environment can be used collaboratively to build confidence and trust.<sup>44</sup>

18. **After conflict, the environment and natural resources underpin the four broad peacebuilding objectives.** In a series of reports on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the UN Secretary-General has emphasized four core areas: establishing security, delivering basic services, restoring the economy and livelihoods, and rebuilding governance and inclusive political processes.<sup>45</sup> Each of these post-conflict peacebuilding objectives relies on natural resources and the environment, and sound environmental management can improve post-conflict peacebuilding, while ignoring the environment can undermine post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> I.e., conflicts with at least 1,000 battle deaths.

<sup>40</sup> Bruch et al. 2019, p. 10135.

<sup>41</sup> Bannon and Collier 2003; Ross 2004; Le Billon 2013.

<sup>42</sup> Blundell and Harwell 2016.

<sup>43</sup> Mason, Gröbli, and Sguaitamatti 2016.

<sup>44</sup> Dawes 2016.

<sup>45</sup> E.g., UNSG 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014.

<sup>46</sup> E.g., Lujala and Rustad 2012; Jensen and Lonergan 2012; Unruh and Williams 2013; Weinthal et al. 2014; Young and Goldman 2015; Bruch, Muffett, and Nichols 2016.

## 1.4 Environmental interventions, conflict, and fragility

19. **Environmental interventions can interact with conflict and fragility in three ways: (1) the intervention can be negatively affected by conflict and fragility; (2) the intervention can inadvertently worsen conflict and fragility; and (3) the intervention may help address the drivers, dynamics, and impacts of conflict and build peace.** In other words, a project can both be affected by and affect the conflict situation. This report highlights the fact that the first two categories of intervention can occur when conflict dynamics are not managed effectively, and, by contrast, that applying a conflict-sensitive lens in project design and implementation can support the final scenario.

20. **Conflict and fragility can present challenges to projects through several pathways, for example, through security threats to staff, difficulty with hiring, and challenges to accessing resources and areas.**<sup>47</sup> Conflict may directly threaten those working on the project. This occurred during the implementation of GEF Project 1086 in Cambodia, “Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains,” when poachers murdered two park rangers,<sup>48</sup> injured a local villager, and pillaged a ranger substation in the Phnom Aural Wildlife Sanctuary project area, a former Khmer Rouge stronghold.<sup>49</sup> Short of such tragic outcomes, interventions in conflict-affected areas may have difficulty hiring staff, as was the case for GEF Project 3220 in Afghanistan, which eventually had to be cancelled because of issues with staff recruitments and other “challenging security conditions.”<sup>50</sup> As with humanitarian efforts, environmental programming can legitimize certain groups or leaders by partnering with them, shift local markets with an influx of resources, and effectively replace governance functions or structures.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, impacts of conflict on the environment can directly affect a project’s implementation, and they can more broadly affect the environmental benefits that such projects may seek to achieve.

21. **Conflict can make it unsafe to try to access project sites.** During the implementation of GEF Project 3772 in the Albertine Rift, project staff were unable to collect data on project indicators because of the presence of armed groups in the area.<sup>52</sup> In such circumstances, some projects may also choose or be forced to move their project sites entirely, such as was the case for GEF Project 1253 in Mali, where military operations forced project relocation and project staff “fled” the site and took refuge in southern Mali or neighboring countries.<sup>53</sup> Institutional weakness during times of conflict may also affect project implementation, especially where the cooperation of the government is a necessary component of project activities. GEF Project 1152 faced nearly 40 months of delays and economic inefficiencies because the project team could

---

<sup>47</sup> GEF STAP 2018; Morrow 2018; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012. A more full typology of the ways that conflict and fragility can affect GEF projects is found at paras. 114-140.

<sup>48</sup> Project 1086, Terminal Evaluation, p. 73.

<sup>49</sup> FFI 2005; Project 1086, Terminal Evaluation, pp. 2 and 41.

<sup>50</sup> Project 3220, Agency Notification on Dropped/Cancelled FSP (Sept. 22, 2010), on file with authors.

<sup>51</sup> UNDP 2016c.

<sup>52</sup> Project 3772, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 55.

<sup>53</sup> Project 1253, [Terminal Evaluation](#), pp. 21-22.

not reach an agreement with the National Investment Agency for Local Communities when conflict broke out in Mali in 2012.<sup>54</sup>

22. **Environmental interventions can aggravate tensions or conflict.** If it is unaware of ongoing tensions and conflict dynamics, an organization designing and implementing a project can inadvertently exacerbate existing grievances or perceptions of injustice. For example, a planned hydroelectric dam project in Santa Rita, Guatemala, funded through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's Clean Development Mechanism, would have threatened neighboring Mayan communities' access to water, food, and sacred sites. With the legacy of the Guatemalan Civil War, a project that threatened their existence, and the lack of free, prior, and informed consent, disputes over the project escalated to violence, resulting in seven deaths and the eventual cancellation of the project.<sup>55</sup>

23. **Environmental projects may restrict access to land, forests, and other natural resources, generating grievances.** This is frequently the case in wildlife-related projects, where recovering wildlife populations expand and infringe on neighboring communities.<sup>56</sup> In East Africa, tens of thousands of Maasai were evicted from their ancestral lands to create Serengeti National Park and other national parks.<sup>57</sup> It is estimated that 70 percent of Africa's rural population "has been hurt by the conservation policies of colonial powers and independent governments."<sup>58</sup> Human-wildlife conflict continues: in the areas surrounding Kenya's Tsavo East National Park, for instance, ranchers lost an estimated \$290 for every lion attack.<sup>59</sup>

24. **Environmental and natural resource projects can also introduce new burdens or result in inequitable distribution of benefits and burdens.**<sup>60</sup> Where there is little trust of authorities, the perception of these injustices may worsen tensions. Conservation projects can also inadvertently facilitate violence when park guards are militarized, particularly in areas already affected by armed conflict or where protected areas are located on lands historically occupied by indigenous peoples.<sup>61</sup> In Cameroon, for example, park eco-guards, who were recruited, trained, paid, and outfitted in Lobéké National Park by a conservation nongovernmental organization (NGO), were reported in 2015 to be conducting violent nighttime raids in which they looted and beat villagers in neighboring Baka communities.<sup>62</sup>

25. **Even where benefits and burdens are shared equitably, conservation projects can backfire.** In the Mikeno sector of Virunga National Park in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, community members who were compensated for helping to build walls to prevent

---

<sup>54</sup> Project 1152, [Project Completion Report](#).

<sup>55</sup> Filzmoser and Brasier 2017; Neslen 2015

<sup>56</sup> IUCN 2016.

<sup>57</sup> Mittal and Fraser 2018.

<sup>58</sup> Veit and Benson 2004.

<sup>59</sup> Patterson et al. 2004.

<sup>60</sup> Hammill et al. 2009; RRI 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Duffy et al. 2019.

<sup>62</sup> See, e.g., Vidal 2016, 2020; Lang 2017.

buffaloes from raiding crops became targets of armed groups who looted their homes for food and money.<sup>63</sup>

26. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, efforts to empower park rangers to address poaching backfired. When the rebel M23 militia forces started using the Virunga National Park (home to the eastern mountain gorilla) as a base, the local park rangers were out-gunned and out-maneuvered. A conservation group sought to address this by providing them with military-grade automatic weapons and training them in both military techniques and anti-poaching strategies.<sup>64</sup> The rangers received extra pay for the risks in confronting the rebels. After the training was completed and the rangers returned to their park, though, the government stopped providing this extra pay.<sup>65</sup> Some of these rangers were then recruited by the M23 and helped M23 take over park tourism, which in turn helped to fund their efforts in the ongoing conflict.<sup>66</sup>

27. **Environmental projects can use their intervention as an opportunity for peacebuilding.** One example of this took place in the Emerald Triangle, a forested area that encompasses land along the borders of Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. The biodiverse area has faced various threats, particularly from illegal wildlife trade and habitat fragmentation, challenges which require substantial transboundary cooperation to address. Such cooperation was historically difficult because of tension and conflict over contested state borders in that area. The International Tropical Timber Organization initiated a project in the area to improve biodiversity conservation in the transboundary region and strengthen cooperation between the three governments.<sup>67</sup> Project documents noted improved conservation and collaboration outcomes.<sup>68</sup> In addition to promoting cooperation between combatting groups, these types of conflict-sensitive interventions have the potential to improve the outcomes and sustainability of the intervention itself.

### **1.5 Growing attention to conflict sensitivity**

28. **Institutions around the world, including some GEF Agencies, have begun to address the linkages between their interventions and the conflict dynamics in which they operate.** These include a broad range of environment and development interventions. The efforts to address the linkages include adopting conflict-related policies and guidelines; instituting conflict analysis processes; integrating conflict-related measures into project design and implementation; adapting monitoring, evaluation, and learning protocols; instituting conflict-related training and allocating staff time to implementing changes; and developing relevant resources and guidance related to conflict sensitivity.

---

<sup>63</sup> Crawford and Bernstein 2008.

<sup>64</sup> Rice 2006.

<sup>65</sup> Interview, subject matter experts, July 2019 and October 2020.

<sup>66</sup> Jones 2012.

<sup>67</sup> Suissey 2012, p. 6.

<sup>68</sup> ITTO 2010.

29. Conflict sensitivity first emerged in humanitarian assistance as a way of helping actors achieve positive outcomes and understand the unintended consequences of aid.<sup>69</sup> In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, genocidaires exploited humanitarian relief to launch attacks, and development agencies aggravated tensions between social groups by recruiting primarily Tutsi local staff.<sup>70</sup> After this, international development agencies acknowledged that aid is not necessarily neutral, and they started developing, implementing, and revising approaches to be more conflict-sensitive.<sup>71</sup>

30. **The growth of conflict sensitivity in the humanitarian and development sectors, coupled with the growing recognition of the linkages between environment, conflict, and peace, led to the development of conflict-sensitive environmental programming.** The first major guide on the topic was the 2009 International Institute for Sustainable Development publication, *Conflict-Sensitive Conservation: Practitioners' Manual*.<sup>72</sup> The Wildlife Conservation Society,<sup>73</sup> Conservation International,<sup>74</sup> and other environmental organizations have adopted toolkits, protocols, and guides for operating in fragile and conflict-affected settings. United Nations agencies adopted a series of guidelines on conflict-sensitive conservation,<sup>75</sup> as well as guidance on preventing and managing conflict related to natural resources.<sup>76</sup> The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) adopted a similar series of guidance notes,<sup>77</sup> and the UK Department for International Development (DfID) produced *Back to Basics: A Compilation of Best Practices in Design, Monitoring & Evaluation in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Environments* to highlight best practices throughout a development program's cycle.<sup>78</sup>

31. **Conflict analysis is the prevalent tool for conflict-sensitive programming.** It can be undertaken at the institutional, program, and project levels, and it explores the connections between a given institution's interventions and the conflict context in which it operates. Many institutions have developed their own conflict analysis processes and procedures to reflect their particular programming areas and modalities.<sup>79</sup> The findings from the conflict analysis guide organizations in adapting their design and implementation to the particular context in which they operate.

32. **International organizations and bilateral aid agencies have adopted a variety of measures to operationalize the policies and toolkits on conflict-sensitive programming.** The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Organization of American

---

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> For a review of the development of conflict-sensitive programming, see Annex I.

<sup>72</sup> Hammill et al. 2009.

<sup>73</sup> Interview with WCS staff, July 2020.

<sup>74</sup> CI 2017.

<sup>75</sup> UNFTPA 2012a; UNDG 2013.

<sup>76</sup> UNFTPA 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e.

<sup>77</sup> USAID 2015, 2014, 2005, 2004.

<sup>78</sup> Corlazzoli and White 2013.

<sup>79</sup> E.g., FAO 2019b; CI 2017; UNICEF 2016; USAID 2012a, 2012b.

States, and others have trained staff and partners on conflict sensitivity tools and processes.<sup>80</sup> Others have appointed a focal point person for conflict sensitivity or create a taskforce to streamline relevant initiatives, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-Operation.<sup>81</sup> Beyond operationalizing conflict sensitivity within their own programs, many organizations share lessons learned, as exemplified by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme's *Lessons Learned: Conflict and Gender Sensitive Programming in Fragile and Conflict Affected Contexts*,<sup>82</sup> or develop broader guidance, as the International Institute for Sustainable Development and Conservation International have done.<sup>83</sup>

## 1.6 Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and conflict

33. **Some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have specific provisions on armed conflict.** Under the 1972 World Heritage Convention, natural heritage that is threatened by the outbreak or threat of an armed conflict can be included in the "list of World Heritage in Danger," a list of property for which major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been requested.<sup>84</sup> The preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity provides that "ultimately, the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity will strengthen friendly relations among States and contribute to peace for humankind." Some MEAs specifically provide that they do not apply during armed conflict,<sup>85</sup> or that their application may be suspended by States Parties.<sup>86</sup>

34. **Regardless of whether an MEA explicitly has provisions explicitly addressing armed conflict, the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) often have to address the effects of armed conflict, fragility, and violence on achieving the objectives of the convention.** COPs have adopted a range of resolutions, plans, and other measures that recognize the risks and opportunities related to armed conflict. Examples include the Convention on Biological Diversity;<sup>87</sup> the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat;<sup>88</sup> the World Heritage Convention;<sup>89</sup> and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).<sup>90</sup> In addition, COP reports include

---

<sup>80</sup> E.g., FAO 2012; Soto 2016; CI 2017.

<sup>81</sup> OECD 2000.

<sup>82</sup> NSRP 2017.

<sup>83</sup> Hammill et al. 2009; CI 2017.

<sup>84</sup> Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, art. 11(4).

<sup>85</sup> E.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, art. 4(5)(a); 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), art. 3(3).

<sup>86</sup> E.g., 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), art. XIX(1).

<sup>87</sup> [Decision 14/8](#), annex IV, para. 5(g); [Decision XI/2](#), para. 27; [Decision XI/3](#), Strategic Goal D, Target 14; [Decision X/35](#), para. 10(a); [Decision X/42](#), para. 24; [Decision VII/5](#), Priority 3.1; [Decision VII/27](#), Action 2.3.3; [Decision V/23](#), Activity 8 (c); [Decision VII/2](#), Activity 8(c); [Addis Ababa Principles](#); [Whakatane Mechanism](#).

<sup>88</sup> [Draft Resolution 18.19](#), para. 52; [Resolution XII/6](#), para. 10; [Resolution XI/12](#), ann. 1; [Resolution X/19](#), paras. 33 and 231; [Resolution X/3](#); [Resolution VIII/31](#), para. 5; [Resolution VIII/36](#), para. 12.

<sup>89</sup> E.g., 42 COM 7 (Emergency Situations Resulting from Conflicts).

<sup>90</sup> E.g., [Conf. 17.4](#); [Conf. 10.10](#).

comments by countries and others experiencing challenges of meeting MEA commitments because of conflict.<sup>91</sup>

**35. Some MEA Secretariats have developed significant initiatives related to peace and conflict.** For example, the Secretariat of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) has launched three major initiatives. In 2007, UNCCD and the African Union launched the Great Green Wall Initiative. By planting trees, restoring degraded land across the Sahel, sequestering carbon, and creating millions of green jobs, the initiative seeks to address resource-driven conflict and migration.<sup>92</sup> In 2016, UNCCD also helped launch, and serves as the secretariat for, the Initiative on Sustainability, Stability and Security, an intergovernmental effort to address the root causes of instability in Africa, focusing on migration and conflict-related degradation of natural resources.<sup>93</sup> The 3S Initiative seeks to create 2 million green jobs for vulnerable groups through investment in restoration and sustainable land management; strengthening access to land and tenure rights in fragile areas; and preventing displacement by improving preparedness and early warning systems for drought and other natural disasters.<sup>94</sup> And in 2020, UNCCD and the Korea Forest Service launched the Peace Forest Initiative to support post-conflict peacebuilding through cooperation and development of forest-related livelihoods.<sup>95</sup>

**36.** The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) launched the Peace and Biodiversity Dialogue Initiative in 2015. This initiative highlighted the value of peace parks both in conserving biodiversity and fostering conditions that help alleviate conflict.<sup>96</sup> It sought to strengthen transboundary management systems and the establishment of regional networks, one of the objectives of CBD COP Decision VII/28.<sup>97</sup> More broadly, this initiative supported efforts to prevent and resolve tensions, including those over access to natural resources, and promoted the resolution of armed conflict and post-conflict reconciliation. Among its many activities, the initiative prepared and delivered a massive open online course (MOOC) on “Peace Park Management and Development,” in which more than 1,000 people enrolled.<sup>98</sup>

**37. In addition to MEAs, key global environmental declarations have long emphasized the importance of peace to environmental protection and sustainable development, and decried the destructive impacts of war.** Paragraph 6 of the preamble to 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment emphasizes the “three basic goals of mankind – protection of the human environment, peace and worldwide economic development,” and in Principle 26 calls for the “elimination and complete destruction of” nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

---

<sup>91</sup> E.g., Ramsar [COP 9](#), paras. 48 (Nepal) and 67 (Democratic Republic of Congo); Ramsar [COP 6](#), para. 71 (Angola); Basel [COP 14 Bureau](#), para 5; Basel [COP 8](#), VI, para. 44; [COP 7](#), VIII, para. 180; Minamata [COP 2](#), I.B, para. 16 and V.D., para. 75; Stockholm COP 8, V.C, para. 94 and D.

<sup>92</sup> UNCCD, [The Great Green Wall Initiative](#).

<sup>93</sup> UNCCD, [Sustainability, Stability, Security \(3S Initiative\)](#).

<sup>94</sup> UNCCD 2018, p.3.

<sup>95</sup> UNCCD, 2020.

<sup>96</sup> PBDI, [Peace and Biodiversity Dialogue Initiative](#).

<sup>97</sup> [Decision COP VII/28](#), Goal 1.3, p.10.

<sup>98</sup> <https://www.learningfornature.org/en/courses/peace-park-development-and-management/>.



destruction.<sup>99</sup> Principle 24 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development declares warfare to be “inherently destructive of sustainable development.”<sup>100</sup> The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration pledges, under Principle 19, to place particular focus on fighting conditions that pose severe threats to sustainable development, including armed conflict, terrorism, and foreign occupation, among others.<sup>101</sup> The 2012 Rio Declaration (“The Future We Want”) reaffirmed “the importance of freedom, peace and security” and emphasized the need to devote specific attention to countries in situations of conflict.<sup>102</sup>

### 1.7 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), conflict, and peace

38. **The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasizes the central role of peace to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):** “There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.”<sup>103</sup> SDG 16 seeks to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.” This is considered a cross-cutting goal, underpinning and reinforcing all the other SDGs.<sup>104</sup>

39. To understand the nature and scope of the relationship between the SDGs and peace and conflict, the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) analyzed each target for the 17 SDGs—a total of 169 targets. For each target, ELI considered whether (1) environmental peacebuilding activities advance the specific target, and (2) activities undertaken to achieve the target advance environmental peacebuilding. In the analysis, the team referred to the literature on and practice of environmental peacebuilding. A conservative view of environmental peacebuilding was adopted, focusing was on violent conflicts. It was recognized that education and healthcare are important factors in peoples’ ability to govern and manage natural resources and the environment in a way that supports peace, but this research focuses on more direct links. If the link is direct, partial contributions were recognized. For instance, SDG 1 seeks to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere.” Environmental peacebuilding might not tackle all the forms of poverty, nor does it do so everywhere; but it does help to generate sustainable livelihoods and helps to end poverty in specific ways and specific places. The results are shown in figure 1.2, with the detailed results in Annex J.

40. **Each SDG is affected by environmental peacebuilding, and every SDG affects the outcomes of environmental peacebuilding.** The strongest links (100 percent in both directions) are with Goal 6 (water and sanitation) and Goal 13 (climate change and its impacts). The weakest linkages are with Goal 3 (healthy lives and well-being), which still has a 22 percent relevance in both directions. Eight of the 17 SDGs have at least a 70 percent synergy with environmental peacebuilding.

---

<sup>99</sup> [Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment](#), pmb., prin. 26.

<sup>100</sup> [Rio Declaration on Environment and Development](#), prin. 24.

<sup>101</sup> [Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development](#), prin. 19.

<sup>102</sup> [The Future We Want](#), arts. 8 and 32.

<sup>103</sup> UN 2015, pmb.

<sup>104</sup> UNDESA 2019.

41. **The vast majority of linkages between SDGs and environmental peacebuilding are mutually reinforcing, but in two instances SDG targets could negatively affect peace and stability, depending on how they are implemented.** For example, target 12.c is to “Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions ... including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies ....”<sup>105</sup> Though important to sustainable development, phasing out harmful subsidies, which has the effect of raising the price of gasoline, needs to be done with sensitivity, because doing so has prompted riots and instability in a range of countries.<sup>106</sup> Target 17.11 is “Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries’ share of global exports by 2020.”<sup>107</sup> Though this is often important to peacebuilding, a political priority on rapid, large-scale extraction of natural resources can lead to land grabbing for commercial agriculture,<sup>108</sup> conflicts with local communities over forests,<sup>109</sup> and conflicts with small-scale miners.<sup>110</sup> These potential tensions between specific measures to advance sustainable development and overall peace highlight the importance of including peace in the conceptualization of sustainable development.

---

<sup>105</sup> UN 2015, Target 12.c.

<sup>106</sup> E.g., MEE 2019 (Egypt); Fassihi 2019 (Iran); Godoy 2017 (Mexico); Helman 2014 (Venezuela); Parker 2012 (Nigeria).

<sup>107</sup> UN 2015, Target 17.11.

<sup>108</sup> Ndi 2017; Dell’Angelo et al. 2017; FAO 2016b.

<sup>109</sup> E.g., Altman et al. 2012; Lamb et al. 2009.

<sup>110</sup> E.g., Katz-Lavigne 2019.

**Figure 1.2: Linkages between Sustainable Development Goals and environmental peacebuilding**



Source: ELI and GEF IEO.

Note: This figure shows the percentage of the targets for a particular Sustainable Development Goal that affects environmental peacebuilding (inner ring of percentages) and the percentage of targets for that Goal that are affected by environmental peacebuilding activities (outer ring of percentages).

## 1.8 Implementing Agency policies, safeguards, and toolkits

42. The GEF executes its mandate through partnerships with designated Implementing Agencies, which develop project proposals and implement projects in collaboration with governments, NGOs, and other stakeholders at the project site.<sup>111</sup> These partnerships are central to the GEF theory of change.<sup>112</sup> While the Implementing Agencies are accountable for fulfilling projects according to the GEF's principles and theory of change, they follow their own policies and safeguards and use their own tools.<sup>113</sup>

43. **At least seven Implementing Agencies have sought to learn from their experiences in fragile and conflict-affected situations, undertaking evaluations of their own programming and producing flagship reports.**<sup>114</sup> One example is IFAD's *Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Situations—Corporate-Level Evaluation*. Learning from programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations is discussed further in chapter 3.<sup>115</sup> As a result of these evaluations, many GEF Implementing Agencies have recognized that working in fragile and conflict-affected settings requires additional considerations and sensitivity.

44. **Half (i.e., nine) of the GEF Implementing Agencies have adopted policies, strategies, and toolkits guiding programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** Box 1.2 lists some of the more prominent examples. The World Bank Group's *Operational Model* includes a policy on "Development Cooperation and Conflict" that lays out the importance of managing conflict-related risks to its mission, its work in relation to conflict, and the principles of operation in such contexts.<sup>116</sup> Some Implementing Agencies have developed Operational Plans, including the Asian Development Bank's *Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*.<sup>117</sup> Others have released guides focusing on environmental issues, such as *Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management*, developed by UNEP, UNDP, and other agencies through the UN Development Group (UNDG).<sup>118</sup> Some agencies have also released some more specialized trainings, as exemplified by the FAO's Programme Clinic on Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions.<sup>119</sup>

### Box 1.2: Conflict-Sensitive Strategies, Policies, and Toolkits of Implementing Agencies

A growing number of GEF Implementing Agencies have adopted strategies, policies, toolkits, and other instruments informing the development of projects in situations affected by conflict and fragility. Following is an illustrative list:

<sup>111</sup> See GEF 2019a, para. 2; GEF 2017b ; <https://www.thegef.org/partners/gef-agencies>.

<sup>112</sup> GEF 2009a, p. 3.

<sup>113</sup> GEF 2019a, ann. D.

<sup>114</sup> See box 3.1 and paras. 192-201.

<sup>115</sup> IFAD 2015.

<sup>116</sup> World Bank Group 2014.

<sup>117</sup> ADB 2013b.

<sup>118</sup> UNDG 2013.

<sup>119</sup> See FAO 2002.

- **African Development Bank**
  - [Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States](#) (2002)
- **Asian Development Bank**
  - [Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) (2013)
  - [Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations](#) (2013)
  - [A Peacebuilding Tool for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development: A Pilot Initiative in Nepal](#) (2012)
- **Conservation International**
  - [Environmental Peacebuilding Training Manual](#) (2017)
- **Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**
  - [Guide to Context Analysis Informing FAO Decision-Making: Approached to Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts](#) (2019)
  - [The Program Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions – Approaches to Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts](#) (2019)
  - [Corporate Framework to Support Sustainable Peace in the Context of Agenda 2030](#) (2018)
  - [Collaborative Conflict Management for Enhance Nation Forest Programmes \(NFPS\)](#) (2012)
  - [Conflict Management Over Natural Resources](#) (2006)
  - Community-Based Forest Resource Conflict Management: A Training Package, [Vol. I](#), [Vol. II](#) (2002)
- **International Fund for Agricultural Development**
  - [Disaster Early Recovery Guidelines](#) (2011)
  - [IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery](#) (2006)
- **International Union for Conservation of Nature**
  - [Environment, Conflict, and Security – TECS Conflict Sensitive Adaptation Series](#) (2014)
- **United Nations Development Programme**
  - [The Peace Promise](#) (2016)
  - [Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings](#) (2013) (through UN Development Group)
  - [Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management](#) (2012) (through UN Framework Team on Protective Action) [Conflict-related Development Analysis \(CDA\)](#) (2003)
- **United Nations Environmental Programme**
  - [Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings](#) (2013) (through UNDG)
  - [Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management](#) (2012) (through UN Framework Team on Protective Action)
  - [Integrating Environment in Post-Conflict Needs Assessment](#) (2009)
- **World Bank Group**
  - [World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2050](#) (2020a)
  - [A Practical Handbook for Environmental Regulations and Legislators Working in Situations Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Extreme Violence \(FCV\)](#) (2018)
  - [Strategic Environmental Assessment: Capacity Building in Conflict-Affected Countries](#) (2005) (with Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment)

45. **At least 11 Implementing Agencies have started to incorporate considerations of conflict and fragility into their safeguards and associated procedures,**<sup>120</sup> in part because populations in fragile and conflict-affected situations are more vulnerable. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) *Environmental and Social Policy Framework* cautions that:

In conflict and post-conflict areas, the risks and impacts described in this ESPS may be greater. The risk that a project could exacerbate an already sensitive local situation, leading to an increase in the risk of personal or communal conflict, or stress scarce local resources, should be considered carefully, as it may lead to further conflict and increased threats to human security.<sup>121</sup>

It also notes the particular risk of gender-based violence in situations of communal conflict.<sup>122</sup> The African Development Bank (AfDB) safeguards require conflict to be considered in the development of Country Strategy Papers and Regional Integration Strategy Papers.<sup>123</sup> The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) requires consideration of the conflict context when preparing a Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures preparatory study for results-based country strategic opportunities programs.<sup>124</sup> Several GEF funded projects that raised safeguard issues were implemented in fragile and conflict-affected situations. An earlier evaluation by the GEF IEO found that the World Bank Inspection Panel received five complaints that GEF projects had not complied with the World Bank safeguards.<sup>125</sup> All five were in fragile situations (although the IEO did not comment on that fact).<sup>126</sup> Similarly, recent GEF projects that triggered complaints to UNDP's Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (SECU) were also in four fragile states.<sup>127</sup> These complaints were regarding safeguards that did not relate directly to conflict sensitivity; but it is noteworthy that all seven complaints of GEF projects violating Implementing Agency safeguards were all in fragile situations.

46. **Implementing Agency safeguards recognize that projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations can aggravate tensions and generate conflict.** For example, UNDP's *Social and Environmental Screening Procedure* provides that environmental and social impacts that "may give rise to significant social conflict" are categorized as "critical" (highest risk rating) during the screening process.<sup>128</sup> UNDP's Social and Environmental Risk Screening Checklist asks,

---

<sup>120</sup> These include: the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the West African Development Bank, the World Bank Group, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature.

<sup>121</sup> IDB 2020, p. 61.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>123</sup> AfDB 2015, p. 33.

<sup>124</sup> IFAD 2017, pp. 44 and 65.

<sup>125</sup> GEF IEO 2018b, p. 24.

<sup>126</sup> These include Brazil (warning), India (warning), Kenya (alert), Mexico (warning), and Peru (warning).

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., pp. 24-25 (India (warning)); Accountability Counsel and Conservation Alliance Tanawthari 2019 (Myanmar (alert)); UNDP SECU n.d.a (Cameroon (alert)); UNDP SECU n.d.b (Republic of Congo (alert)).

<sup>128</sup> UNDP 2016a, p. 17.

“Is there a risk that the Project would exacerbate *conflicts* among and/or the risk of violence to project-affected communities and individuals?” IFAD highlights a range of linkages between conflict and disease, climate change, and the environment,<sup>129</sup> and notes that projects can lead to conflicts, sometimes “serious,” for example, over resource rights.<sup>130</sup>

**47. Implementing Agency safeguards also recognize that it may be difficult for normal procedures and approaches to be undertaken during in contexts of fragility and conflict.** For example, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) notes that “particular challenges” in times of conflict and crisis may, for example, mean that UNIDO’s commitment to transparency may be mitigated and “sensitive information relative to the political/economic contexts may need to remain confidential.”<sup>131</sup> The Asian Development Bank (ADB) similarly recognizes that usual processes and documents may not be “feasible” in “fragile and conflict-affected environments,” and provides for alternative means of meeting the relevant safeguards.<sup>132</sup>

**48. Implementing Agency safeguards pay particular attention to incorporating consideration of fragility and conflict into risk analyses and screening.** For example, IDB<sup>133</sup> and the World Bank<sup>134</sup> include conflict as a factor in determining project risk classification, and AfDB includes conflict as a factor in determining social vulnerability.<sup>135</sup> In risk analysis for due diligence, the World Bank Group requires consideration of “threats to human security through the escalation of personal, communal or interstate conflict, crime or violence” and “risks related to conflict or contestation over land and natural resources.”<sup>136</sup> In categorizing risk, “considerations relating to stability, conflict or security” are considered.<sup>137</sup> Conflict is also a factor in the initial environmental and social screening under AfDB safeguards.<sup>138</sup> UNDP’s *Social and Environmental Screening Procedure* provides that “changes in the Project context” such as armed conflict “that alter[] the Project’s risk profile” may necessitate amending completed screenings.<sup>139</sup> IDB requires consideration of “stability, conflict, or security” and “risks related to conflict or contestation over land and natural resources” during risk analysis.<sup>140</sup> Other safeguards—and the screening procedures designed to ensure compliance with the safeguards—flag conflict-affected situations as high risk. For example, the Development Bank of Latin America includes conflict as a factor that automatically indicates high environmental and social impact potential,<sup>141</sup> UNDP includes conflict in a list of critical (intensity level 5/5) social

---

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., pp. 94, 107.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., pp. 140, 143, 144, 152, 164, 172, 174.

<sup>131</sup> UNIDO 2017, p. 23.

<sup>132</sup> ADB 2013c, para. 51; ADB 2009, p. 67.

<sup>133</sup> IDB 2020, p. 13, para. 3.16.

<sup>134</sup> World Bank 2017, p. 6, para. 20.

<sup>135</sup> AfDB 2015, annex 2 (Environmental and Social Screening: Categorisation), pp. 39, 40; see generally AfDB 2013.

<sup>136</sup> World Bank Group 2017, p. 4, para. 4(b); see also *ibid.*, pp. 19-20, para. 28(b).

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6, para 20.

<sup>138</sup> AfDB 2015, p. 40.

<sup>139</sup> UNDP 2016a, p. 8.

<sup>140</sup> IBRD 2020, paras. 3.17 and 9.

<sup>141</sup> CAF 2015, p. 12, para. V.4.1.

impacts,<sup>142</sup> and the World Wildlife Fund deems projects in fragile or conflict-affected situations to be “special consideration cases.”<sup>143</sup> Some Implementing Agencies specifically interrogate how conflict affects indigenous communities.

49. **Implementing Agency safeguards encourage the use of conflict analysis.** For example, the World Bank Group, UNDP, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa call for the use of social and conflict analysis, with IFAD calling for an “in-depth” conflict analysis.<sup>144</sup>

50. **Implementing Agency safeguards call for stakeholder consultation and engagement to manage risks related to conflict and fragility.** For example, IFAD calls for consultation to manage conflict-related risks.<sup>145</sup> Consultation can affect conflict-related risks; it can also be affected by conflict.<sup>146</sup>

51. **Some Implementing Agencies provide that the safeguards applying to involuntary resettlement do not apply to people displaced by conflict.** The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development notes that Performance Requirement 5, which covers involuntary resettlement, does not apply to “the settlement of refugees, internally displaced persons, and victims of natural disasters, conflict, crime or violence,” and that “In cases where there has been displacement as a result of conflict prior to Project-induced displacement, the involuntary resettlement process will be guided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).”<sup>147</sup> The World Bank Group has a similar provision in its safeguards.<sup>148</sup> More broadly, AfDB considers local conflicts in relation to relocation.<sup>149</sup>

52. **At the same time, Implementing Agencies provide that their safeguards for indigenous peoples applies to those who have been forcibly displaced by conflict.** Examples include the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IDB, and the West African Development Bank.<sup>150</sup>

53. **The GEF safeguards make only one mention of conflict, and it lacks detail.** The current GEF safeguards have numerous provisions regarding grievance and conflict resolution.<sup>151</sup> These are important provisions, but they focus on conflicts around a project, rather than the conflict context in which a project is designed and implemented. The sole mention of conflict context is in Minimum Standard 9, on Community Health, Safety, and Security. Paragraph 17(a)(iii) provides that

---

<sup>142</sup> UNDP 2016a, p. 17, table 2.

<sup>143</sup> WWF 2019, p. 17.

<sup>144</sup> World Bank Group, p. 23, para. 5(e); UNDP 2016a, p. 23; DBSA 2018, p. 24, para. 1.3.3; IFAD 2017, p. 165.

<sup>145</sup> IFAD 2017, p. 166.

<sup>146</sup> DBSA 2018, p. 31, para. 2.3.1.

<sup>147</sup> EBRD 2019, p. 42.

<sup>148</sup> World Bank Group 2017, ESS 5, p. 55, para. 9.

<sup>149</sup> AfDB 2015, p. 71.

<sup>150</sup> WBG 2017, ESS 7, p. 77, para. 9; EBRD 2019, p. 61; IDB 2020, p. 86; BOAD 2018, OP 8, p. 154, para. 4 and fn. 94.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, annex I.A, paras. 5-6; see also *ibid.*, annex I, paras 15, 17, 18.



Agencies demonstrate that they have in place the necessary policies, procedures, systems and capabilities to ensure that: (a) Where the screening or assessment processes described under Minimum Standard 1 identify risks or potential impacts to the health, safety and security of project- or program-affected communities, further assessments are carried out, considering: ... (iii) The particular risks that may be present in a conflict or post-conflict context; ....<sup>152</sup>

This safeguard lacks a holistic recognition of the way that conflicts might be linked to the environment and natural resources. It provides no procedures for identifying, evaluating, or deciding how to manage the risks in a conflict or post-conflict context. It provides no standards regarding management of the conflict-related risks. It is silent on the risks associated with fragility, thus failing to provide any safeguards relevant to fragility in situations that are not “conflict or post-conflict.” The safeguard seems to apply only during the design stage, whereas situations affected by conflict and fragility are dynamic and can change rapidly, and it is necessary for conflict sensitivity to apply throughout the project life cycle.

### 1.9 GEF objectives and theory of change

54. **The GEF seeks to assist countries in implementing their commitments under specific multilateral environmental agreements, and thereby advance global environmental benefits.**<sup>153</sup> The GEF was established in 1991 as a financial mechanism to support implementation of the various emerging agreements and conventions, especially in developing countries. The GEF initially providing assistance in four focal areas: climate change, biodiversity, ozone depletion, and international waters. The basic mission, then, was “to provide concessionary and additional funding of the incremental costs for achieving global environmental benefits” in these four focal areas.<sup>154</sup> The scope of GEF programming has since expanded to include additional focal areas and impact programs.

55. **According to the GEF-7 Programming Strategy, the “GEF’s mission is to safeguard the global environment by supporting developing countries in meeting their commitments to multiple environmental conventions and by creating and enhancing partnerships at national, regional and global scales.”**<sup>155</sup> The GEF’s formal mandate, however, remains to operate “as a financing mechanism under the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Minamata Convention, and the Stockholm Convention, and [to support] countries with economies in transition in their implementation of the Montreal Protocol.”<sup>156</sup> In addition, while the GEF does not serve as a financial mechanism for the SDGs,

---

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., annex I.A, para. 17(a)(iii).

<sup>153</sup> GEF 2012.

<sup>154</sup> GEF 2016.

<sup>155</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 2.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.


its activities advance the SDGs and are linked to them through their synergies with the Conventions.<sup>157</sup>

56. The GEF IEO developed a General Framework for the GEF’s theory of change based on past evaluative evidence, which states:

GEF support is provided to activities that directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of environmental status and/or address drivers of environmental degradation. Based on past evaluative evidence, the framework classifies the contributions of GEF support into three main categories: knowledge and information, institutional capacity, and implementing strategies. These areas of GEF support interact, complement, and reinforce each other; and collectively contribute to impact, usually at a low scale (i.e., only at sites within the project’s direct influence), in the form of environmental stress reduction and improved environmental status. In many cases, the GEF contributes to putting in place conditions enabling progress toward impact. Impact may occur immediately as a result of project activities, but more often than not, the social or ecological system the project aims to influence may manifest change years or even decades after the project is completed, especially if large-scale impact is the aim.<sup>158</sup>

57. The framework for the GEF theory of change (figure 1.3) assesses how GEF activities affect the causality chain leading to global environmental benefits, links GEF activities to other activities and actors, and “identif[ies] constraints on further GEF contributions to progress towards [global environmental benefits].”<sup>159</sup>

**Figure 1.3: General framework for the GEF theory of change**



Source: GEF IEO.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., pp. 2, 5.

<sup>158</sup> GEF IEO 2014, pp. 47-48.

<sup>159</sup> GEF IEO 2012b.

58. The STAP guidance suggests the establishment of focal area-specific theories of change based on a systems approach such as the Resilience, Adaptation Pathways, and Transformation Approach framework that emphasizes the “GEF’s goals of being *transformative* and *durable*.”<sup>160</sup>

59. **With respect to the theory of change, conflict and fragility are most often potential constraints.** Conflict and fragility can interact with projects both through (1) their impacts on a project’s implementation and (2) the effects that a project may have on the conflict or fragile context. While the GEF recognizes that many contextual factors are beyond its control, GEF programs are intentionally selected and “designed to support fundamental changes” and cause “a large-scale and sustainable impact, subject to the quality of implementation/execution and supportive contextual conditions,” according to the theory of change.<sup>161</sup> This evaluation highlights the numerous ways that conflict and fragility can affect GEF projects and their outcomes, as well as the ways that GEF projects can affect the context in which they are operating—for better, or for worse.

60. **The STAP highlights that given the prevalence of fragility and conflict in the GEF portfolio countries, conflict and fragility should be considered an essential contextual factor affecting the GEF’s ability to achieve fundamental change or large-scale and sustainable impact.** In 2018, the GEF’s STAP published *Environmental Security: Dimensions and Priorities* following its 2014 recommendation that the GEF lend more attention to the issue of environmental security. The report noted that “conflict, irrespective of its source, affects the viability or sustainability of investments in environmental protection,”<sup>162</sup> concluding that “addressing environmental security in an explicit, consistent and integrated manner is essential to delivering global environmental benefits, including the long-term sustainability of project investments.”<sup>163</sup> The STAP report also recommended that the GEF: “(1) Explicitly address environmental security in project and program design ... ; (2) Assess conflict risk routinely among investment risks beyond the scope of GEF intervention ... ; (3) Evaluate the relationships between environmental change and vulnerability within GEF interventions through the use of tools such as the Resilience, Adaptation Pathways and Transformation Assessment (RAPTA) framework ... ; [and] (4) Contribute to conflict prevention through environmental cooperation.”<sup>164</sup>

61. **To achieve the desired transformational change and advance global environmental benefits, the GEF works through Implementing Agencies and national partners,<sup>165</sup> which have increasingly recognized the importance of conflict and fragility to environmental programming.** As this evaluation emphasizes, environmental programming and fragility and conflict are linked in many important ways, and the GEF Implementing Agencies increasingly (but do not uniformly) recognize these linkages and have adopted means for conflict-sensitive

---

<sup>160</sup> GEF STAP 2019, p. 6.

<sup>161</sup> GEF IEO 2017, para. 3.

<sup>162</sup> GEF STAP 2018, p. 3.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> GEF 2019a.

programming. However, the GEF does not yet have any policies, toolkits, or institutional mechanisms to help interventions be more conflict-sensitive and thus achieve their desired impacts.

### 1.10 GEF interventions and conflict

62. In accordance with its mandate to support countries implementing their commitments under specific Conventions, the GEF supports projects in five focal areas. Focal area strategies are established for each GEF Replenishment period and incorporate guidance from Conventions,<sup>166</sup> recommendations from the GEF's Overall Performance Studies, and the national priorities of recipient countries.<sup>167</sup> In addition to the focal areas, impact programs contribute to the GEF's aim of supporting transformational change by addressing cross-cutting challenges and integrated solutions that do not correspond narrowly to one focal area.<sup>168</sup> In GEF-7, there are three impact programs: food systems, land use, and restoration; sustainable cities; and sustainable forest management.<sup>169</sup> The focal areas and impact programs in which the GEF operates are exposed and sensitive to risks posed by conflict and fragility. Drawing on the focal area strategies as expressed in the GEF-7 Programming Strategy document and on experiences from the field, this section illustrates how programming in each focal area may interact with conflict dynamics.

63. In the **Biodiversity** focal area, projects are designed to “mainstream biodiversity across sectors as well as landscapes and seascapes; address direct drivers to protect habitats and species; and further develop biodiversity policy and institutional frameworks.”<sup>170</sup> Biodiverse areas have high overlap with conflict. From 1950 to 2000, more than 80 percent of major armed conflicts (i.e., conflicts with at least 1,000 battle deaths) took place in biodiversity hotspots, and more than 90 percent of these conflicts took place in countries with biodiversity hotspots (figure 1.4).<sup>171</sup> These biodiversity hotspots cover 2.3 percent of the earth's surface, but they host half of the endemic species.<sup>172</sup> Though conflict can harm biodiversity, peace agreements are often followed by opening of biodiverse territory to in-migration by people seeking livelihoods and food security, as has been witnessed in Colombia following the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).<sup>173</sup>

64. **Of the 1,458 country-level biodiversity projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 567 (38.9 percent) were in countries affected by major armed conflict, and 1202 (82.4 percent) were in fragile situations.**<sup>174</sup> For example, several of the national child projects of the GEF-funded Global Wildlife Program (Phase 1 and Phase 2) are in conflict-affected and

---

<sup>166</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 7.

<sup>167</sup> GEF 2015.

<sup>168</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 7.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76-130.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>171</sup> Hanson et al. 2009.


<sup>172</sup> Mittermeier 2004, pp. 29, 32.

<sup>173</sup> GEF IEO 2019b, p. 31; Armenteras et al. 2018; Prem et al. 2020.

<sup>174</sup> 263 were in “alert” situations, and 939 were in “warning” situations.

fragile situations identified on the World Bank Harmonized List, and some of these were delayed or otherwise affected by conflict.<sup>175</sup>

**Figure 1.4: Conflict Hotspots and Location of GEF Projects and GEF-Supported Protected Areas (1989-2020)**



Source: GEF IEO, using conflict data (through October 2020) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, project locations from GEF IEO data, and protected area boundaries from the World Database on Protected Areas. The map shows 1230 GEF supported protected areas and 202 land degradation and multi-focal area projects that could be precisely located.

65. **Efforts to conserve biodiversity can exacerbate tensions with communities, especially when those communities are excluded from protected areas and when enforcement agents are militarized.** This occurred, for example, during a project in Cameroon (not financed by the GEF), where eco-guards who were recruited, trained, paid, and outfitted with weapons by the project were found to be conducting violent nighttime raids in the surrounding Baka communities.<sup>176</sup> Tensions can also be exacerbated when biodiversity conservation activities take place on land that contains land, minerals, or other natural resources that people want to use. The results of such aggravations can be observed throughout the course of the GEF project on “Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains” in Cambodia. The project took place in an area formerly controlled by the Khmer Rouge in which there were existing conflicts over land appropriations, corruption, and illegal resource

<sup>175</sup> E.g., World Bank Group 2020e, p. 34 (Mali).

<sup>176</sup> Baker and Warren 2019; Lang 2017.

extraction. The Terminal Evaluation found that the project had “not sufficiently addressed” the limited institutional capacity, the rivalries over illegal logging, or the incorporation of conservation into the development agenda.<sup>177</sup> The subsequent rivalry and lack of coordination between governmental authorities as well as gang activity caused regular conflict at the site, leading to several project delays, activity cancellations, and the deaths of two park rangers.

66. **GEF Climate Change** interventions aim to “promote innovation and technology transfer for sustainable energy breakthroughs; demonstrate mitigation options with systemic impacts; and foster enabling conditions for mainstreaming mitigation concerns into sustainable development strategies.”<sup>178</sup> Of the 1,836 country-level climate change projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 810 (44.1 percent) were in countries affected by major armed conflict, and 1574 (85.7 percent) were in fragile situations.<sup>179</sup> Many conflict-affected countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change: of the 10 countries with the most peacekeeping personnel, 8 are classified as “most exposed” to climate change.<sup>180</sup> As this report details, GEF interventions are often affected by the fragile and conflict context, and a substantial number of GEF climate change interventions are in these settings—particularly in Least Developed Countries.

67. **Climate change interventions can also affect a fragile situation and exacerbate conflict.** Both adaptation and mitigation measures can result in “winners” and “losers.”<sup>181</sup> These may inadvertently lead to disputes over access to benefits (such as revenues) and burdens (such as forests that can no longer be harvested); it may also lead to land grabbing.<sup>182</sup> There is also evidence that climate change may directly amplify the effects of conflict.

68. The **Land Degradation** focal area strategy for GEF-7 has three main goals of “aligning GEF support to promote UNCCD’s Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) concept through an appropriate mix of investments; seeking effective integration within the Impact Programs for generation of multiple benefits; and harnessing private capital and expertise to finance investments in sustainable land management, in particular in co-operation with the LDN fund and other innovative financing mechanisms.”<sup>183</sup> The strategy acknowledges the “increasing evidence of the complex interactions between climate change, food and water insecurity, extreme events—such as e.g. prolonged and repeated droughts—, and their link to fragility, armed conflict and migration,”<sup>184</sup> and seeks to “positively [reinforce] the linkages between human well-being and the health of ecosystems.”<sup>185</sup> The strategy also directs investments toward “(i) decreasing fragility and risks through enhancing governance of natural resources, including e.g. tenure and access rights (including potential uneven rights across gender and

---

<sup>177</sup> Project 1086, [Terminal Evaluation](#).

<sup>178</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 36.

<sup>179</sup> 379 were in “alert” situations, and 1195 were in “warning” situations.

<sup>180</sup> Krampe 2019, p. 2.

<sup>181</sup> Dabelko et al. 2013.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 47.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

ethnic groups) and/or decreasing resource pressures and enhancing natural resource based employment and livelihoods; (ii) restoring governance and degraded lands and water sources in post-natural disaster and/or conflict prone or conflict affected areas (with special attention to unemployed youth, women and other vulnerable or marginalized groups); and (iii) global early warning to identifying early signs where a combination of environmental risks are contributing to fragility and conflict vulnerability and sharing this knowledge to promote preventive or remedial actions as appropriate armed conflict and migration.”<sup>186</sup> As with other focal areas, land degradation and efforts to address land degradation can be affected by conflict and fragility, and they can affect conflict and fragility.<sup>187</sup> Of the 315 country-level land degradation projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 115 (36.5 percent) were in countries affected by major armed conflict, and 260 (82.5 percent) were in fragile situations.<sup>188</sup>

**69. GEF interventions that advance alternative land use schemes have faced challenges in areas where land use is disputed, affecting both project effectiveness and sustainability.**<sup>189</sup>

Conflict between the Tuareg ethnic group and the government of Niger erupted while a GEF-funded project on “Sustainable Co-Management of the Natural Resources of the Air-Ténéré Complex” was ongoing.<sup>190</sup> Although land commissions had been put in place to improve governance and management of localized land-based tensions, there were no measures to manage larger-scale armed conflict. As a result, project costs increased substantially, causing the project activities to be scaled back, weakening coordination between project stakeholders, and reducing profits for local cooperatives as a result of free food distribution. Ultimately, questions were raised about the sustainability of project outcomes in an area affected by weak institutions and conflict.<sup>191</sup>

**70. GEF interventions in the International Waters focal area have a unique mandate to “support transboundary cooperation in shared marine and freshwater ecosystems,”**<sup>192</sup> recognizing the centrality of multinational collaboration to achieving its objectives of “strengthening Blue Economy opportunities ... ; improving management in the Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ); and enhancing water security.”<sup>193</sup> Even as International Waters interventions seek to advance global environmental benefits, this emphasis on cooperation around mutual interests in international waters is unique among the GEF focal areas. Of the 84 country-level International Waters projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 29 (34.5 percent) were in countries affected by major armed conflict, and 70 (83.3 percent) were in fragile situations.<sup>194</sup> The numbers of country-level projects are relatively low, because most International Waters projects are regional or global.

---

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. p. 52.

<sup>187</sup> E.g., Solomon et al. 2018; Barbut and Alexander 2016; van Schaik and Dinnessen 2014.

<sup>188</sup> 69 were in “alert” situations, and 191 were in “warning” situations.

<sup>189</sup> GEF IEO 2017b.

<sup>190</sup> Project 2380, [Terminal Evaluation](#).

<sup>191</sup> Morrow 2018.

<sup>192</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 55.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> 9 were in “alert” situations, and 61 were in “warning” situations.



71. **GEF programming in both freshwater and marine areas often brings together States who have fought with one another, and there are often residual tensions.** Many international basins where the GEF supports projects—including those of the Jordan, Nile, and Sava Rivers—encompass countries affected by conflict or in tension with one another. The GEF also frequently supports efforts in large marine ecosystems that are affected by tensions and conflict, such as in the South China Sea, where evaluations have identified conflict as a challenge to effective project implementation.<sup>195</sup>

72. The GEF-7 Programming Directions recognize that **water scarcity is linked to “risk multipliers leading to destabilization, violence and migration as well as possible ground for radicalization spurring further conflict on national and regional levels,”** and recognize the need to prioritize investment in cooperation initiatives that seek to diminish water-related conflict.<sup>196</sup> The GEF-7 strategy directly orients itself to supporting environmental security by enabling investments in fragile and conflict-affected countries in transboundary basins so as to “support actions by which decreasing natural resource pressures and water stress can contribute to decreasing fragility ... hence contributing to preventing larger regional conflict.”<sup>197</sup>

73. The GEF-7 Strategy for the **Chemicals and Waste** focal area is organized around four programs: the Industrial Chemicals Program, the Agriculture Chemicals Program, the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States Program, and the Enabling Actions Program. The GEF-7 Replenishment is also the first new replenishment since the Minamata Convention entered into force, and as such various programs emphasize its implementation. Several countries participating in the GEF-supported flagship planetGOLD program on artisanal and small-scale gold mining have identified conflict as an issue. Of the 157 country-level Chemicals and Waste projects supported by the GEF through 2019, 63 (40.1 percent) were in countries affected by major armed conflict, and 144 (91.7 percent) were in fragile situations.<sup>198</sup>

74. **Chemicals and Waste interventions can interact with fragile and conflict-affected situations by being affected by the situation, by affecting the situation, and by addressing impacts of the situation.** As with other focal areas, GEF-supported Chemicals and Waste projects can be affected by fragility and conflict in many ways (chapter 3). When pollution from chemicals, waste, oil, mining, and other toxic substances is substantial, widespread, or severe—especially where the impacts are inequitably felt—it can catalyze social or violent conflict.<sup>199</sup> At the same time, pollution and governance breakdowns associated with armed conflict have provided motivation for a number of GEF projects.<sup>200</sup>

---

<sup>195</sup> GEF IEO 2012a.

<sup>196</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 54.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>198</sup> 29 were in “alert” situations, and 115 were in “warning” situations.

<sup>199</sup> E.g., The New Humanitarian 2006 (Côte D’Ivoire); Babatunde 2020 (Niger Delta); Regan 1998 (Bougainville, Papua New Guinea).

<sup>200</sup> E.g., Projects 3160 (Democratic Republic of Congo), 4108 (Lebanon), and 4124 (Jordan).



75. **Several GEF Integrated Approach Pilots recognize conflict and fragility as an issue.** For instance, the Food Integrated Approach Pilot<sup>201</sup> focused on Sub-Saharan Africa has several child projects in countries with insecurity and conflict situations, such as northern Ethiopia. The Taking Deforestation out of Commodity Supply Chains Integrated Approach Pilot,<sup>202</sup> where post-conflict Liberia has a child project, recognizes different dimensions of conflict.

76. **The three GEF impact programs as well as geographic emphases on the Amazon, drylands, tropics, and Congo Basin all have linkages to conflict and fragility.** There are three impact programs in GEF-7: (1) the Food Systems, Land Use, and Restoration Impact Program; (2) the Sustainable Cities Impact Program; and (3) the Sustainable Forest Management Impact Program. Considering the substantial percentage of the GEF portfolio—as measured both by the number of projects and overall expenditure—that are in fragile and conflict-affected situations, it is likely that many of the impact program interventions will be in these types of situations; as such, they will interact with conflict drivers through the same mechanisms as do the focal areas.

77. The **Food Systems, Land Use, and Restoration Impact Program** aims to address the “underlying drivers of unsustainable food systems and land use change through supporting countries to take a more holistic and system-wide approach that is in line with their specific needs for generating Global Environmental Benefits.”<sup>203</sup> Many fragile and conflict-affected countries struggle with unsustainable food systems and land use change.

78. The **Sustainable Cities Impact Program** seeks to promote integrated urban planning to address the manifold sustainability challenges that are confronted and created in urban areas. The GEF-7 strategy for this program acknowledges that conflict- and climate-induced displacement has accelerated urbanization, exacerbating the interlocked social and environmental issues that erupt in cities.<sup>204</sup> Cities present a variety of sustainability challenges; they also provide an opportunity for programs to adopt an integrated approach capable of addressing both social and environmental factors.

79. **The Sustainable Forest Management Impact Program, particularly with the GEF’s geographic foci in the Amazon, drylands, and the Congo Basin, illustrates the high overlap of biodiverse areas and conflict hotspots.** The variety of roles that forests can take in armed conflict—including as a source of financing,<sup>205</sup> as cover for guerrilla groups,<sup>206</sup> as refuges and sources of fuel and food for displaced persons,<sup>207</sup> and as targets of war<sup>208</sup>—can complicate the design and implementation of forest-related interventions in conflict-affected situations. One

---

<sup>201</sup> <https://www.thegef.org/project/food-iap-fostering-sustainability-and-resilience-food-security-sub-saharan-africa-integrated>.

<sup>202</sup> <https://www.thegef.org/project/comm-iap-taking-deforestation-out-commodity-supply-chains-iap-program>.

<sup>203</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 80.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>205</sup> E.g., Price et al. 2007.

<sup>206</sup> E.g., FAO 2005; Price 2003.

<sup>207</sup> E.g., FAO and UNHCR 2018.

<sup>208</sup> E.g., Westing 1971; McNeely 2003; Jongerden et al. 2006; Metreveli and Timothy 2010.

example of this is the way in which rebel M23 forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo took control of gorilla tourism in the Virunga Mountains to finance their operations.<sup>209</sup> The GEF-7 Strategy for this impact program acknowledges conflict in its discussion of the Congo Basin Sustainable Landscapes Program, noting that “violence, fragility, insecurity, and various related traffics severely [weaken] the rule of law, and [have] devastating effects on capacities to manage forests, protected areas, and protect wildlife.”<sup>210</sup> It also proposes establishing “landscape level mechanisms ... for conflict resolution between different land users and across national boundaries.”<sup>211</sup>

### **1.11 Methodology**

**80. This evaluation assesses the impacts of conflict and fragility on the design and implementation** of GEF interventions on three scales: globally, at the country and regional levels, and at the project level. It also assesses the impacts of efforts to make GEF interventions conflict-sensitive. The analysis draws upon both quantitative and qualitative methods.<sup>212</sup>

**81. At the global level, the evaluation examined the full GEF portfolio, looking at a variety of dimensions.** It considered the extent, nature, and results of GEF-funded interventions in countries affected by fragility and major armed conflict vis-à-vis other countries. This analysis included projects that were dropped, cancelled, and withdrawn. The projects in the GEF’s full portfolio were sorted by country to compare Terminal Evaluation scores, delay times, and cancellation rates in countries affected by major armed conflict compared with other countries. The evaluation also explored the GEF’s engagement over time in countries listed on the Fragile States Index and the World Bank’s Harmonized Index to look at fragility more broadly beyond major armed conflict. The evaluation surveyed the approaches to conflict and to conflict sensitivity adopted by GEF Implementing Agencies, Secretariats of the MEAs that it serves, and other peer institutions. Safeguard policies, guidance documents for operating in conflict-affected settings, and peacebuilding initiatives from the Implementing Agencies and MEA Secretariats were reviewed for conflict-sensitive approaches among GEF-associated institutions. Toolkits, guides, and gray literature from other organizations involved in international development and specifically environmental programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility were examined with particular attention to conflict-sensitive strategies. The quantitative results of the global analysis are presented in the second section of this evaluation, and the qualitative results inform the third section.

**82. The evaluation selected seven situations of focus using the criteria of regional diversity, presence of major armed conflict since 1989, geographic scope and temporal aspects of conflict, number of GEF projects and amount of GEF support, diversity of GEF projects, involvement in GEF-7 Impact Programs, and diversity of situation scales.** Based on these criteria, Afghanistan, the Albertine Rift (including parts of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), the Balkans (including Bosnia-

---

<sup>209</sup> Jones 2012.


<sup>210</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 122.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>212</sup> Additional information on the methodological approach is available at paras. 85-90 and Annexes E, F, G, and H.

Herzegovina, Croatia, (North) Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia), Cambodia, Colombia, Lebanon, and Mali were selected as the seven situations of focus (figure 1.5). In each situation, the evaluation team reviewed the available project documents for all projects in the situation and then selected 6-10 illustrative projects for further analysis. The findings from this analysis are presented chiefly in the third section of this evaluation.

**Figure 1.5: GEF Case Study Situations and Conflict (1989-2020)**



*Source:* GEF IEO, using conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (through October 2020).

83. **At the most granular level of analysis, the evaluation reviewed individual projects in depth.** For each of the illustrative projects selected for a particular situation, it examined project documents, analytic review of data, materials from Implementing Agencies, coverage by third parties, and interviews with key personnel. This review sought to understand the context for the project, ascertain how the project managed (or did not manage) the various risks associated with conflict and fragility, and determine how conflict and fragility affected the project. The findings from this analysis are presented chiefly in the third section of this evaluation.

## 2. GEF INTERVENTIONS IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS

84. This chapter examines the prevalence of fragile and conflict-affected situations in the GEF portfolio and summarizes the results of quantitative analyses of the effect of fragility and major armed conflict on performance of GEF projects.

## 2.1 Methodology

85. The research team examined the dataset of projects provided by the GEF IEO (Project Management Information System [PMIS]), which includes both projects that do and do not appear in the GEF’s public online database,<sup>213</sup> so as to gain a broad understanding of the GEF-supported interventions in countries of varying states of fragility. The project used the Fragile States Index produced by the Fund for Peace, which has used a consistent methodology since 2004. The Fragile States Index includes the vast majority of countries receiving GEF funding. [By contrast, the World Bank’s List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations has a more limited geographic scope and its analytic methodology has changed repeatedly.] As noted below, the Fragile States Index has four broad categories of fragility: alert (very fragile), warning (of concern), stable (mostly stable), and sustainable (very stable). The research team analyzed 149 of the 164 countries listed in Annex E (“Fragility of States and Territories Receiving GEF funding”).<sup>214</sup> The team then examined whether there was a statistically significant relationship between its fragility classification (“significant,” “stable,” “warning,” and “alert”) and its performance (including whether a GEF project was cancelled or dropped<sup>215</sup> and the binary scores received for evaluation criteria in the Terminal Evaluation Reports [TERs]).

86. For the analysis of the effect of fragility on GEF projects, a preliminary review of the fragility classification over the period 2006–19) was performed, and the country was assigned the most commonly occurring classification. Through June 2019, there were 4,136 country-level projects in the database in 149 countries classified as “significant,” “stable,” “warning,” and “alert.” However, no country had a “significant” classification that predominated over the time period of interest, so only the three remaining classifications were used: 12 percent (500 projects) were in “stable” situations indicating that the countries were mostly stable, 67 percent (2,787 projects) were in “warning” situations indicating countries of concern, and 21 percent (849 projects) being in “alert” situations indicating that the countries were very fragile. There were 1,176 GEF projects in these countries with TERs, including including 164 (14 percent) in “alert” countries, 843 in “warning” countries (72 percent), and 169 in “stable” countries (14 percent).

87. To assess whether a GEF project was more likely to be cancelled or dropped based on classification of the country as “stable,” “warning,” or “alert”, a cross-tabulation and a Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence were performed. To assess the GEF project outcomes distribution across the countries classified as “stable,” “warning,” and “alert,” a Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence, a 2-sample test of proportions, and OLS models

---

<sup>213</sup> Though the GEF’s public online database has a substantial amount of information and documents, the evaluation team found that some documentation was missing and sometimes dates and other information on the public online database was out of date or missing.

<sup>214</sup> This is because 15 of the countries had no categorization in the Fragile States Index: Cook Islands, Dominica, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

<sup>215</sup> 1,003 projects were dropped and 115 were cancelled; in addition, one project was classified as rejected and one was deferred.

with robust standard errors were performed. This was done for countries classified as “stable” vis-à-vis “warning,” “stable” vis-à-vis “alert,” and “warning” vis-à-vis “alert.”

88. Separately from the analysis of GEF projects in fragile situations, the research team examined the dataset of projects provided by the PMIS to gain a broad understanding of the GEF-supported interventions in countries affected by major armed conflict since 1989 relative to countries that have not been affected by major armed conflict since 1989.<sup>216</sup> Countries affected by major armed conflict are defined as those experiencing at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.<sup>217</sup>

89. Projects in the database were classified as “conflict,” “non-conflict,” “mixed,” and “not specified.” Projects for which the target country was affected by major armed conflict (or, if the project took place in multiple countries, all countries were affected by major armed conflict) were tagged as “conflict.” Those projects for which the target country was not affected by major armed conflict (or, if multiple countries, none are affected by major armed conflict) were tagged as “non-conflict.” Those regional projects which included both countries affected by major armed conflict and other countries were tagged as “mixed.” Where country information for regional projects was not available in the database, the research team consulted project documents to discern which countries were involved in the given project to classify their conflict status. The information was frequently unavailable for global projects, but it was beyond the scope of the project to consult and classify these projects. Projects whose country information was not discernable from project documents were marked as “not specified.” This was often the case in projects that had been cancelled or discontinued early in the approval or implementation process and that therefore did not have published documentation in the GEF’s online database. The “not specified” projects are not included in the statistical analysis for this project.

90. To assess whether GEF project outcomes differed between countries classified as conflict (i.e., affected by major armed conflict since 1989) and non-conflict (i.e., not affected by major armed conflict since 1989), a two-sample test of proportions was performed on TER binary scores and dropped or cancelled projects data, and a two-sample *t*-test and a Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test were performed on project delays data.

## 2.2 Prevalence of fragile and conflict-affected situations in the GEF portfolio

91. **The vast majority of GEF projects are located in fragile countries.** The Fragile States Index produced by the Fund for Peace provides a comprehensive listing of fragile countries around the world, and has used a consistent methodology since 2004 with values ranging from alert (i.e., very fragile), to warning (of concern), to stable (mostly stable), to sustainable (very stable). From 2006–19, the 164 countries and territories receiving GEF funding have had a total


---

<sup>216</sup> The year 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and saw a dramatic change in the dynamics between environment, conflict, and peace, and how those dynamics were addressed. Bruch, Jensen, et al. 2019. It is also shortly before the initial establishment of the GEF in 1991.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid., table 1.

of 2,086 listings on the Fragile States Index (i.e., 14 x 149), with 15 countries not listed. Of these 2,086 listings, 21 percent have been at *alert* status, 60 percent have been at *warning* status, 18 percent have been at *stable* status; and less than 1 percent have been at *sustainable* status (Annex F and figure 2.1). Of the 164 countries and territories, 134 were categorized as either very fragile or of concern at some point, and 15 were stable or sustainable the entire period;<sup>218</sup> 15 were not listed during this time period.<sup>219</sup> It seems that there are about the same amount of countries at *alert* status across this time period: 32 in 2006 and 31 in 2019. There are, however, more *stable* countries in 2019, with 30 stable countries as compared with 19 in 2006. There also appear to be more *warning* countries: 73 in 2006 and 89 in 2019.

**Figure 2.1: Fragility of countries and territories receiving GEF funding (2006–20)**



Sources: ELI and GEF IEO, drawing upon data from The Fund for Peace (n.d.).

Note: Not all countries receiving GEF funding are included in the Fragile States Index.

92. It is more difficult to distill trends from the World Bank’s List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations because of its more limited geographic scope and the repeated changes in methodology. Nevertheless, a few general observations may be noted. First, fragility tends to be multiyear: if a country appears on the list, it tends to appear at least once again.<sup>220</sup> Fifteen countries and territories have been on the list every year from 2006 to 2019.<sup>221</sup> Most fragile states listed are located in Africa and Asia. There is also a subset of nations in the South Pacific,

<sup>218</sup> These were Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Oman, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, and Uruguay.

<sup>219</sup> These were Cook Islands, Dominica, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

<sup>220</sup> Out of 63 countries that appear on the list across all years, only 8 (Malawi, Mauritania, Dominican Republic, Nauru, Seychelles, Syria, and Trinidad and Tobago) appear only once.

<sup>221</sup> These include Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, and Togo.

such as the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea, that consistently appear on the list. Additionally, the list includes countries in a special category that are considered politically fragile by their Country Policy Institutional Assessment score but do not have a sufficiently low Gross National Income to qualify fully for International Development Association aid.

93. **Since its inception, a substantial portion of the GEF’s global portfolio has been invested in situations affected by major armed conflict.** As of July 2020, the GEF has invested over \$4.0 billion, accounting for 29 percent of its global portfolio, in countries affected by major armed conflict, with an additional \$2.2 billion, or 16 percent of the portfolio, invested in mixed contexts.<sup>222</sup> In all, 45 percent of GEF investments have been in projects implemented in at least one conflict-affected country (figure 2.2). The present available data for GEF-7 projects that have already received CEO endorsement (n=25) indicate that 22 percent of the GEF-7 portfolio is invested in conflict-affected countries and 14 percent in mixed contexts, accounting for 36 percent of the funding allocated in the current replenishment. An additional 11 percent of the GEF-7 portfolio has been invested in situations not affected by major armed conflict and 25 percent in unspecified contexts. In addition, there are several proposed projects for GEF-7 that have not yet received CEO endorsement, including many in countries affected by major armed conflicts.

94. **Of all GEF-funded projects, 33 percent (n=2,153) have been implemented in countries affected by major armed conflict, 11 percent (n=710) in mixed contexts, 49 percent (n=3,188) in countries not affected by major armed conflict, and 7 percent (n=426) are not specified based on available country information.**<sup>223</sup> This is captured in figure 2.2. Although many projects remain in the project proposal phase for GEF-7, the PMIS database indicates that 35 percent (n=54) would take place in countries affected by major armed conflict, 14 percent (n=22) in mixed contexts, 5 percent (n=8) in unspecified contexts, and the remaining 46 percent (n=71) in countries not affected by major armed conflict. Based on this information, at least 49 percent (n=76) of the projects in the GEF-7 portfolio have been proposed for implementation in at least one country affected by major armed conflict. This would constitute a slight increase in the number of GEF-7 projects that would be implemented in at least one country affected by conflict as compared to the total proportion for the entire GEF portfolio. These findings are consistent with the STAP’s findings that “half of GEF recipients (77 countries) experienced armed conflict since the GEF’s inception in 1991, and over one-third of GEF recipients (61 countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while armed conflict was ongoing somewhere in the country. Nearly one-third of all GEF funding has been invested in projects during years when recipient countries experienced conflict.”<sup>224</sup> Similarly, an unpublished report for the GEF on conflict sensitivity found that more than one-third of “GEF members (64

---


<sup>222</sup> This is according to the amount committed at the CEO endorsement stage and does not account for additional costs that may have accrued during project implementation, nor costs avoided because of project cancellations or changes after this stage.

<sup>223</sup> These numbers are for projects through GEF-6 found in the GEF Project Management Information System Database (downloaded May 2019).

<sup>224</sup> GEF STAP 2017, p. 4.

countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while major armed conflict was ongoing.”<sup>225</sup>

**Figure 2.2: GEF Investments in situations affected by major armed conflict (Pilot–GEF 6)**



Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on Project Management Information System.

Note: “conflict” refers to major armed conflict.

95. **The GEF’s ability and willingness to fund projects in conflict-affected situations can be catalytic in generating additional funding.** Interviews with key informants highlighted the fact that the GEF was often one of the few organizations willing to support projects in areas affected by conflict. In a number of instances, GEF funding has provided the initial funding necessary to pilot projects and lay the ground for additional, larger investments by other institutions that expand and extend the impacts of the GEF funding (see, for example, box 2.1).

96. This catalytic role is particularly important as the GEF aims to be catalytic in scaling up action to deliver global environmental benefits. While this catalytic role can be difficult to measure, in the context of the GEF’s role as a funding agency, it means that “given the limited amount of money available for projects, the GEF hopes to design projects in such a way so as to attract additional resources, pursue strategies that have a greater result than the project itself, and/or accelerate a process of development or change.”<sup>226</sup> The emphasis on the GEF’s catalytic role has been increasingly emphasized as environmental challenges grow more dire, and as the GEF focuses on “radical transformation.”<sup>227</sup> The GEF-7 Programming Directions note that “The GEF needs to seize opportunities to make a bigger difference. Going forward, the GEF must strategically focus its investments in areas where it can help catalyze the necessary change in

<sup>225</sup> Morrow 2018, p. 7. These statistics include projects supported by the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.<sup>226</sup> NCSTE 2009, p. 1.

<sup>226</sup> NCSTE 2009, p. 1.

<sup>227</sup> GEF 2020a.



key systems, and leverage multi-stakeholder coalitions in alignment with countries' demand and commitment under the various multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) for which the GEF serves as financial mechanism."<sup>228</sup>

### **Box 2.1: GEF Catalytic Funding in Conflict-Affected Situations – The Case of Sapo National Park in Liberia**

GEF-supported programming in post-conflict Liberia illustrates the catalytic potential of GEF programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility. After the end of the Second Liberian Civil War in 2003, the World Bank was not programming in Liberia because of the insecurity related to the immediate aftermath of conflict.<sup>a</sup>

Approved in 2004, GEF Project 1475, “Establishing the Basis for Biodiversity Conservation on Sapo National Park and in South-East Liberia” marked one of the earliest GEF-funded projects in postwar Liberia. The World Bank implemented the project, and Flora and Fauna International executed the project in collaboration with the Forestry Development Authority of Liberia between 2005 and 2010. This marked the start of the World Bank's re-engagement in Liberia.

Sapo National Park is the country's only national park and a biodiversity hotspot within the Upper Guinea Forest—and is the largest national park in the area. The Project Document noted that under the baseline scenario of business-as-usual management based on the contemporary situation in Sapo National Park, “conservation and forest & wildlife management would remain low national priorities” and that international nongovernmental organizations currently operating in the area would “collectively ... reduce their aid.”<sup>b</sup> The project applicants noted that the GEF funding would “have an important leveraging effect, too, catalysing funding that otherwise would not have been forthcoming.”<sup>c</sup>

The project was deemed successful, and project documents noted that “implementation occurred within a period of profound governance, environmental, institutional and societal changes in Liberia following a decade and half of civil instability.”<sup>d</sup> Since then, the GEF has supported various projects in Liberia in different focal areas. Two other relevant GEF funded projects (GEF ID 3284 “Consolidation of Liberia's Protected Area Network”; and GEF ID 3837, “SPWA-BD: Biodiversity Conservation through Expanding the Protected Area Network in Liberia [EXPAN]”) followed the first one and were also implemented by the World Bank. The Forest Development Authority of Liberia executed the projects. Both of these projects were “build on successful GEF investments in Sapo NP”<sup>e</sup> and focused on biodiversity conservation, protected area management, community participation, and reducing rural dependence on forests and wildlife in Liberia.


---

<sup>228</sup> GEF 2018a, p. 2.

Drawing on lessons from its earlier GEF projects in Liberia, the World Bank continued its engagement with forests and protected area interventions in Liberia, expanding the protected area systems and strengthening capacity to maintain them. Ultimately, the Government of Liberia received a grant funding (\$37.5 million) through the World Bank from the Government of Norway for “Liberia Forest Sector Project,” 2016–2023 (P154114), which expanded substantially on the initial GEF projects.<sup>f</sup> This project supports priority investments to strengthen the on-the-ground management of Sapo National Park, including physical demarcation, provision of vehicles and equipment, and updating the Park’s management plans.<sup>g</sup>


The remote sensing analysis results (below) indicate minimal forest loss, close to zero deforestation within the park boundary (flat green line), and could be explained by the prohibitions on all economic activities, including mining, within Liberia’s national parks, per Liberian legislation.

The results indicate how efforts to protect Sapo National Park’s resources during the first project have been sustained beyond the project duration and supported through subsequent interventions. This trend inside Sapo National Park contrasts with the dramatic increase in forest loss outside the park, mainly driven by illegal activities such as mining and logging, in postwar Liberia.<sup>h</sup> There are also legal mining concessions in the buffer zone. The two dips in the forest loss outside the Park (around 2005 and 2010) coincide with the eviction of illegal gold miners and settlers in Sapo National Park.<sup>i</sup> The lack of financial, technical, human resources, and capacity and conducive legal environment in Liberia to effectively monitor artisanal and small-scale mining sites and other illegal activities also explain forest loss in the Sapo National Park’s buffer zone.<sup>j</sup>



**Figure B.2.1.1: Deforestation trends in Sapo National Park, adjacent 15km and 30 km buffers, and Liberia (2001–19)**

**Figure B.2.1.2: Satellite Images of Sapo National Park and adjacent buffers (2001, 2019).**



Source: GEF IEO based on UMD GLAD Dataset.

Note: Deforested areas are visible in red color around the national park, and adjacent 15 km and 30 km buffers.

-----  
<sup>a</sup> IEG 2012, p. xiii.

<sup>b</sup> Project 1475, [Project Document for CEO Approval \(Revised\)](#), p. 10.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid., p. 49

<sup>d</sup> Project 1475, [Project Implementation Completion Report](#), p. i.

<sup>e</sup> Project 3284, [Implementation Completion Memorandum](#), p. 4.

<sup>f</sup> World Bank Group 2016, p. 26.

<sup>g</sup> Ibid. p. 51.

<sup>h</sup> See, e.g., IMF 2008; Small 2012, p. 48.

<sup>i</sup> Project 1457, [Project Implementation Completion Report](#). The Liberian Government used the term "Voluntary departure" for the 2010-2011 removals.


<sup>j</sup> World Bank Group 2020f.

97. **A greater portion of the GEF portfolio is now implemented in countries affected by major armed conflict than in earlier GEF replenishment periods.** As shown in figure 2.3, the percentage of the GEF portfolio in countries affected by major armed conflict remained relatively stable between the Pilot Phase and GEF-3, but starting in GEF-4, it jumped about 10 percentage points to encompass 44 percent of the portfolio.<sup>229</sup> This finding aligns with findings by Morrow, which noted greater numbers of projects in conflict-affected countries as well as larger financing envelopes.<sup>230</sup>

<sup>229</sup> These percentages include both "conflict" and "mixed" projects.

<sup>230</sup> Morrow and Hudson 2017; see also Morrow 2018; Morrow n.d.; Morrow 2020.

**Figure 2.3: Projects by Conflict Status for Each GEF Replenishment**



Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on Project Management Information System.

Note: “conflict” refers to major armed conflict.

98. **In most instances, the allocation of projects across GEF focal areas is comparable in situations affected by major armed conflict, mixed situations, and those not affected by major armed conflict (table 2.1).** Aside from International Waters (discussed in paragraph 99), there have also been a slightly higher percentage of Climate Change projects in situations affected by major armed conflict (38 percent, compared to 34 percent in non-conflict situations).

99. **International Waters projects have frequently been in mixed contexts: 24 percent, compared to 2.1-3 percent for conflict and non-conflict countries and the GEF portfolio average of 5.8 percent.** This is logical, given that International Waters focal area projects by their nature engage multiple countries that border a body of water, and the mixed category exclusively contains multi-country projects. However, it should also be noted that International Waters is the only GEF focal area that has an explicit orientation toward improving cooperation and communication between different actors, and therefore is positioned to consider and address conflict-related issues in its projects.

**Table 2.1: GEF projects across focal areas (1991–2019)**

Focal Area	Non-conflict (%)	Mixed (%)	Conflict (%)	Not specified (%)	Total (%)	Total (count)
Biodiversity	29%	23%	27%	21%	27%	1762
Chemicals and Waste	3.3%	3.4%	3.0%	0.9%	3.0%	196
Climate Change	34%	17%	38%	24%	33%	2118
International Waters	3%	24%	2.1%	18%	5.8%	378
Land Degradation	6.5%	7.5%	5.4%	6.6%	6.3%	405
Multi Focal Area	16%	17%	17%	21%	17%	1086
Ozone Depleting Substances	0.66%	0.56%	0.42%	0.70%	0.6%	37
POPs	7.6%	8.7%	7.4%	7.3%	7.6%	495
<b>All</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>6477</b>

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on data from the Project Management Information System.

Note: “conflict” refers to major armed conflict. POP = persistent organic pollutant. These numbers include dropped and cancelled projects.

100. **The proportions of enabling activity projects, full-sized projects, and medium-sized projects were relatively similar for countries affected by major armed conflict and for those that were not.** As shown in table 2.2, mixed projects have a substantially larger proportion of full-sized projects, and a lower proportion of enabling activities. This is to be expected because mixed projects are regional projects that include both countries affected by major armed conflict and countries that are not.

**Table 2.2: Types of GEF projects and conflict status (1991–2019)**

	Non-conflict	Mixed	Conflict	Not specified
<b>Enabling Activity</b>	26%	5%	24%	2%
<b>Full-Sized Project</b>	49%	70%	54%	54%
<b>Medium-Sized Project</b>	25%	25%	21%	44%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on Project Management Information System.

### 2.3 Statistical analysis of project results vis-à-vis fragility

101. The team conducted several statistical tests analyzing the binary evaluation ratings in project TERs to explore the extent to which project ratings depended on the fragility classification (“alert,” “warning,” or “stable”). It should be noted that not all projects have TERs. To minimize the interference of confounding factors that can occur when comparing country-

level with regional and global projects, as well as the fact that many regional and global projects did not list the countries in which they operated, tests were conducted for country-level projects only.

**102. An increasing country fragility classification is associated with a negative and statistically significant impact on project outcomes, sustainability, M&E design, M&E implementation, implementation quality, and execution quality.** A Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence showed a negative and statistically significant impact on the TER scores for Outcome, Sustainability, M&E Design, M&E Implementation, Implementation Quality, and Execution Quality (table 2.3). These represent every TER criterion, except the Terminal Evaluation Overall Quality. OLS models with robust standard errors replicated this finding (table 2.4).

**103. The most significant impacts were for projects in countries classified as “alert.”** The two-sample test of proportionality shows statistically significant impacts for “stable” countries vis-à-vis “alert” (which is not particularly surprising) (table 2.3). For “stable” vis-à-vis “warning,” there were two statistically significant relationships (Sustainability and M&E Implementation). In contrast, for “warning” vis-à-vis “alert,” all criteria except the Terminal Evaluation Overall Quality exhibited a statistically significant relationship. This indicates that as a country moves from “stable” to “warning,” there are some impacts (particularly for sustainability and M&E implementation); but the transition from “warning” to “alert” raises many more challenges, and the challenges with Sustainability and M&E Implementation seen in “warning” situations become more widespread.

**104. A country’s fragility classification is associated with a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of projects being cancelled or dropped.** Out of 4,136 country-level GEF projects,<sup>231</sup> 1,122 projects were cancelled or dropped (with an additional one being deferred and one being rejected). Of these 1,124 projects that experienced difficulty, 10.6 percent were in “stable” countries, 69.6 percent were in “warning” countries, and 19.8 percent were in “alert” countries. When comparing projects in “stable” and “warning” countries, both the independent 2-test sample of proportions and the OLS model with robust standard errors showed that increasing fragility had a statistically significant impact on whether a project would be cancelled or dropped (e.g., table 2.5). There is a 4.9 percent greater likelihood of being dropped or cancelled if a project is in a “warning” country compared to being in a “stable” country. This was the only statistically significant difference: a Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between a country’s fragility classification and whether the project would be cancelled or dropped when all three classifications were considered.

---

<sup>231</sup> Through June 2019, there were 4,136 country-level GEF projects in the 149 countries listed on the Fragile States Index.

**Table 2.3: Impacts of fragility on Terminal Evaluation Review binary scores for country-level GEF Projects (1991–2019)**

TER variable	Average value for fragility classification			n (sample size)	Statistical test performed	Std error	p-value
	Stable avg.	Warning avg.	Alert avg.				
Outcome	0.84	0.80	0.70	1162	Pearson chi sq	0.030	0.01*
Sustainability	0.73	0.62	0.46	1115	Pearson chi sq	0.029	0.00*
M&E design	0.65	0.68	0.53	1114	Pearson chi sq	0.031	0.00*
M&E implementation	0.75	0.66	0.54	1037	Pearson chi sq	0.031	0.00*
Implementation quality	0.85	0.81	0.72	1011	Pearson chi sq	0.032	0.02*
Execution quality	0.87	0.81	0.73	1021	Pearson chi sq	0.032	0.01*
Overall quality	0.83	0.85	0.81	1042	Pearson chi sq	0.030	0.12
Outcome	0.84	-	0.70	331	2-sample test of proportions	0.044	0.00*
Sustainability	0.73	-	0.46	315	2-sample test of proportions	0.055	0.00*
M&E design	0.65	-	0.53	316	2-sample test of proportions	0.054	0.04*
M&E implementation	0.75	-	0.54	297	2-sample test of proportions	0.055	0.00*
Implementation quality	0.85	-	0.72	283	2-sample test of proportions	0.047	0.01*
Execution quality	0.87	-	0.73	288	2-sample test of proportions	0.046	0.00*
Overall quality	0.83	-	0.81	331	2-sample test of proportions	0.041	0.71
Outcome	-	0.80	0.70	994	2-sample test of proportions	0.039	0.01*
Sustainability	-	0.62	0.46	957	2-sample test of proportions	0.043	0.00*
M&E design	-	0.68	0.53	952	2-sample test of proportions	0.044	0.00*
M&E implementation	-	0.66	0.54	888	2-sample test of proportions	0.045	0.01*
Implementation quality	-	0.81	0.72	871	2-sample test of proportions	0.040	0.04*
Execution quality	-	0.81	0.73	876	2-sample test of proportions	0.040	0.03*
Overall quality	-	0.85	0.79	885	2-sample test of proportions	0.035	0.32
Outcome	0.84	0.80	-	999	2-sample test of proportions	0.032	0.17
Sustainability	0.73	0.62	-	958	2-sample test of proportions	0.039	0.00*
M&E design	0.65	0.68	-	960	2-sample test of proportions	0.041	0.51
M&E implementation	0.75	0.66	-	889	2-sample test of proportions	0.040	0.02*
Implementation quality	0.85	0.81	-	868	2-sample test of proportions	0.034	0.18
Execution quality	0.87	0.81	-	878	2-sample test of proportions	0.032	0.09
Overall quality	0.83	0.85	-	899	2-sample test of proportions	0.033	0.58

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on data from the Project Management Information System.

Note: \* Statistically significant variables.

**Table 2.4: Effect of Country Fragility on TER Binary Outcome Variables (Warning Baseline)**

	Stable	Alert	Constant (Warning)	R <sup>2</sup>	n
Outcomes	0.044 (0.032)	-0.096* (0.039)	0.795*** (0.014)	0.01	1162
Sustainability	0.113*** (0.039)	-0.163*** (0.043)	0.621*** (0.017)	0.02	1115
M&E Design	-0.027 (0.041)	-0.143*** (0.044)	0.675*** (0.017)	0.01	1114
M&E Implementation	0.094* (0.040)	-0.118** (0.045)	0.658*** (0.017)	0.01	1037
Implementation Quality	0.045 (0.034)	-0.085* (0.040)	0.805*** (0.015)	0.01	1011
Execution Quality	0.055 (0.032)	-0.087* (0.040)	0.814*** (0.014)	0.01	1021
Overall Quality	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.064 (0.034)	0.856*** (0.012)	0.00	1169

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on data from the Project Management Information System.

Note: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors.

**Table 2.5: Effect of Country Fragility on Likelihood of Project Cancellation (Warning Baseline)**

	Stable	Alert	Constant (Warning)	R <sup>2</sup>	N
Cancelled, Dropped, Deferred, and Rejected	-0.048* (0.021)	-0.020 (0.017)	0.282*** (0.009)	0.00	4,136

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on data from the Project Management Information System.

Note: \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.005 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors.

## 2.4 Statistical analysis of project results vis-à-vis conflict

105. The team conducted several statistical tests to explore the extent to which project ratings depended on whether the project was in a situation affected by major armed conflict. As noted in paragraph 101, not all projects have TERs. To minimize the interference of confounding factors that can occur when comparing country-level with regional and global projects, the team conducted tests along four distinct aggregations: country-level projects only, regional projects only, regional and country-level projects, and all projects.

106. **Globally, the conflict status of a project's country had a statistically significant impact on the project's TER Sustainability rating** at all levels of aggregation ( $p=0.00$ ).<sup>232</sup> The presence of major armed conflict in a project country correlates with a lower score for sustainability,

<sup>232</sup> Using a two-sample test of proportions for country level only, and Pearson chi-squared for all other scales of aggregation.



suggesting that projects taking place in conflict-affected sites are on average less sustainable than projects taking place in non-conflict contexts.

107. **At all scales of implementation, the country's conflict status had a statistically significant impact on the duration of a project's delays ( $p=0.04$ ).**<sup>233</sup> This measure was also almost statistically significant at the regional and country scale ( $p=0.07$ ). A number of examples of how conflict can delay projects are found below.<sup>234</sup> An example of fragility and tensions causing project delays may be found in Project 2929 ("Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin through Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme"). This project began in August 2009 with a planned closing date of July 2013, but was actually completed in December 2014. Tensions between the two project countries—Haiti and the Dominican Republic—built throughout the project's lifetime. The worsening relations, combined with other issues, undermined the achievement of the ultimate objective of the project. Although the parties had signed a binational agreement to facilitate the integrated management of the watershed by both governments, meetings were cancelled at critical moments. With the worsening bilateral relations, the project team worked hard and arguably successfully to maintain communication between governments and ministries.<sup>235</sup> During its latter stages, the project benefited from assistance from the government of Mexico that facilitated training and exchange of experiences on how to manage a binational water source.

108. **The conflict context (particularly major armed conflict) had a statistically significant impact on the rate of dropped and cancelled GEF projects.**<sup>236</sup> This was true at all levels of aggregation except for the regional-only scale. Use of a logistical regression model showed that projects in countries affected by major armed conflict had 1.26 higher odds of being dropped or cancelled than projects in other countries.

109. To see whether there were regionally discernable impacts of major armed conflict on GEF projects, a set of statistical tests were performed on country-level data for GEF projects in four regions: Africa, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>237</sup> The results are provided in Annex G.

110. **Although the details vary for each region, the regional analysis of TER ratings reveals that major armed conflict can have a statistically significant effect (or almost statistically significant effect) on projects in five ways: Sustainability, M&E Design, M&E Implementation, Overall, and the likelihood that a project will be dropped or cancelled.** For the Africa and Asia regions, the analysis showed a statistically significant difference in TER Sustainability ratings between countries affected by major armed conflict and other countries. For the Latin America

---

<sup>233</sup> Using a two-sample *t* test with equal variances for the country level only, and the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test for all other scales of aggregation.

<sup>234</sup> Paras. 65, 155-157.

<sup>235</sup> Project 2929, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 25.

<sup>236</sup> Using a two-sample test of proportions for country level only, and Pearson chi-squared for all other scales of aggregation.

<sup>237</sup> Countries in regions reflect the World Bank country groupings.

and the Caribbean region, results showed TER M&E Design and M&E Implementation binary ratings between conflict and non-conflict countries were statistically significantly different. Although not technically statistically significant, for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean regions, TER Overall and Sustainability binary ratings were close to being statistically significantly different between countries affected by major armed conflict and other countries, respectively. Additionally, the Asia region exhibited a statistically significant difference in dropped or cancelled projects between countries affected by major armed conflict and other countries. The analysis showed no statistically significant difference in project delays.

## **2.5 Conclusions**

### **111. Statistical analyses of projects in the GEF portfolio show impacts of fragile and conflict-affected situations on several dimensions of project performance and outcomes.**

Fragility has a statistically significant impact on all TER indicators. It is also noteworthy that although there are some statistically significant impacts comparing “stable” and “warning” situations, the impacts are even more clear and widespread when comparing “warning” and “alert.”

### **112. There is a statistically significant impact of major armed conflict on the likelihood that a project will be cancelled and dropped, but this relationship is not observed for fragility.**

While fragility (especially states classified as “alert”) does affect many aspects of project implementation and success, there was no statistically significant impact of fragility on the likelihood that a country-level project will be cancelled or dropped. It appears that barring major armed conflict (i.e., more than 1,000 battle deaths), projects are able to continue navigating the challenging context with effects on the project short of termination.

### 3. FINDINGS: ANALYSIS OF GEF INTERVENTIONS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS


113. This chapter presents the findings from the evaluation in four key sections.

- (a) The first section provides a typology of the key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects.
- (b) The second section considers the resulting impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects, particularly with respect to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.
- (c) The third section provides a typology of the approaches to conflict-sensitive programming that GEF projects have innovated, in the absence of a broader GEF approach to managing conflict- and fragility-related risks.
- (d) The fourth section takes a more granular approach, examining opportunities for integrating conflict and fragility considerations into the project life cycle.

#### 3.1 Key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects

114. **There are five key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects: physical insecurity, social conflict, economic drivers, political fragility and weak governance, and coping strategies.** These pathways are illustrated in figure 3.1. This typology draws upon analysis of the numerous projects reviewed for this evaluation. This section explores each pathway in turn, with illustrative examples.

**Figure 3.1: Key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects**



Source: ELI and GEF IEO.

## Physical insecurity

115. **Issues related to physical security were the most common issues affecting project performance, implementation, and results.** Physical insecurity tended to manifest itself in one of two ways: (1) the presence of land mines and unexploded ordnance and (2) the potential targeting of staff and partners. These challenges have had the effect of making it difficult for GEF projects to hire staff, consult affected communities, undertake project activities, and conduct the necessary activities to evaluate projects. For Project 3828, the suspension notice noted that “[t]he deteriorating security situation in Syria is not conducive to project implementation. Travel to parts of the country is difficult and unsafe, and there are reports that buildings/sites that were intended to be energy efficiency demonstration projects under the GEF projects have been damaged or destroyed in the ongoing civil unrest.”<sup>238</sup> Similarly, Project 5152 in Yemen was cancelled because of challenges with access and procedural issues. The cancellation notice stated that “given the situation of civil unrest and the UN security phase in Yemen, we have been unable to send staff to the country to hold consultations and finalize the documentation for some time now.”<sup>239</sup> In Chad, the TER for Project 3959 reported that “Towards the end of the project some project sites were difficult to reach because of the threat of Boko Haram in the area, and those political and security threats remain in the country now.”<sup>240</sup>

116. **Difficulty accessing project areas is particularly common in situations of active and protracted conflict.** For example, unexploded ordnance from the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War was noted as a security threat constraining access to the project site for Project 3028 in Lebanon.<sup>241</sup> In Mali, staff members for Project 1253 were forced to relocate when the project area was occupied by military groups in March 2012.<sup>242</sup>

117. **In many instances, physical insecurity can compel a project to stop work in particular locations.** For example, Project 3418 on mainstreaming biodiversity management could not include sites from southern Lebanon because of the security risk posed by unexploded cluster bombs from the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, which reduced the area of project implementation.<sup>243</sup> And, prior to implementation of Project 2019 in Colombia, one of the identified project areas was abandoned on the rise of a “delicate public security situation”<sup>244</sup> that made it impossible for project staff to access the area. Also in Colombia, Project 774 encountered difficulties in accessing the project area during implementation; a project staff member, blaming project design, specified that the project area was under control of the FARC and the risk posed for the crew was too high for the project to continue there.<sup>245</sup>

---

<sup>238</sup> Project 3828, Agency Notification of Suspension of Full-Sized Project, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>239</sup> Project 5152, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>240</sup> Project 3959, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 69.

<sup>241</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, July 2020.

<sup>242</sup> Project 1253, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 22.

<sup>243</sup> Project 3418, [Project Information Form](#), p. 4.

<sup>244</sup> Project 2019, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 9.

<sup>245</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, June 2020.

118. **Land mines and unexploded ordnance can pose a serious threat in certain countries.** A number of GEF projects in Cambodia have been affected by the presence of land mines. For example, Project 621 reported that the 6–9 million remaining land mines hindered data collection, conservation activities, and the project’s operations to tackle illegal logging.<sup>246</sup> Similarly, Project 1086 noted that while the presence of land mines impeded access for conservationists, illegal hunters and loggers continued to operate in the area.<sup>247</sup>

119. **Notwithstanding physical security challenges, GEF projects have found ways to continue operating.** For example, Project 2357 in Burundi received satisfactory Terminal Evaluation ratings for “quality of supervision” and “overall performance” despite “extremely challenging security environment that precluded easy and frequent site access.”<sup>248</sup> And Project 9661 noted that if the security situation worsened, the project would relocate and adjust its strategy to focus on legal frameworks.<sup>249</sup>

120. **Rising insecurity and conflict in project areas have affected GEF projects, highlighting the need to look beyond conflict to the broader fragility when planning projects.** For example, implementation of Projects 1253 and 9661 in Mali were directly affected and halted by the rapidly escalating conflict context. Activities for Project 1253 were suspended following a coup d’état in March 2012 and the subsequent occupation of project areas by military groups, compelling project staff to flee for their safety. The Terminal Evaluation observed that risks such as insecurity and the coup d’état “were not envisioned in the PAD,”<sup>250</sup> and that “even before the military coup, the project area was often vandalized by foreign military groups,”<sup>251</sup> resulting in deep financial losses.

121. The experience with Project 9661 illustrates how physical insecurity can spread within a country. Project 9661 aims to restore ecosystems throughout the elephant range. Implementation began in 2018 and is ongoing. However, an interview with project staff revealed that staff members have been unable to begin their work in the Gourma region of Mali because of insecurity in the designated project area: the risk of poaching is very high, and poaching is directly attributable to the armed conflict, given that it was nonexistent in the region before.<sup>252</sup> In short, the spread of armed conflict to the region led to poaching, which led to a worsening of the physical insecurity, which escalated to such a point that the project had to cease working in the region.

### **Social conflict and mistrust**

122. **Social conflict and mistrust (whether between local stakeholders or toward the government) have affected the performance and outcome of numerous GEF projects.** Social

---

<sup>246</sup> Project 621, [Project Document for WP](#), p. 5.

<sup>247</sup> Project 1086, [Project Brief](#), p. 8.

<sup>248</sup> Project 2357, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 23.

<sup>249</sup> Project 9661. [Project Document](#). p. 15.

<sup>250</sup> Project 1253, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 29.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>252</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, May 2020.

competition for resources can occur in settings where there is a scarcity of arable land, water, and other natural resources upon which people and communities depend for their livelihoods and food security.<sup>253</sup> Moreover, influxes of refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants can generate social conflict and tensions.<sup>254</sup>

**123. Social conflicts concerning land tenure are particularly common and can be problematic for GEF projects if not managed.** In Colombia, Project 1020 aimed to support indigenous communities in the Matavén Forest; the project had to be redesigned at implementation because indigenous communities stressed their preference for creating an indigenous *resguardo* or reserve, rather than a national park, so they could retain autonomy over the land.<sup>255</sup> The redesign was necessitated as the conflict escalated, resulting in the death of a park staff member and several indigenous people.<sup>256</sup> In Mali and Burundi, GEF projects have also needed to navigate social conflicts between ethnic groups related to land tenure. Project 2357 in Burundi noted that the conflict exacerbated capacity issues and risks, especially with regard to land tenure, affecting implementation and sustainability.<sup>257</sup> Project 3699 in Mali did consider land tenure conflicts in consideration of agrofuels production, but in the request for CEO endorsement it was noted that the risk had not been adequately addressed.<sup>258</sup>

**124. Social tensions can present administrative challenges unrelated to natural resources, for example in hiring staff.** Some projects have faced problems, albeit to a lesser extent than tenure-related problems, related to the equal hiring of local staff for project implementation. Interviews with Implementing Agency staff reported that some regional projects in the Balkans were affected by mistrust among project participants and staff.<sup>259</sup> In an interview with a former employee of the Sava River Commission, it was noted that cooperation was extremely difficult to sustain, given that there had to be the same number of employees from all participating countries; mistrust affected all cross-border environmental projects in the region after the war.<sup>260</sup> This is not always the case, however; interviews with several respondents, for example, highlighted the fact that notwithstanding the social sensitivities associated with sectarianism in Lebanon, it was usually possible to hire and manage staff without undue burden.<sup>261</sup>

**125. Understanding social conflicts can enhance the success of GEF projects, if the projects are designed in a conflict-sensitive way to bring people together.** For example, Project 2357 in Burundi foresaw that “land tenure conflicts [were] likely to be a serious issue for the rural population,”<sup>262</sup> exacerbated by the reintegration of returnees after the war. However, the Terminal Evaluation notes the project’s success in reinforcing social cohesion through

---

<sup>253</sup> Young and Goldman 2015; Unruh and Williams 2013; Theisen 2008.

<sup>254</sup> See paras. 136-139, below.

<sup>255</sup> Project 1020, Terminal Evaluation Review, p. 4.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid.

<sup>257</sup> Project 2357, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 7.

<sup>258</sup> Project 3699, Request for CEO Endorsement/Approval, p. 47

<sup>259</sup> E.g., Projects 5604 and 5723 (based on interviews with key informants in December 2019 and January 2020).

<sup>260</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, December 2019.

<sup>261</sup> Interviews with Implementing Agency staff and NGO staff, June and July 2020.

<sup>262</sup> Project 2357, Project Information Document.

producers' organizations "whose members are draw[n] from all three ethnicities (Tutsi, Batwa and Hutu)."<sup>263</sup> Similarly, Project 1253 in Mali considered intercommunal conflicts over land management—especially between traditional practices and government-led conservation—as hampering the project's objective of intercommunal land management. Consequently, the project pursued an approach of generating dialogue and project planning workshops, including conflict resolution mechanisms and grievance redress, enabling local leaders to consider the project as "their project."<sup>264</sup>

### **Economic drivers**

#### **126. The economic consequences of conflict can affect implementation of GEF projects.**

This is true at both the macro level (national and regional economies) and at the micro level (livelihoods). Illicit extraction and trade in minerals, timber, and other natural resources can exacerbate and prolong conflict.<sup>265</sup> At the same time, economic interest can provide an incentive to make and build peace.<sup>266</sup> Economic stresses associated with conflict and with post-conflict recovery can push a government to quickly generate revenues, leading to natural resource concessions with bad terms or concessions that are illegal. For example, a post-conflict review of 70 timber concessions in Liberia found that not a single concession complied with the law.<sup>267</sup> Unhealthy concessions can also reduce the domestic value added on exports.<sup>268</sup> Additionally, tensions can arise as people's livelihoods are affected by conflict, climatic stressors, and migration influxes from neighboring fragile situations.<sup>269</sup> Though there are instances wherein economic factors affected a project, GEF projects often do include a component aiming to improve local livelihoods.<sup>270</sup>

**127. The profitability of a natural resource combined with low state capacity to govern the resource legally can increase illicit extraction and trade.** Project 9661 in Mali's Gourma region, which seeks to advance biodiversity conservation (particularly the Gourma elephant) noted that the military conflict overwhelmed the "insufficient current environmental policy and IWT [illegal wildlife trade] legal framework, low capacity of the Government ... and a lack of universally accepted structures and institutions" and thereby constituted "a limitation to the success of the project."<sup>271</sup>

**128. Currency depreciation can also affect GEF projects.** For example, Project 1253 in Mali was "partly left unexecuted" because of the depreciation of the CFA franc following the military coup. This resulted in a large portion of the project grant being cut off.<sup>272</sup> This is consistent with

---

<sup>263</sup> Project 2357, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 21.

<sup>264</sup> Project 1253, [Project Document for WP \(Part 2\)](#), p. 23.

<sup>265</sup> UNDP and UNEP 2015.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid.

<sup>267</sup> Rochow 2016.

<sup>268</sup> Hill and Menon 2014; Sayne, Gillies, and Watkins 2017.

<sup>269</sup> OHCHR 2016; USAID 2015.

<sup>270</sup> E.g., projects with community-based management (such as Projects 1253 and 9661) and Sustainable Production Landscapes projects (such as Project 9578), among others.

<sup>271</sup> Project 9661, [Project Document](#), p. 15.

<sup>272</sup> Project 1253, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 53.



observations by commentators who have noted that conflict may lead to a depreciation in the value of exports, to sanctions, and to expenditure-induced inflation.<sup>273</sup>

**129. GEF projects can help to manage economic risks by incorporating livelihoods components.** Project 9661, which is being implemented in the Colombian Amazon region, provides an example. An interview with a project staff member revealed that while the implementation location was fully under rebel control and impossible to access, strategies aimed at improving livelihoods through differentiated production methods (honey, silvo-pastoral approaches, etc.) have so far been successful.<sup>274</sup> The project seems to be strengthening social cohesion, because many ex-combatants have secured jobs in the sectors of the project.<sup>275</sup> A non-GEF project in Kenya funded by the Catholic Funds for Overseas Development was successful in improving social cohesion between nomadic tribes.<sup>276</sup> This project operated on the assumption that together, improved livelihoods and mainstreaming practices for peacebuilding would address the drivers of conflict. Through the development of a shared market for livestock, project participation increased, drawing different communities closer together so that the external evaluation deemed the project's sustainability to be highly likely.<sup>277</sup>

#### **Political fragility and weak governance**

**130. Political fragility, weak governance, and limited institutional capacity have affected GEF project implementation and sustainability** directly or by creating an environment in which other factors, both predictable and not, can affect projects. Where governments are weak and have limited capacity, they may not be able to effectively govern remote areas (where many GEF projects are located), which can lead to reduced legitimacy and increased mistrust. This was the case, for example, in projects in remote areas of Colombia (e.g., Projects 9663 and 9441) and several projects in Afghanistan in regions with low institutional capacity (e.g., Projects 1907 and 4227). In such a setting, social conflicts can escalate rapidly. Corruption and nontransparent governance may adversely impact the natural resources that the project seeks to protect; and low administrative capacity may extend a project's end date, while low financial capacity and low capacity of the local executing partner may lead to delays in transferring funds.<sup>278</sup> A lack of interagency coordination can also undermine GEF projects.<sup>279</sup>

**131. Limited government capacity to implement and enforce policies can increase barriers to project execution.** In Mali, Project 9661 considered the armed conflict "a limitation to the success of the project" because of barriers including "insufficient environmental policy, low

---

<sup>273</sup> Verpoorten and Serneels 2015.

<sup>274</sup> Interview, Project Staff Member, July 2020.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012.

<sup>277</sup> Galgallo and Scott 2010.

<sup>278</sup> OECD 2011.

<sup>279</sup> Project 789, [Project Document](#), p. 17.



capacity of the government to implement effective law enforcement,” and lack of institutional capacity to mainstream sustainable natural resource management.<sup>280</sup>

132. **The legacy of colonialism is a factor in some of the governance challenges.** For example, conflicts related to land tenure (as well as control over other natural resources) can often be traced back to the colonial era.<sup>281</sup> National boundaries drawn during the colonial era can persist as territorial disputes that affect GEF projects. For example, the project document for Project 789, which sought to integrate management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem, highlighted concerns related to territorial disputes persisting from colonialism.<sup>282</sup>

133. **Political instability and weak governance can affect project sustainability. For example,** the TER for Project 3028 in Lebanon stated that the instability in the country and the region threatened the sustainability of project outcomes. Specifically, changes in government at the national and local levels “jeopardize commitments made to the project’s objectives.”<sup>283</sup> In another instance, Project 1043 in Cambodia was particularly affected by the governance landscape. Despite the project’s ability to meet its objectives being deemed “a testament to what can be achieved through the NGO implementation modality,”<sup>284</sup> the Terminal Evaluation stated that “current governance poses an overwhelming risk to the sustainability of the project,”<sup>285</sup> particularly challenges related to illegal and poorly managed concessions.

134. **Where a GEF project is a priority to the government, though, governments can prioritize their scarce resources to engage.** For example, the project document for Project 789, which involved Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, suggested that the civil strife in Angola might result in a diminished project commitment from that country.<sup>286</sup> In fact, inter-ministerial involvement was present at every meeting of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem, given the “growing realization [...] that environmental sustainability is inextricably linked to food production, tourism, sanitation, population movement and thus, regional stability.”<sup>287</sup>

#### **Strategies to cope with conflict**

135. **During conflict, people often adopt short-term coping strategies to survive that compromise long-term sustainability and prosperity.** There are three common types of maladaptive coping strategies during conflict: liquidation of assets, flight, and resource use by displaced persons. In times of armed conflict, concerns about survival often mean that people liquidate their assets so they can buy food and other necessities, or flee to safety, even if these actions compromise the ability to return. This liquidation of assets often results in the rapid and intense exploitation of natural resources, typically at the expense of the resource’s ability to

---

<sup>280</sup> Project 9661, [Project Document](#), p. 15.

<sup>281</sup> Project 789, [Project Document](#), p. 5; Boone 2015.

<sup>282</sup> Project 789, Project Document ([Fragmented Management: A Legacy of the Colonial and Political Past](#)), p. 3.

<sup>283</sup> Project 3028, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 6.

<sup>284</sup> Project 1043, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 27.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>286</sup> Project 789, [Project Document](#), p. 5.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*

recover, and not always for its highest and best use. For example, livestock can become a risky livelihood asset to hold on to during conflict, since it can be easily stolen or killed. During Burundi's civil war, many households in conflict-affected areas reported losing livestock to theft and looting.<sup>288</sup> Accordingly, during conflict, many rural households sell livestock as a coping strategy. Instead of keeping livestock, rural households tend to resort to the cultivation of low-risk low-return crops that can feed their families and are less likely to attract combatants.<sup>289</sup> In Afghanistan, people cut down pistachio orchards and woodlands to use the wood for cooking, heating, and shelter or to sell it to earn a basic income.<sup>290</sup>

**136. Aggregate changes in natural resources driven by coping strategies can generate social tensions and instability that can affect projects.** The Terminal Evaluation for Project 3028 in Lebanon noted that the sociopolitical sustainability of the project had been compromised by the increasing pressures on land, natural resources, and infrastructure resulting from the Syrian refugee crisis, with the consequent destabilization of the project area and the region more broadly.<sup>291</sup> In addition to the stresses on the resources, changes in the critical mass of stakeholders also affected ownership of the project results and undermined the project's sustainability.

**137. Impacts from coping strategies are linked to local and regional security, refugee influx, and climatic stressors.** Coping mechanisms are primarily attributed to refugees and internally displaced persons in displacement camps, or who migrated to urban areas due to violence and conflict. During the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to safety to a region of Guinea known as the Parrot's Beak.<sup>292</sup> Integrating into local villages, many refugee families cut down trees to make space for and build homes. They also took up logging as a means for income. Forests were quickly depleted, as illustrated by the satellite images in Figure 3.2. Such events cause strains on natural resources while contributing to the proliferation of informal economies and ethnic divisions—all factors that may exacerbate the impacts of conflict on project implementation.<sup>293</sup> Coping strategies carried out on a large scale such as illegal mining, hunting, logging, and land use decrease the local carrying capacity affecting ecosystem services. Moreover, movements of refugees and displaced persons in an unstable region may increase compelling problems such as water scarcity further intensifying grievances.

**138. The struggle of managing response to large influxes of refugees can affect GEF projects as governments reprioritize funding and resources.** For example, in Jordan, the TER for a project to implement a comprehensive PCB management system noted that the intensity of the neighboring armed conflict and the resultant influx of more than 2 million refugees into Jordan posed a significant burden on the Government, stating that “the sustainability of the

---

<sup>288</sup> IDMC and NRC 2006; Mercier, Rama, and Verwimp 2020.

<sup>289</sup> Rockmore 2020; Saumik 2015; Justino 2012.

<sup>290</sup> UNEP 2019.


<sup>291</sup> Project 3028, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 64.

<sup>292</sup> UNEP 2005.

<sup>293</sup> Justino 2012.

project outcomes is partly affected by the situation as the government needs to prioritize funding” for supporting the refugees.<sup>294</sup>

**Figure 3.2: Deforestation in the Parrot’s Beak Region of Guinea (1974 and 2002)**



Source: UNEP 2005, pp. 14-15.

139. **Climatic stressors and environmental security issues may increase movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, potentially heightening risk of conflict.** For example, Project 9661 in Mali saw increasing social conflict between ethnic groups, between farmers and herders, and between local people and migrants over the use of natural resources that have become increasingly scarce due to climatic stressors.<sup>295</sup> In a number of instances, conflict arose over differences in natural resource management practices and values held by different ethnic groups. Additionally, Project 2139 in the Albertine Rift considered refugee movements as a “high risk” to project implementation, given the increasing pressure on resources by returning refugees and internal ecological refugees due to climate variability. The project Results document noted that the refugee influx indeed “exacerbated the land use management in the country [Tanzania],”<sup>296</sup> resulting in increased violent conflicts between farmers and livestock owners. In response, a successful strategy of participatory land use plans and conflict management was adopted.

### **Conclusion**

140. **This section has highlighted the most common scenarios by which conflict and fragility can affect (and have affected) GEF projects.** It should be noted, however, that throughout the projects examined in this report, there is an additional array of less frequently occurring pathways by which conflict and fragility have affected GEF projects. For example, the reduced

<sup>294</sup> Project 4124, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 6.

<sup>295</sup> Project 9661, [Project Document](#), p. 64.

<sup>296</sup> Project 2139, [Results](#), p.132.

opportunities to have an effective dialogue space for diverse stakeholders in a project can have long-term implications for the project.

### 3.2 Impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects

**141. Risks related to conflict and fragility, as well as the ways in which GEF projects respond to those risks, affect project relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.** The GEF uses these four criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability—as the cornerstones for evaluation.<sup>297</sup> They are interconnected, and the examples noted in this evaluation illustrate particular impacts on one metric without suggesting that other metrics were not affected in the given project. The data for this analysis are both quantitative (scoring in a TER) and qualitative (from the TER, other documents, and interviews). However, the TER scores are limited in that they do not capture nuance, and not all projects have them. Consequently, we draw on other documents and on interviews for the below examples.

**142. Conflict and fragility can affect the relevance of a project—for better and for worse.** The GEF defines the relevance of a project as “the extent to which the intervention design and intended results were consistent with local and national environmental priorities and policies and to the GEF’s strategic priorities and objectives, and remained suited to the conditions of the context, over time.”<sup>298</sup> Armed conflict can shift the focus and priorities of a state and community away from environmental initiatives and initiatives that require cooperation, and toward efforts that directly affect conflict dynamics or provide relief. Fragility can have similar effects in skewing priorities. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, a GEF enabling activity to support the country in meeting its obligations under the Stockholm Convention noted that armed conflict had degraded the capacity of public institutions, and “Many ministries ... lost their capacity for action on the ground and for national coordination.”<sup>299</sup> Accordingly, the need for the project to support both coordination and on-the-ground action was elevated.

**143. The shift in priorities associated with conflict can negatively affect the relevance of projects that are not designed to address livelihoods or are not able to adapt to changing priorities.** Armed conflict disrupts livelihoods, food security, social cooperation, and the provision of basic services, which are often top priorities locally and nationally because of their centrality to quality of life. In Lebanon, for example, a project document for Project 216 noted that, because the violent conflict “took its toll on every resource in the country, ... the vast majority of people have been too preoccupied with overcoming the struggles of day to day living to pay much attention to the environment.”<sup>300</sup> A project can languish, or worse, when its goals are not perceived to be related to current priorities. Documents from another project in Lebanon (9414) noted that “[c]ountries now struggling with political and security challenges

---

<sup>297</sup> GEF IEO 2019a, p. 13. The 2010 Monitoring and Evaluation Policy also included Results/Impacts as a fifth evaluation criterion; the 2019 Policy incorporated Results/Impacts into the evaluation of Effectiveness.

<sup>298</sup> GEF IEO 2019a, para. 25(a).

<sup>299</sup> Project 3160, [Project Document](#), p. 4.

<sup>300</sup> Project 216, [Project Document](#), p. 1.

(including civil war) cannot place much priority on MSBs [migratory soaring birds] which may be seen as ‘someone else’s problem’ and MSB conservation is sometimes seen as a barrier to development and not as an integral part of the process.”<sup>301</sup> In this case, some people perceived the project priorities to be an impediment to achieving development objectives that are critical during conflict.

**144. Conflict often drives governments to reallocate financial, personnel, and other resources to conflict-related initiatives.** This was the case for Project 3828 in Syria. The project was canceled after conflict broke out so that UNDP could shift its program to humanitarian relief and recovery, because the original objectives of the project (related to energy efficiency in buildings) became a lower priority for Syria, and because of the implementation challenges associated with the deteriorating security situation.<sup>302</sup> Changes in state priorities associated with conflict can affect both project relevance and project sustainability. The TER for Project 3430 in Sudan, for example, noted that “the secession of South Sudan, which has perturbed the project, has not ended conflict in the region. The ongoing conflict is expensive, drains government resources and undermines the ability of the state to prioritize and allocate resources to poverty reduction and climate change adaptation.”<sup>303</sup>

**145. Conflict can also enhance the relevance of GEF projects, particularly those designed to be conflict sensitive that address livelihoods, food security, cooperation, and basic services.** A Project Document from the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project (2357) in Burundi noted that “the prevalence of poverty and history of serious internal conflict in Burundi [means that] there is no other feasible development alternative to reducing poverty than agricultural and rural development,”<sup>304</sup> and that “the immediate priority of the government is the revival of the agriculture sector in order to ensure basic food security and the rehabilitation of the several thousands of displaced persons returning since the cessation of major conflict.”<sup>305</sup> This project was designed to directly address post-conflict priorities and was thus highly relevant in the conflict-affected context. Similarly, in Colombia, the Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia’s Orinoquia Region Project (9578) addressed sectors that were priorities for post-conflict peacebuilding and rebuilding. The Revised Project Information Document notes that “[b]iodiversity conservation strategies and climate change mitigation efforts in the Orinoquia – in particular those related to agriculture and forestry (AFOLU) – would be aligned with peacebuilding priorities” because the FARC-EP had a strong presence in the region.<sup>306</sup> The STAP review also commended the project for seeking “to incorporate the issues of conflict and peace into the design of the project to effectively address the environmental and social issues—both of which are priorities for Colombia following the end of the decades-long civil war.”<sup>307</sup>

---

<sup>301</sup> Project 9414, [Project Document Rev](#), p. 22.

<sup>302</sup> Project 3828, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>303</sup> Project 3430, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 6.

<sup>304</sup> Project 2357, [Project Document for WP](#), p. 7.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>306</sup> Project 9578, [Revised PID](#), p. 7.

<sup>307</sup> Project 9578, [STAP review](#), pp. 1-2.



146. One way that GEF projects enhance their relevance is by leveraging environmental objectives to support peace processes in post-conflict contexts. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Project 9515 was designed to align with the Strategy Document for Growth and Poverty Reduction in South-Kivu, which prioritizes peace,<sup>308</sup> and with FAO's earlier peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts through food and agricultural initiatives.<sup>309</sup> Similarly, in Colombia, Project 9441, Contributing to the Integrated Management of Biodiversity in the Pacific Region of Colombia to Build Peace, leverages biodiversity management as a tool for peacebuilding, thus increasing the relevance of the project. In the Project Identification Form, it is noted that the project "is consistent with the Peace Process in the framework of agreement Number 1 of La Habana that addresses the environmental zoning of the territory with the aim of identifying strategic areas for conservation and provision of ecosystem services."<sup>310</sup>

147. **The fluid nature of conflict and fragility can change the relevance of a project over time.** This means that a project, once relevant, can become less relevant. While such changes could happen with any project, the volatility of fragile and conflict-affected situations makes it more likely than in more stable situations. This can be a challenge, because changing the objectives of a project (e.g., to make it relevant in the new conditions) would require approval from the GEF Council.

148. **Conflict and fragility have an impact on the effectiveness of GEF projects through the channels presented in the previous section.** Effectiveness is "the extent to which the intervention achieved, or expects to achieve, results (outputs, outcomes and impacts, including global environmental benefits) taking into account the key factors influencing the results."<sup>311</sup> As pointed out earlier, tension and outbreaks of violence can cause restriction of access to project sites; difficulties with hiring; challenges between project partners; security risks for project staff and components; destruction of project facilities or resources; and many further complications.<sup>312</sup> Each of these challenges can lead to project cancellation or otherwise hamper the achievement of project outcomes.

149. **Statistical analyses of the GEF portfolio indicate that country-level projects in conflict-affected contexts were significantly more likely to be dropped or cancelled than projects in non-conflict contexts.** Specifically, a log regression of GEF projects globally indicated that projects in countries affected by major armed conflict had a 26 percent greater chance of being dropped or cancelled than projects in countries not affected by major armed conflict. A review by ELI of cancellation notices revealed that various conflict-related factors were cited as causes for project cancellation, including general insecurity issues, problems with sending staff to the

---

<sup>308</sup> Project 9515, [Project Document PAD](#), p. 53.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>310</sup> Project 9441, [PIF Document for WPI](#), p. 26.

<sup>311</sup> GEF IEO 2019a, para. 25(b). Because this research includes projects completed prior to 2019, it should be noted that this definition from the 2019 M&E Guidelines differs from the prior evaluation rubric that also included Results/Outcomes; the 2019 Guidelines merge Results/Outcomes into Effectiveness.

<sup>312</sup> See paras. 20-21, above.

country, barriers to cofinancing, damage to infrastructure, and institutional or political disarray. Project cancellation notices provide insights into the various ways in which conflict can hinder the ability to carry out a project.

150. **Many conflict cancellation notices note the challenges posed by deterioration or lack of institutional capacity to carry out project activities.** For example, in Project 2130, encompassing Iran and Afghanistan, “the Government of Afghanistan expressed their inability to go through the project formulation process despite their keen interest” because of the “capacity limitations and overall constraints imposed by the political and security situation in the country.”<sup>313</sup> In Sudan, the cancellation notice for Project 3389 noted that “the uncertainty in terms of institutional and administrative structure resulting from the referendum and the subsequent separation of the South constituted an additional risk element with respect to national policy level interventions (as required by the TerrAfrica program).”<sup>314</sup> In this case, the institutional ramifications of conflict made it difficult to ascertain whether the national government would be able to perform the policy interventions necessary for the project activities to be carried out.

151. **Conflict can present financing challenges that prevent project activities from being carried out.** This problem was prevalent in two cancellation notices from Yemen. For Project 3474, the notice explained that “from January 2011, a number of attempts by UNEP to restart the project activities were unsuccessful due to the Arab Spring that commenced in February 2011, unrealized co-finance commitments by the partners, claims of compensation by the drilling contractor and disbandment of the executing team following the civil war.”<sup>315</sup> In reference to Project 4201, the notice mentioned that “in view of the ongoing situation in Yemen with suspension of disbursements since July 28, 2011, the uncertainties around the likely priorities to emerge in the post-transition/re-engagement period, and the status of project preparation to date and likely future challenges in preparation, it is not feasible to envisage preparation and delivery of the project at this point in time.”<sup>316</sup>

152. **In some cases, there were multiple conflict-related reasons for cancellation.** For example, in Yemen, Project 3474 was cancelled because of insecurity issues that arose from the Arab Spring, lack of co-financing from partners, and staff disbandment after the civil war commenced.<sup>317</sup> In Chad, Project 4081 was canceled because “[s]ufficient co-financing had not been committed by partners and security issues meant that baseline data could not be collected; as UNDP was engaging with partners to resolve this matter, a number of other issues arose. The Sahel food crisis struck Chad in 2009/10 and 2012—and was compounded by a deterioration in the law and order situation in some areas.”<sup>318</sup>

---

<sup>313</sup> Project 2130, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>314</sup> Project 3389, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>315</sup> Project 3474, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>316</sup> Project 4201, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

<sup>317</sup> Project 3474, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors.

<sup>318</sup> Project 4081, Cancellation Notice, on file with authors, p. 1.

**153. Short of leading to project cancellation, conflict can hamper project effectiveness during implementation.** A number of staff interviewed for this evaluation noted that Implementing Agencies are usually reluctant to pursue substantial project changes to address an escalation of conflict, because GEF procedures require substantial changes to a project to be approved by the GEF Council. As a result, interviewees note, when conflict interrupts project activities, projects often make only marginal changes, rather than propose fundamental changes to adapt to the conflict. In such situations, the project proceeds, albeit with less effectiveness.

**154. Conflict and fragility can reduce the efficiency of GEF projects.** Efficiency is defined as “the extent to which the intervention achieved value for resources, by converting inputs (funds, personnel, expertise, equipment, etc.) to results in the timeliest and least costly way possible, compared to alternatives.”<sup>319</sup> Complications generated by conflict and fragility can require costly adjustments. For example, in Colombia, Project 2019 had to be restructured to respond to the conflict. The Terminal Evaluation noted that “the location of the activities under Component B, were not implemented in Las Hermosas Massif, as originally planned, but in the Chingaza Páramo and the National Natural Park Los Nevados due to security concerns.”<sup>320</sup> The restructuring, which happened in 2010, four years after the project was approved, cost an additional \$3.5 million. According to the available documents, this alternative scenario was not considered or included in the initial project proposal or design.

**155. Analyses of the GEF’s global portfolio indicated that conflict has a statistically significant impact on the duration of project delays.**<sup>321</sup> Examination of specific GEF projects highlight a number of specific mechanisms by which conflict and fragility hinder project efficiency. Conflict and fragility can increase costs and delays to accessing project sites; necessitate additional costly security measures; aggravate tensions and lack of trust between stakeholders; cause government institutions to refocus attention and resources to address the situation; or require additional time and costs for institution building and decision making.

**156. When projects require cooperation between stakeholders, tensions between different entities can get in the way of project activities, affecting both efficiency and effectiveness.** Project 2929, on Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin through Development and Adoption of a Multi-Focal Area Strategic Action Programme, illustrates this dynamic. Tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the two countries involved, delayed the project’s completion by 17 months. Meetings were cancelled at critical moments, and the overall objectives of the project were never achieved. According to the TER, “the political and technical had to be separated and unfortunately this never happened and ended up being perhaps the hardest lesson that was learned by project stakeholders when the ultimate project objective would not be reached.”<sup>322</sup>

---

<sup>319</sup> GEF IEO 2019a, para. 25(c).

<sup>320</sup> Project 2019, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 5.

<sup>321</sup> See Annex H.

<sup>322</sup> Project 2929, [Final Evaluation](#), p. 8.



**157. Efficiency can also be affected as institutions shift priorities to address conflict dynamics, as agencies are targeted, or as agencies have fewer resources to direct to projects.** These developments can generate substantial slowdowns in government action, resulting in inefficiencies if projects are unprepared for them. In Mali, GEF Project 1152 (on Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Inner Niger Delta and its Transition Areas) faced numerous delays because of political conditions associated with state fragility, which then were exacerbated when civil war broke out in 2012.<sup>323</sup> The project experienced delays in the implementation of the agreement with the National Investment Agency for Local Communities, a delay in the transfer of funds by the National Department of Agriculture to its Regional Directorate in Mopti, and a delay in launching the investments. The delay in the implementation of the agreement with the National Investment Agency for Local Communities and the political crisis undermined financing of the microprojects. As a result, following the supervision mission in 2013, 22 contracts amounting CFAF110 million were cancelled and the project was delayed by nearly 40 months.<sup>324</sup> Ultimately, the TER noted that “the economic rate of return [of the project] is estimated at 39% ... the insecurity generated by the socio-political crisis experienced in the region, disrupted the achievement of the project investments in the Mopti region, and therefore had an impact on the efficiency.”<sup>325</sup>

**158. One of the most common effects of conflict and fragility on GEF projects is to undermine their sustainability.** Sustainability is “the continuation/likely continuation of positive effects from the intervention after it has come to an end, and its potential for scale-up and/or replication; interventions need to be environmentally as well as institutionally, financially, politically, culturally and socially sustainable.”<sup>326</sup> The STAP has noted that conflict “affects the viability or sustainability of investments in environmental protection.”<sup>327</sup> Conflict and fragility can threaten sustainability by harming institutional and physical structures necessary to continue project outcomes, by affecting relationships between project stakeholders, and by affecting the relevance of the continued project activities.

**159. Throughout the GEF portfolio, of the four GEF evaluation criteria, sustainability scores in Terminal Evaluations are the most clearly affected by the presence of armed conflict.** Statistical analyses, summarized in Annex H, show a statistically significant difference in measures of sustainability in projects in countries affected by major armed conflict as compared to projects in other countries.

**160. Fragility—and particularly sociopolitical instability—has affected the sustainability of many GEF projects.** In these instances, leadership and political priorities pivot away from conservation objectives, undermining the continuous support necessary to a project’s outcomes. For example, in Mali, the TER for Project 1274 observed that the low sustainability

---

<sup>323</sup> Project 1152, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 10.

<sup>324</sup> Project 1152, [Project Completion Report](#), p. 23.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>326</sup> GEF IEO 2019a, para. 25(d).

<sup>327</sup> GEF STAP 2018, p. 3.

rating is related to the political situation of the country following the March 2012 Military Coup that created an environment of instability and uncertainty. The project's accomplishments in key areas such as strengthening of regulatory aspects and increase in capacity building in key sector institutions and at the local community level are to some extent irreversible. The main risk is that the political crises deepen further, or reach a steady state, which would dilute the motivation of the civil service, compel leading staff to search for opportunities abroad, worsen governance in regulatory agencies, and bring the reform process that Mali embarked upon in the 1990s to an indefinite standstill.<sup>328</sup> This project, which sought to increase household energy access in rural Mali was highly dependent on government will and support for project outcomes and continued investment, which were jeopardized by the coup and change in administration.

**161. Fragility at both the national and local levels can affect project sustainability.** In Lebanon, spillover effects from the Syrian conflict undermined the sustainability of Project 3028 on SFM Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources. The Terminal Evaluation for the project noted that "There is instability within the country and region, and the Syrian refugee crisis is currently putting pressure on land and natural resources, as well as on infrastructure and social support systems."<sup>329</sup> This instability posed a threat to sustainability of project outcomes, because it led to changes in government at the national and local levels, jeopardizing commitments made to the project's objectives. Additionally, the final Project Implementation Report noted that one of the seven project pilot sites was grazed by local shepherds who claimed rights to the lands.<sup>330</sup> In this situation, the conflict affected both national priorities and local dynamics, such that project outcomes were threatened both institutionally in terms of political support and locally in terms of land competition.

**162. Land disputes are a common sociopolitical risk for the sustainability of projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** Project 3028 in Lebanon, just described, provides one example; Project 197 in Guatemala is another. The Terminal Evaluation for Project 197, which aimed to support Integrated Biodiversity Protection in the Sarstun-Motagua Region notes that "socio-political sustainability is precarious because Guatemala just came out of a civil war, and it is going through many socio-economic changes, including land ownership conflicts, unresolved land uses issues and other uncertainties that are beyond the scope of the project."<sup>331</sup>

**163. Outbreaks of violence directly undermine the ability of organizations to continue project activities.** This may directly affect sustainability, if the project area becomes difficult to access. For example, during implementation of Project 774 in Colombia, the project site came under control of FARC rebels, and the project team was unable to enter the area because the security risks were too high.<sup>332</sup> In addition, the threat of violence and weakened governance can drive outmigration and affect local livelihoods. In Colombia, the TER for Project 625, which

---

<sup>328</sup> Project 1274, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 21.

<sup>329</sup> Project 3028, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 43.

<sup>330</sup> Project 3959, PIR, p. 4.

<sup>331</sup> Project 197, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 4.

<sup>332</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, June 2020.

took place in the Western Slopes of the Serrania del Baudo, noted that “The constant presence of armed guerrilla groups also undermine socio-political sustainability as the [Terminal Evaluation] mentions that this results in population displacements, rural migration, unemployment, productivity declines and contributes to an overall level of lawlessness and high crime.”<sup>333</sup> While the project focused on the sustainable use of natural resources, criminal networks and activity drove unsustainable (and illegal) resource extraction.

**164. Fragility and conflict can also undermine cooperation and collaboration necessary for sustainability beyond the life of the project.** For example, in Project 625, the TER mentioned that surrounding indigenous communities, which represent 4 percent of the population but occupy 65 percent of the land in the region, as well as some Afro-Colombian communities, refused to participate in the project.<sup>334</sup> Projects, and project evaluations, are increasingly recognizing these challenges. The TER for Project 534, which took place in Dinder National Park in Sudan, noted that:

According to the [Terminal Evaluation], much work still remains to be done with the communities in the area. Although the violent clashes between park scouts and poachers have reduced as a result of the project, relations remain tense. This park conflict is only the “downstream” part of a much wider land use problem in which pastoralists are squeezed out of the areas neighboring the national park states by the unauthorized expansion in (mechanized) farming. Thus, pastoralists have to move to other areas of the park and the scouts shoot their cattle as it invades park areas. The [Terminal Evaluation] makes several recommendations to begin more cooperative work with the communities but the results still remain to be seen, thus socio political sustainability is moderately unlikely.<sup>335</sup>

**165. One of the best ways to enhance sustainability of GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations is to build capacity of civil society.** In assessing lessons from Project 197, in Guatemala, the TER noted that:

Environmental, social and political sustainability of GEF projects cannot always be achieved in 6-8 years and with an investment of \$5–8 million in countries with low governability, high levels of poverty and serious social conflicts as left after a civil war. In such cases, strengthening civil society institutions such as regional NGOs, can be the best strategy to achieve environmental results and increase the likelihood of their sustainability.<sup>336</sup>

Curiously, the TER framed these issues as “beyond the scope of the project.” Because they go to the sustainability of the project outcomes, they cannot be beyond the scope of the project.

---

<sup>333</sup> Project 625, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 4.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> Project 534, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p.3.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

Indeed, there is widespread recognition of important linkages between local ownership, environmental governance, and sustainability.<sup>337</sup>

166. **Another way to enhance the sustainability of projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected situations is to ensure monitoring efforts continue after project closure.** The long-term outcomes of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)'s 1998 Cordillera del Cóndor project provides lessons in this respect. The Cordillera del Cóndor project is well known for its success in helping to resolve a 150-year old border conflict (sometimes violent) between Ecuador and Peru through the creation of a transboundary ecoregion.<sup>338</sup> However, after peace was achieved, the ecological benefits of Cordillera del Cóndor deteriorated as extractive industries and drug gangs became active in the region. Without a proper plan for ongoing monitoring and enforcement, 20 years following the project's closure, few of its conservation goals have been met.<sup>339</sup>

### 3.3 Typology of conflict-sensitive GEF programming approaches

167. **Conflict-sensitive strategies gleaned from the in-depth review of selected GEF-supported projects in the seven situations of focus can be arranged into a five-category typology** (figure 3.3). Acknowledgement, the threshold consideration in the typology, demonstrates in project documents that the project is aware of the conflict context. From there, a project may take no further action (simply acknowledging the situation without trying to manage accompanying risks) or, alternatively, may respond to the conflict context through avoidance or one or more mitigation measures. In some cases, projects actively embrace peacebuilding opportunities in the project's activities. Projects also can draw on learning from other GEF-funded projects and initiatives from other organizations to improve programming of future projects as well (in some instances) as the one under consideration.

---

<sup>337</sup> Bruch et al. 2016, p. 978.

<sup>338</sup> E.g., Westrik 2015; Kakabadse et al. 2016.

<sup>339</sup> Ali 2019.

**Figure 3.3: Typology of Conflict-Sensitive Strategies in GEF Projects**



Source: ELI and GEF IEO.

### **Conflict acknowledgement**

168. **At the most basic level of conflict sensitivity, many projects acknowledge the presence of armed violence and insecurity in the project area.** In several cases, early project documents such as Project Identification Forms acknowledge previous armed conflict (as well as its environmental effects) but do not describe any strategies for managing conflict-related risks. More frequently, especially in projects nearer in time to the armed conflict, acknowledgment of a situation’s conflict context is accompanied by measures designed to avoid or mitigate conflict-related risks, or even to capitalize on peacebuilding opportunities.

169. **Acknowledgement can appear in mentions of several conflict-related phenomena, including conflict itself, associated political instability and fragility, and the presence of refugees, displaced persons, combatants, and ex-combatants.** The Project Appraisal Document for Project 9515 in the Albertine Rift (Democratic Republic of Congo), for instance, lists the country’s “succession of conflicts,” including the “war of the Democratic Force Alliance for the liberation of Congo in 1998 [and] war of the Congolese Rally for Democracy between 1998 and 2003” up to conflicts “still happening today,” when establishing the project’s context.<sup>340</sup> The

<sup>340</sup> Project 9515, [Project Appraisal Document](#), p. 13.

Project Appraisal Document acknowledged the history of conflict, but it did not indicate specific risks that the conflict posed to the project; nor did it propose measures to manage those risks.

170. Where project documents do propose measures to mitigate or otherwise manage conflict-related risks, they also tend to provide more specificity about the risks. For example, some project documents highlight the location of combatants or ex-combatants in relation to the project site. Project 1043 in Cambodia described the project location by explaining that “[f]rom the early 1970s the region was a central base of the Khmer Rouge and as a consequence experienced long periods of conflict and civil war, which only ceased in 1998.”<sup>341</sup> Beyond the Khmer Rouge presence, Project 1043 stated that the “military poses the most significant risk to the project” because of its involvement in illegal logging, large-scale hunting, and wildlife trade.<sup>342</sup> A section on the implications of the 1998–99 Kosovo War in the Project Brief for Project 32 in the Balkans (Macedonia) lists refugees among the “[n]egative repercussions” of the war and identifies “transboundary refugee movements” as a potential resulting issue between Albania and Kosovo.<sup>343</sup>

171. **At the design stage, some projects acknowledge the impact that conflict has had on the environment and natural resources.** For example, projects may highlight instances of illegal resource use, such as logging, wildlife trade, and poaching, that take place during conflict.<sup>344</sup> Several projects note the lasting impacts of land mines. Project 1086 in Cambodia, for example, mentioned that “[l]andmines, armaments and munitions are still widespread”<sup>345</sup> and expressed concern that “the same landmines are then being deployed in the forest to hunt wildlife.”<sup>346</sup> Pollution from an armed conflict has also motivated efforts to address locations suffering from acute pollution (sometimes referred to as “environmental hotspots”; for example, from “the destruction of electrical and military equipment during regional conflicts, such as the Balkans and the Israel-Lebanon wars.”<sup>347</sup> Uncontrolled development is another impact of conflict on the environment with implications for GEF projects. Project 3028 in Lebanon, for example, noted that “[u]ncontrolled urban expansion occurred in particular during the civil war, when many people wished to settle away from the urban centres for security reasons.”<sup>348</sup> Projects have also noted the impacts of conflict on ecotourism,<sup>349</sup> water infrastructure,<sup>350</sup> and energy infrastructure.<sup>351</sup>

---

<sup>341</sup> Project 1043, [Project Document for WP](#), p. 7.

<sup>342</sup> Project 1043, [Executive Summary](#), p. 9.

<sup>343</sup> Project 32, [Project Brief](#), p. 9.

<sup>344</sup> E.g., Project 9661, [Project Document](#), p. 12 (which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks).

<sup>345</sup> Project 1086, [Project Brief](#), p. 9.

<sup>346</sup> Project 1086, [Project Document](#), p. 15.

<sup>347</sup> E.g., Project 2600, [Annex F](#), PDF p. 184 (which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks).

<sup>348</sup> Project 3028, [Project Document](#), p. 10.

<sup>349</sup> E.g., Project 9414, [Project Appraisal Document](#), p. 22 (which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks).

<sup>350</sup> E.g., Project 2143, [Executive Summary](#), p. 16.

<sup>351</sup> Project 4133, [ECOWAS Observatory for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency project document](#), p. 1.

172. In addition to acknowledging the impacts of the conflict on the environment, **some projects have recognized that the effects of conflict (and peace processes) on environmental governance pose risks and obstacles to project success.** Some peace agreements create institutional arrangements that can complicate governance. For example, Project 2143 in the Balkans noted that the institutional structure created by the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “while mitigating the potential for inter-ethnic tensions and conflict[,] is rather complicated and a potential source of diseconomies.”<sup>352</sup> Insecurity associated with conflict can make it difficult to physically access project sites, particularly protected areas. Project 1907 in Afghanistan mentions that “some difficulties could arise in communications routes to/from the protected areas” of focus.<sup>353</sup> After conflict, the political push for economic development can take priority over environmental protection. In Lebanon, for example, Project 3028 identified the “[n]eed for quick reconstruction of the country in the post-war period” as one of the root causes of conversion of woodland.<sup>354</sup> Environmental data are often missing, making it difficult to make governance decisions.<sup>355</sup>

173. The remaining four approaches adopted by GEF projects to conflict-sensitive design and implementation—avoidance, mitigation, embracing the peacebuilding opportunities, and learning—all go beyond simple acknowledgment of the risk and identify measures to manage the risk.

#### **Managing conflict risks through avoidance**

174. **The simplest approach to managing conflict-related risks is avoidance.** To mitigate the risks posed by a situation’s conflict context, some project proponents have deliberately selected a geographic location for the project that is physically removed from the regions affected by conflict. For example, Project 947 in Colombia, noted that the “Quindio departments face some security problems because of armed insurrection, paramilitary forces and common delinquency,” and subsequently ruled out the possibility of working there. In light of the security risk factors, the “high mountain zones were therefore discarded, even if livestock systems in those higher altitudes” were better suited for the project objectives.<sup>356</sup> Projects 4227 and 5017 in Afghanistan similarly decided to select areas “that have experienced calm and good governance.”<sup>357</sup>

175. **Although avoidance can help to manage conflict-related risks, it has its limitations.** Many conflict-affected regions are biodiversity hotspots.<sup>358</sup> Systematically avoiding those areas because of conflict—rather than taking other measures to manage the risk—may contribute to biodiversity loss and overall lower achievement of the GEF’s desired global environmental

---

<sup>352</sup> Project 2143, [Project Document](#), Word p. 21.

<sup>353</sup> Project 1907, [Project Document](#), p. 8.

<sup>354</sup> Project 3028, [Appendices](#), p. 7. See also Project 3772, [Project Information Form](#), p. 3.

<sup>355</sup> *E.g.*, Project 621, Project Document (downloaded 11 March 2020), p. 3 (which also proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks).

<sup>356</sup> Project 947, [Project Appraisal Document for CEO Endorsement](#), p. 111.

<sup>357</sup> Project 4227, [PIE](#), p. 18; Project 5017, [PIE](#), p. 13.

<sup>358</sup> Hanson et al. (2009).



benefits, particularly those related to biodiversity and land degradation. Moreover, the geographic range of conflicts can change quickly, so relying solely on avoidance can be short-sighted.

### **Managing conflict risks through mitigation**

176. **Mitigation strategies directly address conflict-related risks in project design and implementation.** Generally, mitigation strategies recognize that the conflict-affected or fragile context presents risks to the project, and then seek to identify them early on and address them before they escalate and seriously affect the project. The reviewed GEF projects adopted six categories of approaches that mitigate conflict-related risks, including training, monitoring, using a participatory approach, partnering with local organizations, instituting dispute resolution mechanisms, and using adaptive management.<sup>359</sup>

177. **Recognizing that environmental staff may lack expertise in conflict management, some projects have sought to *build capacity* of staff to understand and manage conflict-related risks to environmental projects.** For example, in Mali, Project 2193 used training materials on “Natural Resources Conflict Management,” which had been produced by FAO (the Implementing Agency) and DfID.<sup>360</sup>

178. **Another approach to mitigating conflict-related risks is to develop mechanisms to *monitor security conditions that could affect activities*.** Fragile and conflict-affected situations can be volatile, with the security situation changing both dramatically and rapidly. Monitoring enables project staff to detect emerging risks early, before they have escalated. Monitoring often begins with baseline assessments.<sup>361</sup> While a project is under way, monitoring can continue to inform risk management and ensure rapid action to reduce the risk of negative impacts.

179. ***Participatory approaches that equitably engage all affected stakeholders have been used as a mitigation strategy, especially where tension exists between different actors.*** Project 5202 in Afghanistan, for example, aims to ensure “an inclusive, participatory approach involving all key stakeholders” to mitigate the risk of inter-community conflict.<sup>362</sup> Similarly, Project 2139 in the Albertine Rift (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) identifies “a decentralized, participatory and adaptive management approach” and “extensive stakeholder consultations from local to basin-wide level” in the design stage to mitigate the risk of civil strife and insecurity.<sup>363</sup> With participatory approaches, a project often

---

<sup>359</sup> As noted in para. 4 above, of 62 projects reviewed as part of the seven situation profiles, 59 identified various risks and 56 proposed initial measures to manage risk. Only 39 Project Identification Formss identified conflict as a risk—even though all 62 projects were situated in a country with an ongoing or past major armed conflict—and only 33 of the projects proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks. None of the 62 Project Identification Formss reviewed mentioned fragility. [These numbers do not include other Project Identification Forms that were reviewed, but were not part of the seven situation profiles.]

<sup>360</sup> Project 2193, [Project Document](#), p. 16.

<sup>361</sup> E.g., Project 1152, [Project Document for WP](#), p. 53.

<sup>362</sup> Project 5202, [PIF](#), p. 9.

<sup>363</sup> Project 2139, [PIF Document](#), p. 8.



also strengthens the participation of traditionally underrepresented or otherwise marginalized groups, including “buffer zone and rural communities” and women—as in Projects 2551 and 9663, respectively, in Colombia.<sup>364</sup> A non-GEF project carried out in the Farchana Refugee camp in Chad illustrates the importance of consulting with local communities ahead of project implementation. It is speculated that at least one outbreak of violence, leading the death of two refugees and multiple other injuries, began when an implementing agency “asked the refugees to plant trees.”<sup>365</sup> Across West Africa, tree planting is viewed as a demonstration of land ownership. When the Darfuri refugees were asked to plant trees, they interpreted the request to mean that they were being given the land surrounding the refugee camp and could not expect to return to Darfur. Had the project staff undertaken an earlier consultation with the Darfuri refugees or others from the community, they may have been “able to avoid this misinterpretation and its subsequent violence.”<sup>366</sup>

**180. Consideration of staffing, job creation, and procurement—all of which affect local livelihoods—across social divides can also mitigate conflict-related risks.** Such consideration can help ensure that a project does not unintentionally entrench existing inequities. Careful selection of project staff can be important. Project 9531 in Afghanistan, for example, specified that “[p]roject staff employed will be from local Wakhan communities, wherever possible” to reduce the risk of potential resurgence of conflict.<sup>367</sup> Awareness of conflict dynamics can drive decisions concerning distribution of jobs created by project activities. Project 32 in the Balkans (Macedonia) specified that the project would create “local construction jobs and a very few jobs when the units are operational, which will benefit both ethnic groups,” namely Macedonian and Albanian community members with lingering tensions from the Kosovo War.<sup>368</sup>

**181. Partnering with local groups and communities has been used to help mitigate conflict-related risks.** Before entering a conflict-affected area, projects can work with in-country and local partners to lay the groundwork for coordinated implementation. In the Albertine Rift, project 2139 set out to “obtain full cooperation of local and national government authorities for inter-sectoral processes” to mitigate security risks.<sup>369</sup> Other projects work with local partners to learn from their experiences and so that project activities can continue even if security conditions worsen. In project 774, the World Bank worked with the Humboldt Institute because of its experience in Colombia’s conflict-affected areas, which allowed the project “to work in rural areas and avoid security problems.”<sup>370</sup> Project 9090 in Afghanistan noted that on-the-ground activities would “be coordinated by local-level authorities so that project activities can be completed in relative independence during times of increased security concerns.”<sup>371</sup> Local

---

<sup>364</sup> Project 2551, [Executive Summary](#), p. 4; Project 9663, [Project Document PAD Revised](#), pp. 114-116.

<sup>365</sup> *IRIN News* 2004.

<sup>366</sup> Rehr 2009.

<sup>367</sup> Project 9531, [Project Document](#), p. 52.

<sup>368</sup> Project 32, [Project Brief](#), p. 9.

<sup>369</sup> Project 2139, [Project Document](#), p. 54.

<sup>370</sup> Project 774, [Project Appraisal Document for CEO Endorsement](#), p. 38.

<sup>371</sup> Project 9090, [PIF](#), p. 14.

partnerships can directly engage combatant groups that affect the project.<sup>372</sup> Project 2100 in the Albertine Rift, for example, explained that its “proposed integration of Simba communities into project activities is an important element of the project,” given the group’s presence and history of rebellion in the area surrounding the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Maiko National Park.<sup>373</sup>

**182. Projects have also established *dispute resolution mechanisms* to peacefully resolve disputes before they escalate to violence or conflict.** These mechanisms can rely on or draw from traditional institutions and practices; projects 5202 in Afghanistan and 1152 in Mali, for example, both specify that customary dispute resolution mechanisms will be used to mitigate conflict-related risks.<sup>374</sup> Conflict resolution mechanisms can also support a project’s participatory approach. Another project in Mali, 5746, aims to reduce the number of conflicts in the project area by half through a “conflict resolution mechanism including 30% women as members.”<sup>375</sup> Partners on the ground can also help resolve conflicts when they do arise. This project looks to community-based organizations to “contribute to the conflicts resolution” and to municipalities to “[c]ontribute to the resolution of possible conflicts in the context of the implementation of the project.”

**183. Lastly, a number of projects have integrated *adaptive management approaches* into their design.** Adaptive management relies on monitoring, periodic evaluations, and—most important—an ability to adjust strategies to address new information and developments.<sup>376</sup> Some projects have stated generally that the project will adapt to changing circumstances: Project 2100 in the Albertine Rift drew on the World Bank’s experience in the Democratic Republic of Congo and noted the importance of keeping project design “simple and flexible.”<sup>377</sup> Project documents can also specify ways in which the project could adapt if security conditions worsen. Project 1020 in Colombia proposed a general adaptive approach that would allow modification of project activities. This approach included a number of measures, including a conflict resolution mechanism, and “a flexible design that would allow the modification of some activities according to the security situation (e.g., meetings to be held outside of the region), without affecting project development objective.”<sup>378</sup> Project 5202 in Afghanistan indicated that it will monitor the security situation and “if necessary, project activities will be shifted to more secure districts or management.”<sup>379</sup>

---

<sup>372</sup> See, e.g., Pritchard 2015.

<sup>373</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 127. In addition, Project 1043 proposed working with the Cambodian armed forces, which had integrated excombatants from the Khmer Rouge and other combatant groups after hostilities ended. Project 1043, [Executive Summary](#), pp. 9-10.

<sup>374</sup> Project 5202, [PIE](#), p. 9; Project 1152, [Project Document for WP](#), p. 53.

<sup>375</sup> Project 5746, [Request for CEO Approval](#), p. 24.

<sup>376</sup> E.g., Project 9090, [PIE](#), p. 14; Project 9670, [Endorsement Document](#), p. 33; Project 9491, [Project Document](#), p. 88.

<sup>377</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 16.

<sup>378</sup> Project 1020, [Project Document](#), p. 26.

<sup>379</sup> Project 5202, [Project Information Form](#), p. 9.

184. **Occasionally, projects explicitly contemplate the resource requirements of adaptive actions.** That is to say, even when projects referred to adaptive management or adaptation strategies to manage risks of working in fragile or conflict-affected situations, there was rarely any evidence that they had estimated how much the adaptations might cost, let alone included a budget line. One uncommon example was Project 2888 in the Albertine Rift, which highlighted the need to evaluate “what it will cost now and projected into the future under various scenarios (good security to intermittent security).”<sup>380</sup>

185. Interviews with project staff indicated that **the costs required to respond to a potential conflict flare-up can be listed as a separate budget line without allocated funds in the design phase, making it easier to efficiently reallocate funds if the security situation deteriorates.**<sup>381</sup> Specific and detailed planning for adaptive actions and their costs allows projects to more efficiently change course when the security situation demands it.

#### **Managing conflict risks by embracing peacebuilding opportunities**

186. **Several projects have gone beyond merely trying to manage the risks of conflict to proactively embracing peacebuilding opportunities presented by the conflict or fragile context.** There are three particular types of opportunities in the reviewed GEF-funded projects: political will, cooperation and confidence building, post-conflict recovery, and reintegration of ex-combatants.

187. **Some projects have observed that the heightened *political priority and political will* focused on peacebuilding during conflict and post-conflict periods create opportunities for the project.** Project 1086 in Cambodia noted that “[p]ost crisis conditions create a special set of circumstances which represent both a threat and a significant opportunity for the conservation of nature and natural resources.”<sup>382</sup> In particular, the post-conflict inflow of international funding allowed for a reexamination of Cambodia’s protected area system and development of effective management plans for existing protected areas.<sup>383</sup> Projects have framed their relevance in part as implementing the peace agreement. Project 9441 in Colombia, for example, emphasized the positive implications of the 2016 peace agreement by identifying the GEF’s opportunity “to supporting [*sic*] the inclusion of environmental management criteria in these updated planning tools.”<sup>384</sup> Projects also identify specific ways that conflict and peace dynamics can contribute to the project. As an example, Project 9661 in Mali, which focuses on community-based elephant conservation, explained that the 2017 ceasefire agreement “could be a boon for elephant protection in Mali, as the security tensions should decrease providing opportunity for this GEF project.”<sup>385</sup>

---

<sup>380</sup> Project 2888, [Medium-Sized Project Proposal](#), pp. 13-14.

<sup>381</sup> E.g., Interview, whom.

<sup>382</sup> Project 1086, [PDF-A Document](#), p. 3.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid.

<sup>384</sup> Project 9441, [Project Information Form](#), p. 10.

<sup>385</sup> Project 9661, [Project Document](#), p. 9.

188. **Projects in the GEF International Waters focal area have cited *increased cooperation as a cobenefit*.** In the Balkans, for instance, Project 5723 explained that “[i]nter-state cooperation in the [Drina River Basin] has a potential to ease conflicting interests, and provide gains in the form of savings that can be achieved, or the costs of non-cooperation or dispute that can be averted.”<sup>386</sup> Cooperation can even be a motivating factor for countries to participate in projects. Both tranches of the Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project highlighted that “there is an awareness at the highest political levels of the Nile countries of the possibilities of a ‘cooperation and peace dividend’ which the broader [Nile Basin Initiative] can leverage” “to achieve cooperation, economic exchange and eventually greater integration and interdependence.”<sup>387</sup>

189. **Some projects identify how they will *rebuild livelihoods, infrastructure, capacity, and ecosystems as part of the broader post-conflict recovery process*.** Project 2357 in the Albertine Rift, for example, stated that one of its broad goals was to “help restore productive capacity and livelihoods in a country that is just emerging from severe conflict by revitalizing and diversifying its agricultural production on a sustainable basis.”<sup>388</sup> Project 5604, which was implemented in “among the worst war devastated communities in” Bosnia-Herzegovina where substantial water infrastructure was destroyed, similarly explained that the project, “by transferring best available climate resilient flood risk management, will [...] contribute to further reconciliation in a war damaged area.”<sup>389</sup> Other projects also adopt an approach of building back better with an eye toward future conflict prevention. In Colombia, Project 9578 stated that “[b]y implementing activities for controlling deforestation hot-spots, it is anticipated that the [integrated land-use planning] component will also contribute to improving State presence in areas affected by violence and illicit activities, thus reducing illegal land acquisition and land related conflicts.”<sup>390</sup> The project claimed that on a broader level, the sustainable land use and management component “will contribute to reduce the historical disparity between urban and rural areas, one of the structural causes of the Colombian conflict.”<sup>391</sup> Also in Colombia, Project 4916 and the GEF Small Grants Program funded community enterprises to process and commercialize non-timber forest products in the biodiverse Chocó Region, providing alternative livelihoods to mining.<sup>392</sup>

190. **GEF projects have also been designed to engage with processes to *reintegrate ex-combatants and displaced persons*.** In the Albertine Rift, Project 2357 noted that it aligns with the Burundi government’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, which supports “the reintegration of displaced persons and other victims of conflict into agricultural production.”<sup>393</sup> Actors in armed conflict—including members of rebel groups—can also serve as partners in project implementation. Project 2100 in the Albertine Rift proposed to integrate “Simba

---

<sup>386</sup> Project 5723, [Project Document](#), PDF p. 68.

<sup>387</sup> Project 1094, [Project Document](#), Word p. 38; Project 2584, [Project Appraisal Document](#), p. 23.

<sup>388</sup> Project 2357, [Project Document](#), p. 86.

<sup>389</sup> Project 5604, [Council Notification Letter](#), PDF pp. 25 and 53.

<sup>390</sup> Project 9578, [Project Information Document](#), p. 11.

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.

<sup>392</sup> Project 4916, [PIF Document for WPI](#); GEF IEO 2019b, p. 34.

<sup>393</sup> Project 2357, [Project Document](#), p. 6.

communities into project activities” in Maiko National Park.<sup>394</sup> Project 1043 in Cambodia similarly highlighted that its education program would focus on “awareness and pride in key species conservation” among the “armed forces and at military bases” because the military was among the most involved in illegal natural resource use.<sup>395</sup> During implementation, project staff communicated frequently with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to assess the security situation during the Thai-Cambodian border dispute starting in 2008. Members of the military also escorted project personnel through the forests in the project’s area of work in Cambodia’s Northern Plains.

**191. Other GEF projects explicitly note the role that natural resource management can play in conflict resolution.** Project 2139 in the Albertine Rift, for instance, argued that reversing land degradation would “reduce conflicts over resources for instance between farmers and herders.”<sup>396</sup> Similarly, Project 2551 in Colombia noted that “environmental themes may contribute to the solution of the armed conflict.”<sup>397</sup> Although these projects did not describe in detail how they might build peace, the acknowledgement of their potential role in the process in itself is notable. Project 9663 in Colombia, in contrast, directly addressed how it would contribute to peacebuilding, namely by “improv[ing] interinstitutional coordination [...] and promot[ing] platforms for dialogue and peace building that address the principal barriers that prevent the reduction of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon.”<sup>398</sup>

#### **Managing conflict risks by learning**

**192. Many GEF projects implemented in fragile and conflict-affected settings learn from both their own experiences and from other programming.** Learning in the reviewed GEF-funded projects takes three forms: (1) identification of ways in which conflict or fragility threatened project success, (2) positive assessment of conflict-sensitive strategies used in project implementation that paid dividends in project success, and (3) recommendation of strategies that were not used during implementation but should be used in future programming. Learning can come from within GEF-funded projects, from non-GEF projects implemented by Agencies, and from non-GEF projects implemented by other institutions. For a summary of learning by GEF Implementing Agencies on conflict-sensitive programming, see box 3.1.

**193. Project staff have been learning about the negative impacts of conflicts on project implementation,** particularly as a precipitating factor in project cancellation, difficulty in carrying out project activities, and limited on-site staff involvement because of risks to personnel. UNDP’s Afghanistan office, for instance, requested to cancel Project 3220 “[i]n light of the challenging security conditions in the country in 2009.”<sup>399</sup> Short of cancellation, projects

---

<sup>394</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 127.

<sup>395</sup> Project 1043, [Executive Summary](#), p. 8.

<sup>396</sup> Project 2139, [Project Document](#), p. 33 (emphasis from original removed).

<sup>397</sup> Project 2551, [Project Appraisal Document](#), p. 2.

<sup>398</sup> Project 9663, [Project Appraisal Document](#), p. 8.

<sup>399</sup> Project 3220, [Agency Notification on Dropped/Cancelled FSP, p. 1.](#)

can also face delays because of conflict.<sup>400</sup> The Terminal Evaluation for Project 1253 in Mali explained that, “[w]ith the exception of some emergency operations, IDA suspended all operational activities in Mali” after Mali’s coup d’état in March 2012.<sup>401</sup>

194. **Even when a project as a whole has continued, discrete project activities may encounter difficulties because of conflict.** For Project 398 in the Albertine Rift, 12 of the 17 quarterly progress reports outlined the ramifications of changing security conditions in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo on project operations. Stated impacts ranged from reduced fishing activity “because of army fears that rebels are using fishing boats to transport raiding parties”<sup>402</sup> to insecurity continuing to “seriously limit activities in the Francophone region” of Lake Tanganyika<sup>403</sup> and field staff being unable to sample all of the project’s river monitoring locations.<sup>404</sup> Reflecting on these challenges, the 1998 and 1999 Project Implementation Reviews assessed as high the probability that the project’s assumption that the lake’s security situation would improve throughout implementation “may fail to hold or materialize.”<sup>405</sup>

195. **Learning has also highlighted the risks to project staff and affiliated partners.** For example, during the implementation of Project 1086 in Cambodia, “[s]everal security-related incidents prompted the project to suspend activities and temporarily remove staff from Phnom Aural Wildlife Sanctuary.”<sup>406</sup> Two rangers in Aural Wildlife Sanctuary, in which Project 1086 operated, were murdered during the project, which led to transferring responsibilities to the Ministry of the Environment.<sup>407</sup>

---

<sup>400</sup> For a discussion of conflict-related delays, see paras 152-157, above.

<sup>401</sup> Project 1253, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 21.

<sup>402</sup> Project 398, [Summary of Progress for the Period August 1995 to February 1996](#), p. 3.

<sup>403</sup> Project 398, [Project Quarterly Progress Report for the Period Sept-Nov 1996](#), p. 1.

<sup>404</sup> Project 398, [Progress Report No. 14: June to August 1999](#), PDF p. 15.

<sup>405</sup> Project 398, [Project Implementation Review 1998](#), p. 4, and Project Implementation Review 1999, p. 4.

<sup>406</sup> Project 1086, [Terminal Evaluation](#), Word p. 11.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid*, Word pp. 50-51.

### Box 3.1: Lessons Learned by Implementing Agencies

With a growing body of experiences related to programming in conflict-afflicted and fragile situations, GEF Implementing Agencies have increasingly examined lessons from these experiences to inform future programming. Some of these experiences reflect broad lessons learned; others focus on particular dimensions such as gender or conflict prevention. Following is a sample of flagship reports and other publications distilling lessons:

- **African Development Bank**
  - [From Fragility to Resilience: Mitigating Natural Resources and Fragile Situations in Africa](#) (2016)
- **Asian Development Bank**
  - [Mapping Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations in Asia and the Pacific](#) (2016)
  - [Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situation: Pilot Fragility Assessment of an Informal Urban Settlement in Kiribati](#) (2013)
- **Inter-American Development Bank**
  - [Lessons from Four Decades of Infrastructure Project-Related Conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) (2017)
  - [Conflict Management and Consensus Building for Integrated Coastal Management in Latin America and the Caribbean](#) (2000)
- **International Fund for Agricultural Development**
  - [Fostering Inclusive Rural Transformation in Fragile States and Situations](#) (2017) (with Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services)
  - [Fragile Situations \(Rural Development Report\)](#) (2016)
  - [IFAD's Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations: Corporate-Level Evaluation](#) (2015)
- **United Nations Development Programme**
  - [Risk-Informed Development – From Crisis to Resilience](#) (2019) (with others)
  - [Local Ownership in Conflict Sensitivity Application – The Case of Nepal](#) (2017) (with others)
- **United Nations Environment Programme**
  - [Gender, Climate, and Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change](#) (2020) (with others)
  - [Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Programme – Final Report](#) (2016)
  - [Women and Natural Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential](#) (2013) (with others)
  - [The Role of Natural Resources in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Addressing Risks and Seizing Opportunities](#) (2013) (with UNDP)
  - [Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations](#) (2012) (with others)
  - [Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Analysis and Inventory of International Law](#) (2009)



- [From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment](#) (2009)
- **World Bank Group**
  - [Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Poverty](#) (2020b)
  - [Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict](#) (2018) (with United Nations)
  - [Strengthening Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Climate Change in MENA](#) (2018)
  - [World Bank Group Engagement in Situations for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: An Independent Evaluation](#) (2016)
  - [Enhancing Sensitivity to Conflict Risks in World Bank-funded Activities: Lessons from the Kyrgyz Republic](#) (2014)
  - [Renewable Natural Resource: Practical Lessons for Conflict-Sensitive Development](#) (2009)
  - [Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations](#) (2006)
  - [Towards Conflict-Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy](#) (2005)
  - [Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions](#) (2003)

196. **Some projects have identified and noted successful strategies from other projects to inform their programming.** One approach that has been highlighted is the use of a simple, flexible project design. Drawing on the World Bank’s work since 2002 in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo, Project 2100 recommended in its design stage that the project team “[k]eep project design simple and flexible.”<sup>408</sup> The Terminal Evaluation for Project 4133 in the Albertine Rift noted that the “project design was kept simple considering the country’s post-conflict environment” and assessed that that was a justified mitigation measure given the conflict-related risks.<sup>409</sup> The STAP Review for Project 9441 suggested that the project designers ground-truth assumptions about the project’s peacebuilding potential by making an effort to “learn lessons from post-conflict states and consult with expert organizations such as the Environmental Law Institute and UN Environment’s Expert Group on Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding.”<sup>410</sup>

197. **Projects also reflect on the importance, particularly at an interpersonal level, of building trust and a common cause between various actors involved in project implementation.** This can start at the project design phase. Project 2888 in the Albertine Rift, for example, looked to the example of the International Gorilla Conservation Program (IGCP), a joint initiative between Flora and Fauna International, World Wide Fund for Nature, and the African Wildlife Foundation. The project remarked that collaboration between Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the IGCP “primarily ha[d] worked because it

<sup>408</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 15.

<sup>409</sup> Project 4133, [Terminal Evaluation](#), pp. 16-17.

<sup>410</sup> Project 9441, [STAP Review](#), p. 2.



was built at the field level first rather than being imposed from above.”<sup>411</sup> The potential for person-to-person relationships to break through international tensions also appeared in the design of Project 1094 in the Albertine Rift. Drafters highlighted that the Nile Basin Initiative’s past programming showed that “[d]eveloping trust and personal relations among riparian delegations from countries that have often been in conflict for decades or more is a key ingredient to moving the process further.”<sup>412</sup> Project 2100 in the Albertine Rift expanded further on the example of the IGCP, saying “it demonstrated that it is possible to achieve effective trans-border cooperation for conservation, even between warring parties, by getting them to rally round a common cause.”<sup>413</sup>

**198. Implementing Agencies and other organizations have learned that engagement with the local community can help projects succeed.** Project 1152 in the Inner Niger Delta in Mali indicated that it would draw on the successes of an International Union for the Conservation of Nature project in the same region, particularly in relying on “the traditional management systems at the sites and project areas[,] in order to involve all the local stakeholders in the processes of designing and implementing the activities.”<sup>414</sup> In the Albertine Rift, Project 2357 learned from an earlier GEF-funded project in Lake Tanganyika that was “hampered by civil unrest” and addressed conflict-related risks in Burundi in part “by supporting close coordination among beneficiaries.”<sup>415</sup> Projects have learned that local organizations, too, are valuable partners. In the Albertine Rift, Project 2100 drew from the World Bank’s experience in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo to recommend that Project 2100 “empower perennial institutions,” like government agencies, and “engage local NGOs in program implementation.”<sup>416</sup>

**199. Several projects have learned the value of monitoring and apportioning resources to respond to security conditions.** Project 9661 in Mali referenced the strategies of the Mali Elephant Project, which kept “informed of the detailed situation across the elephant range through its network of informants that include the 670 eco-guards” and “adapt[ed] their behaviour accordingly,” as a possible measure to mitigate the risk of military conflict and jihadist insurgence.<sup>417</sup> In more concrete terms, Project 2584 stated in its evaluation that the project responded to insecurity and conflict with the “[p]rovision of necessary resources for security related equipment and escorts.”<sup>418</sup>

---

<sup>411</sup> Project 2888, [MSP Document](#), p. 7.

<sup>412</sup> Project 1094, [Project Document](#), p. 48.

<sup>413</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 17.

<sup>414</sup> Project 1152, [Project Document](#), p. 48.

<sup>415</sup> Project 2357, [Project Document](#), p. 15.

<sup>416</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 16.

<sup>417</sup> Project 9661, [Project Document](#), PDF p. 62.

<sup>418</sup> Project 2584, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 42.

### **Box 3.2: Learning from the Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity Project (GEF 398)**

Running from 1991 to 2006, this project sought to demonstrate an effective regional approach to controlling pollution and preventing the loss of the biodiversity of Lake Tanganyika's international waters through collaboration between Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia. Overall, this project was scored favorably in the Terminal Evaluation and included significant references to conflict sensitivity in project design documents. The project also dealt with significant and frequent insecurity in Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo during implementation.

A "Results and Experiences" document created in February 2001 dedicated a section to lessons learned by the project for the benefits of future programming in the region and other areas affected by civil war and insecurity.<sup>3</sup> It highlighted six key lessons.

The first lesson, "remain flexible and seek creative solutions," related to the project's decision to relocate project staff to the Democratic Republic of Congo because of a phase III UN security rating in Burundi, where the unit was intended to be based. Relocation was deemed less convenient, but the flexibility to relocate immediately paid off after a subsequent phase IV security rating in Burundi during project implementation. The document noted that Burundi's increased insecurity would potentially have been "devastating to the project." Additionally, this arrangement allowed the Democratic Republic of Congo to remain more engaged in the project.

The second lesson learned was to maintain a presence. The project found that when staff could not reside in project areas, a "considerable amount could be accomplished through emails, telephone calls and short-term visits to the country (as UNDP allowed) by regional staff or visits by national staff to other countries to meet with regional staff."

The third lesson learned was to foster regional collaboration, noting the project's ability to "hold regional meetings, formulate a Strategic Action Programme and draft a Legal Convention during a period of strained relationships among Tanganyika's four riparian nations." This was achieved through close collaboration between project partners on various technical aspects of the project, which "forced participants to see beyond the prevailing political climate and fostered regional collaboration."

The fourth lesson concerned the project's ability to remain neutral, specifically that it was "crucial that expatriate staff and national staff in managerial and coordinating roles be agreeable to collaborating with any and all stakeholders and, moreover, be seen to be impartial." This was relevant to Project 398 because the "government and armed forces in charge of eastern [Democratic Republic of the] Congo changed several times over the project's course," and "Burundi had four national coordinators during the life of the project."

The fifth lesson stressed the importance of not underestimating people's good will during difficult times. The project found that national partners were often "tired and frustrated with the deteriorating political-economic situation that was beyond their control," and "wanted to be a part of something bigger that they perceived to be a good cause." In the Democratic Republic of Congo, local staff were "confident, productive and took a new pride in their work" despite low or nonexistent wages in their roles. Overall, it was emphasized that small

incentives for local partners and the feeling of being part of a good cause can help stabilize communities during conflict.

The sixth lesson indicated that it was important to be briefed on security and have contingency plans. The project found that acting based on the UN's security plans and taking part in "regular security briefing sessions and periodic personal security workshops" combined with good fortune to ensure that project staff were never in immediate danger during the project. Additionally, contingency plans and communication with local staff helped ensure evacuations went smoothly during periods of insecurity.

-----

<sup>a</sup> Project 398, [Results and Experiences](#).

200. **Learning can also reflect on negative experiences and recommend alternative approaches for future programming.** For example, reviewers and evaluators have at times identified steps that future projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings could take to improve their outcomes. This learning often focuses on adequately assessing risks and setting realistic project objectives. The Terminal Evaluation for Project 1348's component in Mali noted that the project design "was preconfigured at the program-level, and did not reflect any country-specific modifications or lessons learned from previous projects executed in Mali."<sup>419</sup> As a consequence, "[n]either the PAD nor the Operations Manual included risks of delays due to [...] political instability" in Mali.<sup>420</sup> The Terminal Evaluation for Project 2357 in the Albertine Rift critiqued the project's objectives, mentioning that the "target set for net profits of 30% [for the project's rural producer beneficiaries] is unrealistically high for these types of operations, particularly in a post conflict situation."<sup>421</sup>

201. During the implementation of Project 32 in the Balkans, Macedonia was experiencing "a period of turbulence [...] caused first by the wave of [...] refugees during the Kosovo War and second by severe civil unrest and tension between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups in the country."<sup>422</sup> Despite the tension, however, the project "encouraged continuing communication and cooperation between the two ethnic communities," a cobenefit.<sup>423</sup> The TER rated the Terminal Evaluation's "lessons learned" section as moderately unsatisfactory, saying in particular that the section "could have addressed how to overcome ethnic tensions to achieve project objectives in future projects, but failed to do so."<sup>424</sup>

### **Conclusions**

202. The typology of conflict-sensitive approaches to programming advanced in this report—including Acknowledgment, Avoidance, Mitigation, Peacebuilding, and Learning—draws upon

---

<sup>419</sup> Project 1348, Terminal Evaluation, p. 80.

<sup>420</sup> Ibid, p. 81.

<sup>421</sup> Project 2357, [Terminal Evaluation](#), PDF p. 11.

<sup>422</sup> Project 32, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 7.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>424</sup> Project 32, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 12.

GEF innovations and experiences. It was developed organically by the project team, based on the findings of the in-depth analysis of designing GEF projects. Many of the approaches may also be found in the peer-reviewed and gray literature on conflict-sensitive programming.<sup>425</sup>

### **3.4 Conflict-sensitive programming across the project life cycle**

203. This section highlights entry points for conflict-sensitive programming across the project life cycle. It draws upon GEF documents, experiences with GEF projects (both in project documentation and from interviews), and the broader literature on conflict-sensitive programming. It includes subsections on project design, implementation, closure, and evaluation and learning.

#### *3.4.1 Project design*

204. **Conflict-sensitive project design comprises four key steps: context analysis, consultation, the development of specific conflict-sensitive measures, and budgeting.** These are discussed in turn, with particular reference to experience from GEF projects, supplemented by international good practice.

#### **Context analysis**

205. **Context analysis—including conflict analysis, environmental and social impact assessments, and stakeholder identification and analysis—is essential to informing project design.** Generally, GEF projects already undertake stakeholder identification and analysis and environmental and social impact assessments; conflict analysis is less common. There are several existing tools to guide conflict analysis;<sup>426</sup> these emphasize analyzing the profile (character), causes (structural, proximate, trigger), actors (their interests, goals, positions, capacities, and relationships), and dynamics (current trends, possible scenarios, opportunities for change) of a given conflict. The International Institute for Sustainable Development adds a further dimension, advising practitioners to consider what types of conflict may affect their work; examples include human-wildlife, park-people, institutional, protected area resource access, transboundary, intercommunity, political, and benefit distribution.<sup>427</sup> Once categories of risks are identified, project proponents can create priority criteria and rank their identified conflicts before brainstorming potential mitigation strategies.

206. **The process for proposing and reviewing GEF-supported projects does not explicitly require project proponents to take account of risks related to fragility or conflict.** Currently, the GEF asks proponents to account for possible risks through the use of risk tables in Project Identification Forms. These tables require project proponents to enumerate potential risks to achieving their proposed objectives and strategies for risk mitigation. However, the Project Identification Form does not require consideration of risks related to fragility or conflict. As

---

<sup>425</sup> E.g., Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012; Akinyoade 2010.

<sup>426</sup> DfID 2012; For a comparison of 15 conflict analysis toolkits, see International Alert et al. 2004, pp. 12-15, table 3.

<sup>427</sup> Hammill et al. 2009, pp. 30-31.

shown in Annex G, in a review of Project Identification Forms for 62 GEF projects in situations affected by major armed conflict, only 39 Project Information Forms identified conflict as a risk, and only 33 of the projects proposed measures to manage conflict-related risks.

**207. The GEF Secretariat gives additional attention to conflict-related risks when reviewing projects proposed for funding under the Least Developed Country Fund and Special Climate Change Fund.** For projects in fragile and conflict-affected states, the GEF Secretariat reviews project proposals to these funds with an expectation of reference to conflict risk and associated mitigation strategies.<sup>428</sup> Interviews with GEF Secretariat staff members indicated that when proposals to these funds lack these elements, the proponent is generally contacted and requested to address conflict-related risks.<sup>429</sup> Such consideration during project review appears to be less common for other GEF funding streams. As a result, the extent to which fragility and conflict are accounted for at this stage of planning remains uneven across the GEF portfolio.

**208. Some GEF Implementing Agencies have created their own tools to standardize conflict-risk assessment in project design.** For example, the World Bank, ADB, UNDP, and Conservation International have found that such tools and practices are necessary for properly managing risk in their portfolios, applying standardized methods across all projects, including those they have taken on with the GEF.<sup>430</sup> For example, the AfDB has systematized the application of the “fragility lens” and a Country Resilience and Fragility Assessment (CRFA) tool to integrate considerations of fragility into Country Strategy Papers and Bank operations.<sup>431</sup>

### **Consultation**

**209. Agency staff designing GEF projects often consult with stakeholders.** Consultation during project design broadens support for project implementation. It is also important because stakeholders often hold contextual information that often cannot be obtained through desk research; hence, project design is usually more appropriate when stakeholders are consulted. For example, when implementing in Project 3418 in Lebanon, on Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Production Processes, project staff realized that the sites they had selected during design were actually not suited to their goals. They then had to undertake a thorough study to choose new sites. As part of this study, they involved local communities to inquire about their cultivation practices, an important element of the project’s implementation. They also reached out to the Lebanese military to get more information on the location of cluster bombs. This consultation with the military allowed the project team to actively avoid sites that would pose major security concerns to their staff.<sup>432</sup>

---

<sup>428</sup> Interview, GEF Secretariat staff, April 2020.

<sup>429</sup> Interviews, GEF Secretariat staff, April and July 2020.

<sup>430</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, June 2020; Interview, Implementing Agency staff, July 2020; see also box 1.1.

<sup>431</sup> AfDB 2018.

<sup>432</sup> Interview, Government Agency staff, July 2020.

210. **Some GEF projects implemented by UNDP have used a participatory process to develop a Map of Risks and Resources.** Maps of Risks and Resources are developed using a participatory approach with community members and lay out the significant risks and assets associated with the project site.<sup>433</sup> UNDP Lebanon adapted the Map of Risks and Resources tool, creating a local version known as Mechanism of Stability and Resilience.<sup>434</sup> This version begins with the same participatory approach but further accounts for existing tensions in the community identified by the project staff and local NGOs. UNDP has leveraged its experience with this process to create reports encouraging other development agencies to take up similar practices.<sup>435</sup>

#### **Development of specific conflict-sensitive measures**

211. **Based on the information from the context analysis—and particularly the conflict analysis—GEF Implementing Agencies have included a range of conflict-sensitive measures in project design.** In some cases, this has meant modifying the project site or activities; in others, it has entailed the addition of specific measures such as scenario planning and contingency plans. The broad range of conflict-sensitive measures is discussed in Section 3.3.<sup>436</sup>

212. **GEF projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected countries have introduced five broad strategies to address risks related to conflict and fragility: the use of moderate objectives, flexible design, stakeholder engagement, dispute resolution, and engaging local customary norms and institutions.** These are discussed in turn.

213. **In several instances, GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings have sought to establish realistic project objectives.** Numerous key informants emphasized the importance of setting realistic project objectives, especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Moreover, interviews with key informants stressed that projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings often needed to emphasize institution building, capacity building, and generally creating an enabling environment for interventions.

214. **Some GEF projects have built in increased flexibility to address shifting dynamics associated with fragility and conflict.** As such, creating space to be flexible is important to the survival of a given project. Project 2100, Support to the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation's Program for the Rehabilitation of the Democratic Republic of Congo's National Parks Network provides a useful example of simple and flexible project design. The project was approved in 2007, just a few years following the end of the Second Congo War and one year after the adoption of the current constitution.<sup>437</sup> The Project Document states explicitly that the "current post-conflict and reunification context of the [Democratic Republic of Congo] calls for simple and flexible project design."<sup>438</sup> Keeping this in mind, the proponents chose to focus

---

<sup>433</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, June 2020.

<sup>434</sup> Interviews, Implementing Agency staff, June 2020.

<sup>435</sup> UNDP 2003.

<sup>436</sup> See paras. 167-2020.

<sup>437</sup> Council on Foreign Relations 2020; Cooper 2013.

<sup>438</sup> Project 2100, [Project Document](#), p. 15.

on limited activities in a few locations. They also included time in their projected schedule to hold annual coordination meetings to adapt their project activities to the evolving conflict context. Notably, the choice to pursue this model was influenced by the proponents' dedication to learning from past projects implemented in this context. The Project Document explains the rationale for the project design and uses lessons learned from past projects instituted by the World Bank, UNDP, and the GEF to help develop an inclusive and flexible model.<sup>439</sup>

215. Project 2357, the Burundi Agricultural Rehabilitation and Support Project, also utilized different mechanisms to build in increased flexibility at the design phase. As with Project 2100, Project 2357 underwent a careful selection process for its project sites and tried to limit localities to ensure better manageability. One of Project 2357's components focused on the selection, funding, and implementation of a variety of "subprojects." The project design included an extensive list of criteria to be used in evaluating these potential subprojects. One of these criteria was for subprojects to be classified as "lacking in conflict" or "stable" prior to approval, giving the project staff the choice to reject subprojects they deemed too risky.<sup>440</sup>

216. **GEF projects often rely on increased stakeholder participation to address conflict-related impacts.** Proponents in some projects sought to involve stakeholders throughout the project design and implementation stages. For example, Project 3772, the Congo Basin Strategic Program's Forest and Nature Conservation Project, which was implemented in the Democratic Republic of Congo shortly after the 2008 peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, incorporated local partners heavily into its project design to accommodate the rapidly changing conditions in the country. According to the Project Information Form, the project, recognizing the likelihood of lasting instability, adopted a "a simple and flexible design, involving partnerships with local and international NGOs that have continued to work on the ground during the recent conflicts and have the capacity to suspend and restart operations quickly."<sup>441</sup> They leveraged the experience of local organizations to improve project resilience.

217. Similarly, Project 9515 in Democratic Republic of Congo, which focused on Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-sylvo-pastoral Resources in the Pilot Province of South-Kivu, identified in its Project Document that civil insecurity outbreaks would pose a significant risk that "cannot be mitigated by the project."<sup>442</sup> Accordingly, project staff used participatory approaches to address conflict where they could. For example, the staff used a participatory approach to land management that both advanced the project's environmental objectives and sought to decrease the prevalence of conflict resulting from land disputes. Furthermore, project staff stated in interviews that they believe transferring greater ownership of the project to local entities would improve its conflict resilience and improve its ability to operate in insecure contexts.<sup>443</sup>

---

<sup>439</sup> See generally *ibid.*

<sup>440</sup> Project 2357, Project Document, p. 8.

<sup>441</sup> Project 3772, [PIF](#), p. 6.

<sup>442</sup> Project 9515, [Project Document](#), p. 3.

<sup>443</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, June 2020.

218. The Project Document for Project 1086, Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains, anticipated that project activities might face risk from the previous “protracted period of political turmoil” in the Cardamom region of Cambodia.<sup>444</sup> It also identified concerns that vested interests in illegal logging and wildlife trade might hinder stakeholder support for the project. As a result, the project was designed with “stakeholder participation at all levels” as a “cornerstone of project implementation.”<sup>445</sup> According to the Terminal Evaluation, the project was ultimately able to use stakeholder participation to address these risks. The project experienced significant community buy-in and was able to improve law enforcement regarding illegal logging and wildlife trade both through outreach to the Ministry of Environment’s rangers as well as through community-level law enforcement efforts.<sup>446</sup>

219. Also in Cambodia, Project 1043 sought to engage with stakeholders who posed potential risks to the project. The Project Document observed that unavoidable interactions with the Cambodian military posed a significant risk to the project’s success.<sup>447</sup> To help manage this, the Project Document laid out programming to increase investment by the military in the outcomes of the project, including holding “environmental education awareness-raising for armed forces” and increasing military involvement in local law enforcement efforts.<sup>448</sup> Interviews with the project staff revealed that these activities helped to create greater loyalty to the project among the members of the military that they worked with, aiding in project activities.<sup>449</sup>

220. **GEF projects sometimes used peaceful dispute resolution as a risk mitigation mechanism.** Although projects generally preferred to avoid conflict, some were able to leverage their connections to various stakeholders to actively reduce conflict risks through project design. For example, in preparing for Project 1043, Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management in the Northern Plains, the project staff worked with the Cambodian government to broker agreements with communities living on the selected project sites. These agreements were created with appropriate measures for land management and prevented the outbreak of conflict or disputes within the wildlife sanctuaries.<sup>450</sup> Likewise, Project 1183, Tonle Sap Conservation, anticipated that their projects might face threats from conflict in the form of land and resource disputes. To mitigate this, they planned to broker agreements between stakeholder groups in their project design.<sup>451</sup>

221. **Conflict-sensitive design can draw upon customary approaches and institutions.** Customary approaches to managing natural resources often have locally appropriate and legitimate approaches to conflict-prevention, management, and resolution.<sup>452</sup> Projects can thus

---

<sup>444</sup> Project 1086, [Project Document](#), p. 20.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

<sup>446</sup> Project 1086, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. iii.

<sup>447</sup> Project 1043, [Project Document](#), p. 30.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>449</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, July 2020.

<sup>450</sup> Project 1043, [Project Document](#), p. 21.

<sup>451</sup> Project 1183, Project Document, p. 28; [Project Brief](#), p. 18.

<sup>452</sup> UNDP and UNEP 2015, p. 16; UNFPA 2012a.



readily tap into approaches that have been tested and validated. Box 3.3 presents a case study on designing a GEF project that incorporates the Islamic approach of the *hima* in Lebanon.

**Box 3.3: Engaging Customary Approaches for Conservation and Conflict Management—*Hima* in Lebanon**

Across the Arab world, the *hima* (or protected area) has been revived as a community-based system of conservation and natural resource management.<sup>a</sup> Rooted within Islamic law, the idea of the *hima* extends back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, who is said to have established a *hima* in the lands surrounding present-day Medina to preserve the area's natural beauty.<sup>b</sup> In doing so, the Prophet transformed the landscape into a community asset that all members of the public had a stake and share in. In the latter 20<sup>th</sup> Century, this community-based form of natural resource management was largely overshadowed by Westernized systems that emphasized centralized resource governance.

More recently, the *hima* has been revived to encourage sustainable resource use, conservation, and the development of friendly relations among all stakeholders. The *hima* is powerful in part because of the importance that Islam attaches to environmental preservation, which creates a common starting point for people across the Middle East.<sup>c</sup> Its decentralized nature is also significant: the *hima* is predicated on the idea that conflict can be reduced by managing resources at the community level, rather than at a more centralized level.<sup>d</sup> In the words of Assad Serhal, Director-General of the Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon, "the ultimate goal in creating Himas is to bring peace to both humans and wildlife."<sup>e</sup>

The *hima* was introduced into the Lebanon component of GEF Projects 1028 and 9491 on Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley/Red Sea Flyway, tranches I and II.<sup>f</sup> Recognizing the importance of involving local communities in natural resource management and the conflict resolution potential of the *hima*, the Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon established Hima Ebel el Saqi in 2004 in southern Lebanon, and in the following year established Hima Kfar Zabad in the central Bekaa region. To date, more than 15 *himas* have been established under the two projects, covering a total of more than 3 percent of Lebanon's land territory.<sup>g</sup> These community-managed protected areas have served two important purposes: providing migrating birds with a safe habitat and promoting cooperation between conservationists, hunters, and local people. By bringing together people with disparate priorities—and a shared religion—and aligning them in the pursuit of a common goal, the *hima* functions as an important conflict management tool. For example, the *hima* provides an opportunity for community members to discuss how conservation and related policies should be implemented while simultaneously encouraging cooperation between groups that is rooted in a common attachment to the land.<sup>h</sup> This function is particularly important in a country such as Lebanon, where sectoral conflict has contributed to decades of fragility and conflict. With Projects 1028 and 9491, the *hima* has enabled the engagement of people from disparate backgrounds to proceed seamlessly, even while instability has affected the country.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Serhal 2019.

<sup>b</sup> Verde 2008.

<sup>c</sup> Abboud 2018.

<sup>d</sup> EcoPeace Middle East 2012.

<sup>e</sup> Serhal 2019, p. 85.

<sup>f</sup> Project 9491, [Project Document rev.](#)

<sup>g</sup> Interview, NGO staff, July 2020.

<sup>h</sup> EcoPeace Middle East 2012.

<sup>i</sup> Interview, NGO staff, July 2020.



*Hima Ebel el Saqi (Source: SPNL).*

## **Budgeting**

222. GEF project staff reported numerous difficulties budgeting for contingencies related to fragility **and conflict-associated risks**. Key informants noted that the GEF does not allow project budgets to include a budget line for contingent costs, and new budget lines to be approved by the GEF Council. As a result, it is difficult to budget for strategies to manage risks that may or may not materialize.

223. **The GEF does not allow for contingent costs, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.** A number of intergovernmental organizations allow contingency budgeting. The World Bank, UNDP, and others allow for contingency budgeting in their central budgets. UNDP's regulation 13.10, for example, provides that "the Administrator may utilize the budgetary contingency provision of 3 per cent of the approved gross appropriations for unforeseen requirements resulting from currency movements, inflation or decisions of the

General Assembly.”<sup>453</sup> And the World Bank’s Budget for fiscal year (FY)2020 included a “Corporate Contingency” of \$10 million “to support unforeseen priorities and cost pressures.”<sup>454</sup> UNDP also provides means for covering expenses when a contributor defaults or “in the face of unforeseen contingencies” by having the national or regional office covering the unexpected expenses.<sup>455</sup> And while contingency costs are common in construction, military projects, and humanitarian operations, there are relatively few development organizations that currently allow contingency costs as a budget line in a project.

**224. Outside the GEF context, the growing interest in resilience—and funding for resilience—seems to be increasing interest in contingency reserves and contingent budgeting.** Contingent budgeting is a standard practice for disaster risk reduction.<sup>456</sup> With the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women provides that “All projects may include a reserve for contingencies not exceeding 4% of the direct project activity costs to allow for adjustments necessary in the light of unforeseen requirements resulting from COVID-19, such as currency movements, inflation, special programming and emergency issues on the ground during times of sudden unforeseen crisis. It can be used only with the prior written authorization of the UN Trust Fund, upon duly justified request by the Organization.”<sup>457</sup> The European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) allows the use of contingency reserves under certain circumstances:

A reserve for contingencies and/or possible fluctuations in exchange rates not exceeding 5 % of the direct eligible costs may be included in the budget for the Action, to allow for adjustments necessary in the light of unforeseeable changes of circumstances on the ground. It can be used only with the prior written authorisation of the Contracting Authority, upon duly justified request by the Coordinator.<sup>458</sup>

DEVCO provides additional guidance regarding the conditions for including and using a contingency reserve.<sup>459</sup>

**225. Some GEF projects have increased budgetary flexibility through the inclusion of a \$0 budget line.** Key informants mentioned that it is often difficult to add new line items to a project budget once it has been approved by the GEF—even when the escalation of violence and conflict necessitates adjustments. One informant, recognizing this challenge and understanding that their work would likely entail new and different costs, included an appropriate budget line for these costs at the design stage.<sup>460</sup> Because it was not certain

---

<sup>453</sup> UNDP 2000, reg. 13.10.

<sup>454</sup> World Bank 2020, p. 58.

<sup>455</sup> UNDP 2000, reg. 5.08.

<sup>456</sup> IMF 2019, 2018; ADB 2019; WHO 2017; FAO 2016a; Phaup and Kirschner 2010.

<sup>457</sup> United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women, [Guidelines](#).

<sup>458</sup> EC DEVCO 2014, p. 65.

<sup>459</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

<sup>460</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, May 2020.

whether this issue would arise or whether this budget would be needed, they set the budget for this line at \$0. The inclusion of this line made it much easier to access funds later, because it is easier to move money between budget lines than to request a new line entirely, especially on short notice. Though this strategy is a good work-around, it only works if the right budget lines are envisioned, included, and approved.

**226. Key informants noted that working in fragile and conflict-affected settings is more expensive, and the GEF’s project budgets do not reflect these realities.** Staff are more expensive, with hazard and fragility pay for locally appointed staff and priority placement premiums for international staff, as well as additional compensation for eligible staff, rest and recuperation benefits to enable staff to take breaks away from their duty station.<sup>461</sup> The costs for security and logistical arrangements are higher. Many key informants reported that fragile and conflict-affected situations required more time for consultations to build confidence and agreement, necessitating additional labor and security costs. At the same time, key informants repeatedly pointed out that budgets to propose and implement projects in in conflict affected and fragile situations often were not sufficient to cover the additional costs of doing business in those settings.

### 3.4.2 *Implementation*

**227. Considering the dynamic and fluid nature of fragile and conflict-affected situations, it is important to think beyond conflict-sensitive design to implementation.** Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke famously noted “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force” (often paraphrased as “No plan survives contact with the enemy.”).<sup>462</sup> Conservation programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations often struggles similarly in the transition from the plan to implementation, requiring ongoing sensitivity, monitoring, and adjustment.<sup>463</sup> Conflict-sensitive implementation can help identify conflict-related risks early so they can be addressed before they escalate; it can also help projects adjust to changing dynamic conditions and prevent projects from exacerbating problems.

**228. To account for the dynamic context, GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have employed three broad categories conflict-sensitive implementation measures: ongoing sensitivity in programming, monitoring and early warning, and adjustment.** In contrast with the proactive orientation of conflict-sensitive design and planning, conflict-sensitive implementation combines both proactive approaches (such as ongoing sensitivity in planning and monitoring) and reactive approaches (particularly, the adjustment of projects). This section outlines these approaches, drawing upon both experiences with GEF projects and the broader literature.

---

<sup>461</sup> E.g., World Bank 2020, para. 28.

<sup>462</sup> Barnett 1963, p. 35.

<sup>463</sup> E.g., Hammill et al. 2009; UNFPA 2012a; FAO 2019a, p. 1; Haider 2014, p. 9; UNDP and UNEP 2015, p. 25.

## **Ongoing conflict sensitivity**

229. **In fragile or conflict-affected contexts, attention to details can make large differences to successful implementation.** Extra care in day-to-day implementation can help avoid and mitigate conflict.<sup>464</sup>

230. **Hiring of staff can generate tensions and undermine project legitimacy if not done in a conflict-sensitive way.** In situations with social conflict along ethnic or other identity lines, projects that hire people from only one group can generate tensions.<sup>465</sup> At the same time, integrating staff from these groups can be delicate, and care needs to be taken—as with the hiring of park rangers in Gorongosa National Park in post-conflict Mozambique.<sup>466</sup> Another source of potential tension is hiring for the higher-paid (and higher-status) technical jobs, which often go to people who are perceived as outsiders, whether they are from the capital city (and not the community) or from another country.<sup>467</sup> For these reasons, many GEF projects hire local staff whenever possible, and over time build up the capacity of local staff to manage and otherwise staff the higher-value jobs.

231. **In fragile and conflict-affected settings, procurement also needs to be undertaken in a conflict-sensitive manner.** Procurement rules often seek to ensure that procurement is efficient (going to the lowest bidder) and has integrity (not supporting corruption); they generally do not consider whether the process is conflict-sensitive.<sup>468</sup> If members of one group consistently win contracts to provide food, equipment, or services, procurement can reinforce social divisions and generate tensions. At the same time, efforts to bring in all the necessary materials can create a “compound” mentality, aggravating relations with the neighboring communities.<sup>469</sup> Procurement can be made more conflict-sensitive through local procurement, transparent criteria and selection process, inclusion of local community members, and providing feedback to those who did not win the procurement opportunity.<sup>470</sup>

232. **Transparency and communication are central to conflict-sensitive implementation.** GEF projects have used a wide range of transparency and communication tools to help stakeholders understand the project (its objectives, activities, benefits, and scope), as well as enabling the projects to understand concerns before they escalate to risks that could threaten a project.<sup>471</sup> Hence, it is important to note that the most effective communication operated in both directions, from the project to the stakeholders and from the stakeholders to the project (in contrast to public relations and propaganda).

---

<sup>464</sup> International Alert et al. 2004, ch. 3, mod. 2, p. 4. .

<sup>465</sup> Conflict Sensitive Consortium 2012, p. 39; Hammill et al. 2009, p. 6; Haider 2104, p. 31.

<sup>466</sup> Pritchard 2015.

<sup>467</sup> UNDP and UNEP 2015, p. 29.

<sup>468</sup> Conflict Sensitive Consortium 2012.

<sup>469</sup> UNDP and UNEP 2015, p. 30.

<sup>470</sup> Conflict Sensitive Consortium 2012.

<sup>471</sup> See paras. 141-165.

233. **Participation is also central to conflict-sensitive implementation.** As noted, GEF projects have adopted a wide range of participatory approaches to build support and ownership, embed the project within local institutions and processes, and enhance long-term sustainability of the project outcomes.<sup>472</sup>

234. **GEF projects have managed unexpected conflict impacts by bringing in new partners.** For example, Project 2929, which focused on reducing conflicting uses in the Artibonite River watershed shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti, faced significant difficulty because of political instability. The Terminal Evaluation noted that in five years, the project staff saw five changes of environment ministers in Haiti and three in the Dominican Republic. Additionally, for the duration of the project, external issues regarding the movement of refugees led to increasingly tense relations between the two countries. The project was further impeded by the lack of experience of both countries in approaching a binational process to create a water treaty. To address this experience gap and improve relations, the government of Mexico was called upon to facilitate trainings on such processes for the Haitian and Dominican governments. Assistance from this new partner helped to mitigate further conflict between the other parties.<sup>473</sup>

235. **Security and the potential use of force are among the most challenging aspects of conflict-sensitive implementation.** In specific circumstances, security forces supporting conservation efforts have committed human rights violations, creating serious reputational risk both for the project and for the conservation organization.<sup>474</sup> Efforts to hire ex-combatants as game guards in Mozambique (simultaneously supporting conservation and reintegration) raised serious questions about the risk of the ex-combatants reverting to past behaviors (which had harmed local communities) as well as fighting with one another.<sup>475</sup> Most of the risks were able to be managed, but the park continues to have difficult relationships with the neighboring communities that want to use the resources in the park. Security must be considered: without security forces, competing demands for resources, armed criminal groups, and others can put project staff at physical risk. But efforts to address these security risks have generated serious new risks—for example by providing rangers in the Albertine Rift with automatic weapons and paramilitary training, only to see a number of them join a rebel group when the project funding ended and the government did not adequately pay their salaries.<sup>476</sup> Approaches to managing the risks related to security forces include defining clear security procedures, training in those security procedures, providing means for potentially affected people to easily and confidentially submit complaints of abuses, timely independent investigation of complaints, and holding security forces accountable.<sup>477</sup>

---

<sup>472</sup> See paras. 179-181.

<sup>473</sup> Project 2929, Terminal Evaluation, pp. 7-8.

<sup>474</sup> See para. 60.

<sup>475</sup> Pritchard 2015.

<sup>476</sup> Interview with Subject Matter Expert, October 2020.

<sup>477</sup> See generally IFC 2017.

## **Monitoring and early warning**

236. Monitoring is “the continuous or periodic, standardized process of collecting and analyzing data on specific Indicators to provide decision-makers, managers, and Stakeholders with information on progress in the achievement of agreed objectives and the use of allocated resources.”<sup>478</sup> In the context of fragile and conflict-affected states, monitoring is important for three key reasons. First, as with other projects, monitoring helps to track whether project activities are proceeding as planned. Second, because the security and social context in fragile and conflict-affected situations can change dramatically in a short period of time, monitoring helps to ascertain if and when the security situation degrades. Finally, monitoring can help to identify any unexpected negative impacts of the project early on, before it becomes a trigger for conflict. All three of these reasons may necessitate adjusting the project activities.

237. **Some GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have adopted enhanced monitoring systems to track social and conflict dynamics.** More robust conflict monitoring allows project implementers to track the changing dynamics of conflict and respond rapidly, before a situation escalates or before there are devastating impacts. Monitoring often relates to the broader security context, but it can also focus on tensions related to the project. The use of these monitoring systems can give project staff more time to prepare for upcoming crises as well as serve as a tool for contingency planning. For example, Project 9056 in Burundi noted in its Project Document that “unstable political conditions” posed a significant security risk to the project.<sup>479</sup> Before commencing implementation, UNIDO, the Implementing Agency, planned to “carefully keep tracking the political conditions in the country” as part of its risk mitigation strategy.<sup>480</sup>

238. **Indicators for GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations may focus more on procedural aspects than environmental outcomes.** As noted previously, GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have often had to focus more on basic institutional capacity building to create the necessary enabling conditions for the environmental benefits to be realized.<sup>481</sup> Indicators for such projects accordingly focus more on procedural and institutional aspects, and less on environmental outcomes.

239. **Real-time monitoring can support enhanced monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected settings.** In situations not affected by fragility or conflict, episodic monitoring may suffice to track progress on a quarterly or annual basis. To be able to respond better to rapidly evolving circumstances, GEF projects could consider adopting a form of real-time monitoring. Real-time monitoring constantly tracks developments, uses both qualitative and quantitative analyses, and draws heavily on local informants.<sup>482</sup>

---

<sup>478</sup> GEF 2019b, p. 6.

<sup>479</sup> Project 9056, [Project Document for CEO Approval](#), p. 30.

<sup>480</sup> Ibid.

<sup>481</sup> See paras. 130-131.

<sup>482</sup> Krummenacher and Schmeidl 2001.



240. ADB's experience can provide guidance for real-time monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The ADB Peacebuilding Tool provides a matrix that asks project staff to consider the distribution of power, local acceptance, social capital, traditional institutions, participation of interest groups, intergroup relations, and impacts on differential access to resources.<sup>483</sup> ADB recommends using this tool to inform monitoring updates during the implementation phase of a project. Project staff can regularly return to this matrix and assess changes in local conflict dynamics, and (if necessary) create new monitoring criteria that address risks revealed by this updated matrix. This ongoing monitoring can give project staff an opportunity to adjust earlier to evolving issues.<sup>484</sup> In assessing pilot testing of the tool in Nepal, ADB noted various indicators that projects can use to monitor the relative security of an area or relative improvements in the conflict context.<sup>485</sup>

241. **GEF projects have used early warning systems in tandem with enhanced monitoring to enable them to know about risks before they have escalated and when adjustment is possible.** Early warning is “a process that (a) alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflict; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflict.”<sup>486</sup> These early warning measures can enable staff to know about risks and adjust course in a timely manner – whether that is ensuring staff safety, addressing project-related tensions before they escalate, or otherwise adapting. Organizations such as the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response<sup>487</sup> monitor a series of conflict indicators to help rapidly detect and respond to conflict flare-ups.<sup>488</sup> Some GEF projects operating in fragile and conflict-affected contexts likewise monitor conflict indicators directly or rely on the reports of other groups doing this work.<sup>489</sup> For example, Project 9441 in Colombia noted that it will rely on the UN Department for Safety and Security's country risk assessments and will follow its advice regarding the security of project staff.<sup>490</sup>

242. **Fragility and conflict can make it difficult for GEF project staff to access the necessary sites and people needed for monitoring.** The security risks associated with conflict-affected contexts can sometimes make it difficult or impossible to access a project site regularly.<sup>491</sup> Such irregularities can affect the quality of monitoring data and thus the potential for early warning. Hence, when planning monitoring criteria and practices for a project in these contexts, project staff should be thoughtful of potential interruptions and suggest alternative criteria and methodologies as contingencies. In some cases, project staff use remote monitoring via WhatsApp and other modalities to overcome these impediments.<sup>492</sup>

---

<sup>483</sup> ADB 2012, p. 30.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid., pp. 2, 10.

<sup>485</sup> Ibid, pp. 13, 16, 32.

<sup>486</sup> OECD 2009, p. 22.

<sup>487</sup> Forum on Early Warning and Response, <http://www.fewer-international.org/>

<sup>488</sup> Forum on Early Warning and Response, <http://www.fewer-international.org/veroeffentlichungen/>.

<sup>489</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, August 2020.

<sup>490</sup> Project 9441, [PIF Document for WPI](#), p. 25.

<sup>491</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, August 2020.

<sup>492</sup> Interview, subject matter expert, October 2020.



**243. Some projects that did not account for conflict sensitivity in their monitoring systems faced difficulties during project closure.** Though environmental projects often rely more heavily on quantitative and scientific indicators focused on outcomes in the physical environment, a fragile or conflict-affected context often requires the introduction of more socially oriented indicators. As such, traditional conservation indicators alone may be insufficient. For example, Project 774, Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region, was implemented by the Instituto Alexander von Humboldt. As a biological research institution, this Institute has more experience in natural sciences than in development work. The project produced substantial scientific data, but its development outputs, including livelihood improvements, were not as robust. The Terminal Evaluation noted that the “project design had an ineffective M&E system, and it underestimated key financial and political risks to sustainability.”<sup>493</sup> The ineffective monitoring system weakened the ability of project staff to market and communicate the project results, leading to an inability to secure further funding to help supplement project closure activities.<sup>494</sup>

**244. There is a lack of standardized tools, processes, and norms for conflict-sensitive monitoring in GEF projects.** Monitoring of GEF projects is conducted pursuant to its Policy on Monitoring.<sup>495</sup> While many GEF projects used similar methods of monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected situations, these methods have been often ad hoc, rather than pursuant to a specific GEF protocol.<sup>496</sup> Therefore, the degree to which projects integrated these considerations while developing their monitoring criteria is uneven, and it is uncommon for projects to feel comfortable changing monitoring criteria to reflect new knowledge or new dynamics.<sup>497</sup>

**245. Monitoring of GEF projects for unintended consequences is limited.** Any project can have unintended consequences. Fragile and conflict-affected situations seem to have a greater number of unintended consequences, though, and many of those are negative. This is due to the greater social cleavages and sensitivities associated with fragile and conflict-affected settings, where modest problems can escalate quickly and in unexpected ways. Monitoring of cobenefits is also limited.

### **Adjustment**

**246. One of the most important and difficult steps in conflict-sensitive programming is adjusting projects to reflect developments and learning.** It is important both because fragility or conflict can change rapidly posing new risks to the project, and because monitoring may highlight that a particular activity or approach is not as effective as previously thought. There is an operational tension between committing to the approved project plan and having the flexibility to adjust to a new reality or to a better understanding of the reality in which the project is being implemented. The following paragraphs highlight the need to adapt and

---

<sup>493</sup> Project 774, Terminal Evaluation, p.7.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>495</sup> GEF 2019b.

<sup>496</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, July 2020.

<sup>497</sup> Ibid.

adjust—especially in fragile and conflict-affected situations—as well as the challenges in doing so.

**247. Interviews with many staff of Implementing Agencies and the GEF Secretariat highlighted difficulties that projects faced in trying to adjust their operations to an escalation of violence and armed conflict.** Project staff repeatedly noted that if projects changed the objectives or substantial portions of their activities, it would be necessary to seek permission from the GEF Council for the revisions. Most staff expressed an understanding that a change in the project objectives was the primary consideration, but there was little clarity on what would constitute such a change.<sup>498</sup>

**248. Thus, staff not only have to struggle with how to navigate difficulties related to fragility or conflict that arose during implementation, but there was a chilling effect on pursuing necessary measures in a timely manner as the project staff sought to avoid going back to the GEF Council for any reason.** This means that GEF projects often make only modest adjustments. This works when the situation is of short duration. The strategy means, though, that there are often delays and additional costs, and that measures that might be more effective at managing the risks are not pursued.

**249. Notwithstanding the challenges of adjusting programming, GEF projects increasingly anticipate at least the possibility of adjustment.** In Afghanistan, for example, project staff for Project 4227 established two baseline requirements for activities to continue operating in a given area: continuing “local political support for the project” and “acceptable security in project sites.”<sup>499</sup> Throughout the duration of the project, staff monitored for both local support and security. By the Mid-Term Review, project staff observed that the “security situation ... has deteriorated significantly in recent months and it may become difficult or even impossible for the project to engage in this part of Badakshan. In general, in the volatile Afghan context, there is always a certain risk that this can change in the future.”<sup>500</sup> It is not clear whether activities were modified in response to this information, because there was no Terminal Evaluation available for this project. However, the inclusion of this reflection in the Mid-Term Review indicates that project staff did carry out ongoing monitoring of conflict dynamics and did intend to adjust their activities if necessary.

**250. Some GEF projects have changed project sites.** This is particularly the case when local conflicts began to affect project activities. For example in Colombia, Project 2019 had to relocate and restructure four years after implementation began, in reaction to a growing “situation of social unease.”<sup>501</sup> According to the project’s Terminal Evaluation, a “public security situation made it impossible for any of the Project’s key partners to work in the area of Las Hermosas.”<sup>502</sup> Consequently, the project had to move operations out of the site specified in the

---

<sup>498</sup> See paras. 147-155.

<sup>499</sup> Project 4227, Midterm Review, p. 34.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid.

<sup>501</sup> Project 2019, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 9.

<sup>502</sup> Ibid.

initial project design. The total cost of this disruption and subsequent restructuring was \$3.5 million. Notwithstanding the additional costs, the project was able to conclude with satisfactory outcomes.<sup>503</sup>

251. **GEF projects have also made adjustments by bringing in new partners and resources.** For example, when political tensions stalled Project 2929 in the Artibonite River Basin between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, project staff engaged experts from the Mexican government who were able to facilitate trainings necessary to negotiate and adopt a bilateral water treaty governing the river.<sup>504</sup>

### **Conclusions**

252. As in project design, attention to conflict sensitivity in implementation is uneven across the GEF portfolio. However, adjusting implementation in reaction to conflict was a concern in several projects, often leading to delays and additional costs. Adopting conflict-sensitive measures at the outset of implementation, while not guaranteeing avoidance of these scenarios, can allow project staff to be proactive rather than reactive as situations evolve.

#### *3.4.3 Project closure*

253. **Project closure practices are important to ensuring the sustainability of a project's benefits over the long term.** Benefits that are not sustained beyond the life of the project yield few, if any, global environmental benefits. It matters little how many trees are planted to fight land degradation if the vast majority die.<sup>505</sup> While a project may only last a few years, it can take a significantly longer period of time for a project's impacts to be consolidated. For example, Project 9073, Unlocking Biodiversity Benefits through Development Finance in Critical Catchments, was budgeted and approved for four years of operations; however, the improvements and impacts on South Africa's biodiversity the project envisioned would likely take 10 years or more.<sup>506</sup> Closure is particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected situations, where attention often focuses on institution building, capacity building, and otherwise creating an enabling environment; gains realized during the project must be sustained for the global environmental benefits of the project to be sustained as well.<sup>507</sup>

254. **Conflict-related impacts often delay project closure.** A variety of factors connected to conflict dynamics can lead to delays throughout the life of a project, ultimately leading to delayed closure. Conflict can make it more difficult for project staff to access project sites or make them inaccessible for periods of time. It is often more difficult to build trust in conflict-affected communities.

---

<sup>503</sup> Ibid.

<sup>504</sup> Project 2929, Terminal Evaluation, pp. 7-8.

<sup>505</sup> The New Humanitarian 2008.

<sup>506</sup> GEF IEO 2019b, p. 30.

<sup>507</sup> Hammill et al. 2009.

255. **Projects need to plan for and create the conditions for a smooth transition.** This includes ensuring that there are local structures in place to sustain the benefits of the project after the project funding ends and project staff leave. Project staff should consider early on when project activities can be transitioned to local organizations or institutions, and work with these partners to create the necessary capacity for the transition. Planning should start at the design stage, with measures undertaken throughout the project.<sup>508</sup>

256. **Building relationships with local institutions early on can ease transitions.** When local institutions that can carry on project operations are identified early, project staff have a greater opportunity to orient aspects of the project activities to suit the transition to the future partner.<sup>509</sup> Likewise, local institutions have more opportunity to become familiar with the activities they will assume responsibility for. This additional time can help to improve the fit between the project and the local community, strengthen the local investment in project success, and improve sustainability. Along with building relationships, a project may also need to build the local capacity for problem solving related to project activities. In addition, project staff can collaborate with local stakeholders to create an action plan that includes post-closure activities to prepare for a smooth transition.<sup>510</sup>

257. **Communicating the transition strategy to all stakeholders early on can help to manage expectations.** Ensuring that all stakeholders are aware of the plan and their potential role in it can help to create a smoother transition.<sup>511</sup> As with early relationship building, communicating and coordinating early in the project can yield additional benefits. A longer timeline for communication creates opportunities for stakeholders to provide feedback and for plans to be adjusted accordingly.

#### 3.4.4 *Evaluation and learning*

258. **Evaluation of projects in fragile and conflict-affected environments can be particularly challenging.**<sup>512</sup> Understanding conflict dynamics requires a complex systems view:<sup>513</sup> evaluation must have consideration of multiple actors, interests, and interactions. Attributing the effects of a project can be challenging, leading to a shift of emphasis on contribution rather than attribution.<sup>514</sup> Moreover, projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings lack counterfactuals (i.e., a comparable situation without fragility or conflict), complicating causality to a particular actor or intervention. Time also complicates evaluations: fragile and conflict-affected situations change frequently and rapidly, and the effects of a project may not manifest themselves or be consolidated until years after a project has closed. For example, in the context of Land Degradation, the GEF IEO has observed that “A lag time of

---

<sup>508</sup> FAO 2006; UNDP, [Programme Transition Planning](#).

<sup>509</sup> Ibid.

<sup>510</sup> Ibid.

<sup>511</sup> Ibid.

<sup>512</sup> Woodrow and Jean 2019; Pearson d’Estrée 2019b; Nanthikesan and Uitto 2012; Menkhaus 2004.

<sup>513</sup> Patton 2010, 2020; Pearson d’Estrée 2019a.

<sup>514</sup> Pearson d’Estrée 2019b; Patton 2020.

4.5-5.5 years was an important inflection point at which impacts were observed to be larger in magnitude.”<sup>515</sup>

259. Scholars stress the importance of tailoring evaluation to conflict-affected and fragile contexts.<sup>516</sup> In recognition of the complexity and dynamism of programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations, there has been a shift to using an adaptive management framework for framing evaluation.<sup>517</sup> In addition, there has been an increasing focus on theories of change, rather than on quantitative metrics.<sup>518</sup> Evaluators and program people working in these fluid settings have noted that evaluators may miss important considerations if they adhere rigidly to a theory of change constructed in the project design phase, years prior to current conditions. Considering the complexity and dynamic nature of situations affected by fragility and conflict, it may be asked whether rigid theories of change are fit for purpose in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Accordingly, some evaluators have developed an open theory of change that considers the project’s broader context over time.<sup>519</sup>

260. **Real-time evaluation can help GEF Implementing Agencies to better adapt projects to fragile and conflict-affected contexts.** Real-time evaluation is “a timely, rapid and interactive peer review of a fast evolving ... operation ... undertaken at an early phase.”<sup>520</sup> Real-time evaluations provide project staff with quick and immediate feedback that allows them to reconsider how well their project design works in an evolving situation, often one affected by conflict or other disasters. Providing real-time evaluations can create an early opportunity for project staff to make key adjustments. In 2000, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) adopted real-time evaluation for use in conflict zones, following experiences in Kosovo. UNHCR considers real-time evaluations as a key tool to “provide suggestions for improvement ... while they can still make a difference.”<sup>521</sup> UNHCR has since used the process successfully in interventions in Angola, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.<sup>522</sup>

261. **GEF projects can have unintended consequences, but evaluation often does not capture them.**<sup>523</sup> Interviews with Implementing Agency staff commented on both unexpected cobenefits and negative impacts.<sup>524</sup> They also noted that evaluations did not always adequately capture the unintended consequences, especially when they were negative. Implementing Agency staff also commented more broadly on the challenges of adapting indicators to programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>525</sup> They noted, for example, that

---

<sup>515</sup> GEF IEO 2018c, p. ix.

<sup>516</sup> Nanthikesan and Uitto 2012; Woomer 2018.

<sup>517</sup> Woodrow and Jean 2019.

<sup>518</sup> Patton 2020.

<sup>519</sup> Uitto 2019, p. 58.

<sup>520</sup> UNHCR 2002, p. 1.

<sup>521</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>522</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>523</sup> Nanthikesan and Uitto 2012.

<sup>524</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, August, 2020.

<sup>525</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, July 2020.

programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations tended to emphasize institution building, and required a more qualitative approach to evaluation.

**262. A growing number of GEF Implementing Agencies have been learning from experiences in designing, implementing, and evaluating environmental projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations.** They have taken stock of experiences and published reports and guidance drawing upon their experiences, often supplemented by best practices.<sup>526</sup> Some, such as the World Bank and Conservation International, have established centers to provide training and technical assistance on conflict-sensitive programming.<sup>527</sup>

### **3.5 Cross-cutting issues**

#### *3.5.1 Human rights*

**263. The GEF’s Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards de facto addresses and protects a number of human rights.** These include rights of indigenous peoples (including free, prior, and informed consent), gender-related rights, labor rights, cultural rights, procedural rights related to stakeholder engagement, and preventing and mitigating involuntary resettlement.<sup>528</sup> If there is a violation of the protections in the Environmental and Social Safeguards, a person may submit a complaint to “to a local or country-level dispute resolution system, a GEF Partner Agency or the GEF Resolution Commissioner.”<sup>529</sup>

**264. A 2017 review by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office noted several human rights–related gaps in the GEF’s Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards.**<sup>530</sup> Though the 2018 Policy did expand protections related to gender and indigenous peoples, it still has notable gaps related to explicit consideration of human rights, nondiscrimination, and equity. Aside from noting these gaps, the 2018 Policy does not mention “human rights,” “nondiscrimination,” or “equity.”

**265. GEF projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations have intersected with human rights considerations at various phases of project design and implementation.** The in-depth analyses of the seven conflict-affected situations underpinning this evaluation include various accounts of projects having both positive and negative impacts on human rights. For example, Project 9114 in Serbia, which sought to build capacity to implement MEAs, included consideration of respect for human rights as part of its Social and Environmental Risk Screening.<sup>531</sup> Discussed in the indigenous peoples section, Project 1020 is a notable example of a project adjusting to address human rights considerations, particularly indigenous rights to autonomy and governance over their historic lands.<sup>532</sup>

---

<sup>526</sup> See paras. 192-201 and box 3.1.

<sup>527</sup> E.g., [World Bank Fragility, Conflict, & Violence \(FCV\) Group](#).

<sup>528</sup> GEF 2018c, 2019c.

<sup>529</sup> <https://www.thegef.org/content/conflict-resolution-commissioner>.

<sup>530</sup> GEF IEO 2018b, p. 36.

<sup>531</sup> Project 9114, Project Document, p. 79.

<sup>532</sup> See para. 267. Also in Colombia, see Project 9663.

### 3.5.2 Indigenous peoples

266. **Consideration of indigenous peoples is important in GEF projects, and in fragile and conflict-affected this consideration becomes even more important.** Throughout the seven fragile and conflict-affected situations examined in detail by this evaluation, as well as other GEF projects considered, there are many instances wherein a GEF project affected or was affected by indigenous groups. The GEF has long engaged with indigenous groups, funding projects implementing three MEAs that directly affect them.<sup>533</sup> The GEF Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards was updated in 2018 to reflect best practice standards regarding indigenous peoples.<sup>534</sup> GEF Minimum Standard 5 provides a set of procedural and substantive protections ranging from free, prior and informed consent, to respect for rights to land and other resources, to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. These protections are particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected situations, where weakened government capacity can leave indigenous peoples at greater risk.

267. **GEF project designs have benefited from consultation and consideration of perspectives of indigenous communities.** At “the request of indigenous leaders,” Project 1020 in Colombia shifted its original intention after indigenous communities voiced their preference.<sup>535</sup> Initially, the project had intended to create a new national park, but after consultation, this became a community-managed reserve. Based on the experience of the National Parks Association’s creation of Tuparro National Park, local communities in Matavén Forest “discarded the option of creating a National Park” because the previous case “generated conflict with the region’s indigenous people over the degree of co-management to be allowed and resulted in the death of various indigenous people as well as of the park’s administrator.”<sup>536</sup> The TER notes that Project 1020 was particularly noteworthy in choosing to support a government initiative to create protected areas under indigenous management instead of a national park that would not involve local inhabitants.<sup>537</sup>

268. **GEF projects have considered particular vulnerabilities and perspectives of indigenous groups when developing a project’s conflict prevention methods.** Project 9661, set up to protect Mali’s elephants in key sites and enhance the livelihoods of local communities living along elephant migration route to reduce human-elephant conflict, recognized that the project area had a diverse range of natural resource uses by different ethnicities and communities.<sup>538</sup> To ensure their inclusion in the community’s natural resource plans, Project 9661 planned to create an Indigenous People Plan to guide the project’s conflict prevention methods.

---

<sup>533</sup> <https://www.thegef.org/news/partnering-peoples>.

<sup>534</sup> GEF 2018c, pp. 3-4.

<sup>535</sup> Project 1020, [Terminal Evaluation](#), p. 6.

<sup>536</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>537</sup> Project 102, [Terminal Evaluation Review](#), p. 7.

<sup>538</sup> Project 9661, [Project Document](#), p. 10.

**269. Learning from indigenous communities about current resource use and community objectives for land management has been critical in laying foundations for working with the community on resource management issues.** In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Project 9802 identified land-use conflicts between indigenous communities and park authorities as one of the primary barriers to the project’s achievement.<sup>539</sup> Much of the tensions arose from the origin of the park, when indigenous communities were removed from their ancestral lands; a related source of tension is that indigenous communities continue to use the park for hunting and fishing, pursuant to tradition but in violation of statutory law. In developing Simple Management Plans, the project aimed to understand current economic activities, livelihoods, and aspirations among local communities, including indigenous groups. In order to build a representation system that was rooted locally and could be consolidated on a larger geographical scale, the project involved a local NGO that was well connected to the communities and traditional authorities as well as their administration, at all stages of the project design.<sup>540</sup>

### 3.5.3 Gender

**270. Gender dimensions to environmental management have shown higher negative impacts on women and girls, an issue that can be exacerbated by conflict or fragile settings.** The GEF’s Gender and Equality Policy was updated in 2017 to promote gender sensitivity and gender mainstreaming in programming through guiding principles, including program elements that do not exacerbate gender inequalities, inclusive engagement with both men and women in relation to their roles associated with the environment, and the implementation of gender-responsive approaches at all project phases.<sup>541</sup> The GEF has identified three gender gaps that are of most significance to GEF programming: access to natural resources, decision making, and access to benefits.<sup>542</sup>

**271. Access to and management of natural resources is often unequal when seen in terms of gender differences, and it is one of the GEF’s vital concerns in alleviating gender inequality.** As part of its Gender Mainstreaming Plan, Project 9663 incorporates efforts to identify the roles of men and women in relation to production, as well as the gendered limits to credit or other incentives.<sup>543</sup> Not only do women have inequitable access to management, but gender equality has been linked to positive economic growth and development. Gender mainstreaming, then, became part of Project 9056 in Burundi to support a sustainable energy initiative.<sup>544</sup> In Project 5226, Improving Women and Children’s Resilience and Capacity to Adapt to Climate Change in the Democratic Republic of Congo, international institutions were engaged to support women’s access to natural resources and their management.<sup>545</sup>

---

<sup>539</sup> Project 9802, [PIF Document for WPI](#), P.7.

<sup>540</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>541</sup> GEF 2017a.

<sup>542</sup> GEF 2018b.

<sup>543</sup> Project 9663, [Project Document](#), p. 30.

<sup>544</sup> Project 9056, [PIF](#), p. 13.

<sup>545</sup> Project 5226, [PIF Document for WPI](#).



**272. The decision-making space for natural resource management has historically excluded women, opening an opportunity for GEF projects to promote gender equality.** In some communities, women are essential to natural resource sectors targeted by projects but are historically absent from decision making on resource management. Project 9056, though considered to have limited gender dimensions, ensured that all decision-making processes would be built with a gender consideration as well as engagement with stakeholders at the implementation level concerning gender inequality and women’s empowerment.<sup>546</sup> Part of Project 9663’s Gender Mainstreaming Plan tackles this gap by identifying female participation in decision making and designing ways to engage women in multi-stakeholder discussions.<sup>547</sup> In Serbia, Project 9114 set out to alleviate gender disparities by encouraging more gender-balanced participation.<sup>548</sup>

**273. Another way the GEF projects alleviate gender inequality is to make a large percentage of beneficiaries of project outputs women.** For example, Project 5226 set a goal of ensuring 40 percent of project investments would be for women,<sup>549</sup> and Project 9114 monitored the gender balance of beneficiaries of project implementation.<sup>550</sup>

#### 3.5.4 Private sector

**274. The private sector is important to GEF programming.** The GEF’s Private Sector Engagement Strategy recognizes that the private sector is important to leverage funding and transform both markets and economic systems—all of which was necessary to scale up global environmental benefits and ensure that those benefits are sustained.<sup>551</sup> Moreover, the GEF’s Policy on Non-Grant Instruments provides guidance for the use of non-grant instruments to strengthen partnership with both the private and public sectors.<sup>552</sup> The private sector is a key stakeholder in many of the transformations that the GEF seeks to achieve, because they are central to trade that drives environmental degradation.

**275. GEF projects have both sought to engage the private sector and struggled with how to engage.** For example, in Cambodia, Project 9103 sought to improve livelihoods by improving smallholders’ access to and uptake of renewable energy technologies. The Project Document noted that the “Cambodian government is actively pursuing private-public contracts to keep consistent streams of capital flowing in.”<sup>553</sup> At the same time, interviews with key informants noted that there was a reluctance by the government to provide “a playground where private sector can test approaches,” which made it difficult to pilot test approaches that could then be

---

<sup>546</sup> Project 9056, [Project Document](#), p. 27.

<sup>547</sup> Project 9663, [Project Document](#), p. 114.

<sup>548</sup> Project 9114, [Project Document](#), p. 83.

<sup>538</sup> Project 5226, [Project Document](#), p. 14.

<sup>550</sup> Project 9114, [Project Document](#), p. 23.

<sup>551</sup> GEF 2020b.

<sup>552</sup> GEF 2014.

<sup>553</sup> Project 9103, [Project Document](#), p. 28.

scaled up.<sup>554</sup> Project 9578 in Colombia (aiming to improve enabling conditions for sustainable and low-carbon landscape planning) sought to strengthen public-private coordination.<sup>555</sup>

**276. Fragile and conflict-affected situations can undermine efforts of GEF projects to engage the private sector.** For example, the Energy Efficiency Project in Burundi (Project 4133) included infrastructure services for private sector development as one of its themes for building local capacity to provide energy efficiency advice to public institutions and private sector companies.<sup>556</sup> According to the Terminal Evaluation, the project was rated unfavorably overall largely because of the legacy of the past conflict.

### 3.5.5 *The COVID-19 pandemic*

**277.** This evaluation was well under way when the COVID-19 pandemic spread rapidly around the world. The public health crisis has led to an economic crisis, and the economic crisis is leading to a fiscal crisis. The pandemic has affected GEF projects in diverse ways; it has also highlighted the importance of adaptive approaches to GEF programming.

**278. The pandemic has affected GEF projects in many ways.** The disruption to the global economy has had many ground-level consequences, especially in agrarian and natural resource-based economies.<sup>557</sup> Domestic economies of many GEF countries have been hampered and expectations are that this trend will continue for several months, if not longer. Government resources are being re-prioritized to focus on addressing the pandemic.<sup>558</sup> For both public health reasons and because of the new priorities, government officials (including law enforcement) have a reduced presence in many regions. In this vacuum, there has been an increase in land grabbing, illegal mining, illegal logging, and other illegal or illicit natural resource exploitation.<sup>559</sup> Community leaders and activists defending their lands and resources—i.e., environmental defenders—have been targeted.<sup>560</sup> This combination of economic downturn, weakened governance, growth of illegal resource exploitation, and targeting of environmental defenders threatens to reverse decades of gains achieved by GEF interventions.

**279. The travel restrictions due to COVID-19 have hindered GEF project staff from working on the ground, affecting the ability to establish trust with the local populations.** Interviews with key informants in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, and Cambodia, among others, highlighted restrictions on travel and meetings as affecting projects. They noted that it is difficult to travel to countries and within countries. Moreover, it is difficult to hold in-person meetings. Projects focused on agriculture and other resource-based livelihoods seem particularly affected. These restrictions mean that it is more difficult to do the consultations to

---

<sup>554</sup> Interview, Implementing Agency staff, July 2020.

<sup>555</sup> Project 9578, [Project Document](#).

<sup>556</sup> Project 4133, Terminal Evaluation Review, p. 2.

<sup>557</sup> ILO et al. 2020.

<sup>558</sup> OECD 2020a, 2020b; Stiglitz 2020; IMF, [Policy Responses to COVID-19](#).

<sup>559</sup> Troëng et al. 2020; Veit and Quijano Vallejos 2020; Brown 2020.

<sup>560</sup> Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. 2020; Macinnes 2020; International Land Coalition et al. 2020.

develop a project or build public consensus. Where projects can continue, they rely on periodic communications (often by telephone) with partners in remote areas. Monitoring has become more virtual, of necessity. Terminal Evaluations similarly have to rely on remote interviews. These adjustments work for people who are connected via phone or internet, but it means that the project is more removed from local communities. Informants also reported adjusting their activities; for example, in some instances, projects shifted away from on-the-ground fieldwork to emphasize national-level policies and initiatives. In one reported instance, the project repurposed funding for project elements that were not performing well to address COVID-19. While some projects are continuing without anticipated delays, several reported that they anticipated extending the project by up to six months.

280. **Key informants noted that the COVID-19 pandemic can create opportunities.** They noted that the pandemic created an opportunity to shift public opinion toward valuing environmental conservation, particularly where environmental conservation can be linked to pandemic prevention (e.g., with biodiversity and zoonotic diseases). Because COVID-19 is a zoonotic disease, support for land and biodiversity conservation as a global health measure could be strengthened. Inability to rely on global supply chains may spur bottom-up innovations and provide incentives for stewarding natural resources. Informants noted that such a perspective change could increase private financial and political support.

281. **The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of adaptive approaches to GEF programming.** Informants in particularly challenging situations noted that before the pandemic they regularly navigated crises that prevented them from traveling, from meeting, and from undertaking other activities essential to GEF programming. They noted that the adaptive approaches they had adopted for programming generally enabled them to adapt to the emerging pandemic and thereby continue to advance their projects. The STAP has noted that “Reforming the GEF rules and procedures to allow for more adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations can make GEF programming more resilient in pandemics and other crises.”<sup>561</sup>

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS

There are five key ways that the GEF could improve project success through conflict-sensitive programming. Annex A presents some ideas regarding ways that the recommendations could be implemented, drawing upon the lessons learned from the evaluation. These high-level recommendations supplement and reinforce the numerous discrete opportunities that this evaluation has highlighted throughout for improving the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of GEF interventions in situations affected by conflict and fragility. These recommendations emphasize risk management throughout the project life cycle.

***Recommendation 1: The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks. The GEF should use the***

---

<sup>561</sup> GEF STAP 2018, p. ix.

project review process to integrate consideration of fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Project reviews provide an opportunity for the GEF to identify risks that could affect project success and for proposing measures to mitigate those risks. This would help ensure that recognizing and addressing such risks is more consistent.

**Recommendation 2:** *To improve conflict-sensitive programming while also providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming. This guidance could address measures across the programming lifecycle, from design to implementation and closure. GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw upon both the commonalities and innovations of the guidance that has been developed by 10 Agencies.*

**Recommendation 3:** *To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance. These platforms are designed to effectively foster learning and exchange, build capacity, and provide specialized assistance. Since conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue, lessons learned should be exchanged on existing knowledge platforms supported through programs such as the Integrated Approach Pilots, Impact Programs, Global Wildlife Program, and planetGOLD, among others, as well as on the online GEF Portal.*

**Recommendation 4:** *The current GEF Environmental and Social Safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations. At least 11 GEF Agencies have incorporated consideration of conflict and fragility into their respective safeguards. The GEF has adopted Environmental and Social Safeguards that seek to minimize potentially adverse environmental and social impacts from projects. However, these safeguards mention conflict only once and lack a holistic recognition of the way that conflicts might be linked to the environment and natural resources. As it has done when updating safeguards regarding gender, the GEF could consider the more detailed provisions incorporated by Agencies as it considers whether and how to expand its safeguards to more effectively address conflict sensitivity.*

**Recommendation 5:** *The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations. The circumstances on the ground in these situations can change rapidly. Yet, GEF policies and procedures can make it difficult to adjust projects to adapt in a timely manner. Incorporating adaptive management into GEF policies and procedures could provide a more flexible and adaptive environment, enabling projects to adapt more quickly and more efficiently to changes resulting from conflict or fragility, as well as other difficult situations.*

## ANNEX A: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION EXPANDING UPON THE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This annex presents some ideas regarding ways that the recommendations could be implemented, drawing upon the lessons learned from the evaluation. It focuses on the five key ways that the GEF could improve project success through conflict-sensitive programming:

1. *The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks.*
2. *To improve conflict-sensitive programming while also providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.*
3. *To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance.*
4. *The current GEF Environmental and Social Safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.*
5. *The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations.*

These five high-level recommendations supplement and reinforce the numerous discrete opportunities that this evaluation has highlighted throughout for improving the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of GEF interventions in situations affected by conflict and fragility.

2. **These recommendations emphasize risk management throughout the project life cycle.** They provide institutional means that help the GEF, the Implementing Agencies, and the project teams to identify potential risks that conflict and fragility pose to achieving the project objectives. Much emphasis is placed on conflict and context analysis<sup>562</sup> and on the design phase, but situations affected by conflict and fragility are dynamic and can change rapidly. Ongoing monitoring and adjustment are necessary. Similarly, GEF projects and Implementing Agencies continue to learn from the approaches they have innovated. Accordingly, it is critical to mainstream conflict sensitivity throughout the GEF project lifecycle. These five recommendations for the GEF Secretariat provide a strong foundation.

**A.1 *The GEF Secretariat should use the project review process to provide feedback to Agencies to identify conflict- and fragility-related risks to a proposed project and develop measures to mitigate those risks.***

3. **In light of the many ways that conflict and fragility affect GEF projects, the irregular consideration of conflict-related risks in project screening and the almost nonexistent**

---

<sup>562</sup> See paras. 205-208.

**mention of fragility-related risks to GEF projects highlights the need for a more consistent approach to identifying potential conflict- and fragility-related risks.** The easiest approach would be to expand the existing risk management analysis (often in matrix format) in Project Information Forms to more consistently and systematically identify potential risks and propose mitigation measures.

**4. As part of the project review process a combination of standardized and open-ended questions could be used to determine if the context is affected by conflict or fragility.** For example, it could ask whether the project will be in a country that is affected by armed conflict within a particular period (for example, in the past 10 years). This question could ask the project proponent to consult either the Armed Conflict Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)<sup>563</sup> the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project database<sup>564</sup> in answering the question. The screening tool could also ask if the project will be in a situation affected by fragility. Again, this question could ask the project proponent to consult established indices, such as the World Bank’s List of Harmonized Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations<sup>565</sup> and the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index<sup>566</sup>—recognizing that the latter provides a substantially more comprehensive list of countries. For a comparison of the two sets, see Annex E.<sup>567</sup> In addition to reference to standardized databases, the screening tool could also ask an open-ended question that encourages the project proponent to consider the possibility of localized risks related to conflict or fragility that may not be reflected in the national-level indexes of conflict and fragility. If the answers to all these questions are “no,” then this portion of the analysis ceases.

**5. The GEF Portal could also tag or label projects as being in a fragile or conflict-affected situation.** This would prompt them to undertake a careful risk assessment, adaptive management, monitoring, and evaluation.

**6. If the project is in an area affected by conflict or fragility, the review process could identify conflict- and fragility-related risks along five dimensions: physical security, social conflict, economic drivers, political fragility and weak governance, and coping strategies.**

---

<sup>563</sup> <https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/>

<sup>564</sup> <https://acleddata.com/>

<sup>565</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>

<sup>566</sup> <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

<sup>567</sup> The quantitative analysis of the impacts of fragility on project performance contained in the second section of this evaluation highlights the fact that the most fragile situations (designated “alert”) have statistically significant impacts on multiple dimensions of project performance. Comparing the listing of countries on the Harmonized List and the Fragile States Index:

- 24 states are both listed in the World Bank’s Harmonized List and listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index;
- 12 states are listed in the Harmonized List, but are not listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index; and
- 8 countries are listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index, but are not included in the Harmonized List.

These five dimensions represent the key pathways by which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects.<sup>568</sup> That said, this is not necessarily an exhaustive list of conflict- and fragility-related risks, and project proponents should be able to identify other potential risks.

7. **In considering options for enhancing review of conflict- and fragility-related risks, the GEF should consider whether it is best to have a standardized process across all Implementing Agencies.** That is to say, the GEF may articulate the broad framework and core elements, but allow Implementing Agencies some flexibility to have the specific analytic approach reflect their specific practices.<sup>569</sup>

***A.2 To improve conflict-sensitive programming while also providing flexibility to Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.***

8. **To improve conflict-sensitive programming while also providing flexibility to GEF Agencies and projects, the GEF Secretariat could develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming.** Such guidance should address measures across the programming life cycle, from project design and review, to implementation and monitoring, to closure, to evaluation and learning.

9. **GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw upon both the commonalities and innovations of the guidance that has been developed by 10 Agencies.** These include AfDB, ADB, Conservation International, FAO, IFAD, IUCN, UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO, and the World Bank Group.<sup>570</sup> These guidelines, strategies, and toolkits—and experiences applying them—provide a rich body of approaches upon which to draw in developing GEF guidance.

10. **The conflict-sensitive guidelines and other documents developed by these 10 organizations reiterate three important facts: (1) most GEF Implementing Agencies have found guidance on conflict-sensitive programming to be valuable; (2) conflict-sensitive GEF programming is both possible and desirable; and (3) almost half (i.e., eight) of the GEF Implementing Agencies lack guidance on conflict-sensitive programming.** Thus, notwithstanding the innovations and learning on conflict-sensitive programming, almost half of the GEF Implementing Agencies still lack any form of strategy, guidelines, or toolkits for how to develop, implement, close, and evaluate the GEF projects that they implement.

11. **GEF guidance on conflict-sensitive programming could draw upon both the commonalities and innovations of the existing Implementing Agency guidance.** Implementing Agency guidance on programming in situations affected by conflict and fragility share some key elements, including understanding the local context (conflict analysis), collaboration, and stakeholder identification, analysis, and engagement. Existing guidance documents emphasize the importance of actions across the project life cycle. Guidance often provides an introductory

---

<sup>568</sup> See paras. 114-140.

<sup>569</sup> E.g., Project 9663, [Project Document PAD Revised](#), p. 98.

<sup>570</sup> See box 1.1.

section that defines key terms (such as conflict, peace, fragility, and resilience) and explains why conflict-sensitive programming is important.<sup>571</sup>

**12. Most Implementing Agency guidance documents on conflict-sensitive programming include context analysis or conflict analysis as a foundational step in project development.**

This analysis seeks to understand the social, cultural, political, economic, and other dimensions of the local conflict, including the role of natural resources.<sup>572</sup> The approaches for analyzing the context, and the conflict in particular, vary from having a more generalized awareness of the severity of the conflict<sup>573</sup> to providing specific conflict analysis tools.<sup>574</sup>

**13. In addition to context and conflict analysis, Implementing Agency guidance, training guides, and other documents highlight a range of complementary tools that can help project teams to understand the context for the intervention.** These complementary tools include, for example, Post-Conflict Impact Assessments,<sup>575</sup> Post-Conflict Needs Assessments,<sup>576</sup> and Strategic Environmental Assessments.<sup>577</sup>

**14. Conflict-sensitive guidelines from GEF Implementing Agencies often draw upon other guiding principles in framing measures to manage conflict-related risks.**<sup>578</sup> For example, many Implementing Agencies incorporate or refer to the OECD DAC Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations<sup>579</sup> as guidance for managing conflict.<sup>580</sup> The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights<sup>581</sup> were also used in different Implementing Agency guidance tools.<sup>582</sup>

**15. Perhaps the predominant guiding principle is an emphasis on inclusion and collaborative approaches throughout the life of the project.** Several Implementing Agencies recommend partnerships—national and international, private and public—to establish sustainable programming.<sup>583</sup> Stakeholder engagement processes are included in most of the toolkits, manuals, and guidance documents.<sup>584</sup> Provisions on stakeholder engagement

---

<sup>571</sup> E.g., CI 2017; ADB 2013a.

<sup>572</sup> E.g., UNDG 2013; FAO 2006, 2019a, 2019b.

<sup>573</sup> E.g., AfDB 2008.

<sup>574</sup> E.g., UNEP 2012; FAO 2019.

<sup>575</sup> E.g., FAO 2019a.

<sup>576</sup> E.g., UNDG 2013.

<sup>577</sup> E.g., World Bank Group 2005.

<sup>578</sup> E.g., ADB 2013a; FAO 2006, 2012; AfDB 2008.

<sup>579</sup> OECD DAC 2007.

<sup>580</sup> E.g., AfDB 2008; ADB 2012.

<sup>581</sup> OHCHR 2011.

<sup>582</sup> E.g., UNDG 2013.

<sup>583</sup> E.g., FAO 2012.

<sup>584</sup> E.g., CI 2017; FAO 2019a; ADB 2013a, 2013b.



processes tend to include recommendations on communication techniques,<sup>585</sup> determining the need for and defining the role of facilitators,<sup>586</sup> and tips for navigating negotiations.<sup>587</sup>

16. **The GEF may consider developing indicators and/or guidance for monitoring in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.** If the GEF were to do this, monitoring could better track changes in conflict dynamics, project outcomes, and interactions between these two. Some other organizations taking on projects in such contexts have worked to revise their indicators and theories of change as situations evolve through frameworks, such as CARE's Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Framework for Social Analysis & Action.<sup>588</sup> The introduction of standard indicators would provide project staff a more solid foundation for conflict preparedness and could serve as a jumping-off point for the development of more country- or project-specific indicators.

***A.3 To improve conflict-sensitive design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat together with the Agencies should leverage existing platforms for learning, exchange, and technical assistance.***

17. These platforms are designed to effectively foster learning and exchange, build capacity, and provide specialized assistance. Since conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting issue, lessons learned should be exchanged on existing knowledge platforms supported through programs such as the Integrated approach pilots, Impact programs, Global Wildlife Program, and planetGOLD, among others, as well as on the online GEF Portal.

18. Exchanges of approaches, experiences, and learning can enable project coordinators to quickly and effectively improve their projects and project performance. Project exchange can facilitate peer support and learning for teams that are implementing similar projects or facing similar challenges, allowing for network building and collaboration. These platforms also provide valuable services in surveying experiences—both across GEF projects and more broadly—to distill learning regarding best practices. Armed with this learning, the platforms then build capacity and provide technical assistance to new and ongoing projects. These platforms have proven particularly effective in addressing a discrete set of issues, such as international water management (e.g., the International Waters Learning Exchange and Resource Network, or IW:LEARN), illegal trade in wildlife (e.g., the Global Wildlife Program), and climate change (e.g., the Climate Technology Centre and Network).

19. **Alternatively, a learning, exchange, and technical assistance platform could be established by GEF partners and supported by the GEF.** Two examples of this approach are the Global Wildlife Program (GWP) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). A GEF-funded initiative managed by the World Bank, the GWP seeks to end illegal wildlife trade and

---

<sup>585</sup> E.g., CI 2017; FAO 2012.

<sup>586</sup> E.g., FAO 2012.

<sup>587</sup> E.g., FAO 2006.

<sup>588</sup> CARE 2020.

protect endangered species.<sup>589</sup> In addition to 37 child projects across 32 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, one component of this program seeks to enhance knowledge management across the projects. This includes organizing knowledge exchange events in which program participants can learn from experts and from peers. For example, in 2017, GWP brought together 75 participants from 20 countries to discuss solutions to human-wildlife conflict in their home communities.<sup>590</sup> It also established a system to share documents with good practices and lessons from other projects. The goals of knowledge sharing are to accelerate learning, enhance collaboration between governments (especially in surveillance), strengthen partnerships between international organizations, and implement a monitoring and evaluation framework to track the progress of multiple projects within the program.

**20. A variant on the second approach is to have a platform for learning, exchange, and technical assistance that extends beyond the GEF portfolio.** The CTCN is an example of this approach. The CTCN was created in 2012 by the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and it is administered by a coalition led by UNEP.<sup>591</sup> The CTCN receives part of its funding from the GEF. Though not GEF-specific, the CTCN operates similarly to platforms focusing on GEF projects. It focuses on technical assistance for climate programming by providing funding for technical projects, a platform for information exchange, network-building for related project teams, and workshops for capacity building.

**21. In addition to the usual learning, exchange, capacity building, and technical assistance activities, the platform could pay particular attention to learning from failure.** Problematic project experiences are often not properly documented. Unsatisfactory outcomes may be noted in Terminal Evaluations, but the details are rarely fully elaborated—often in an attempt to avoid embarrassment. In an attempt to learn from failures, a growing number of organizations and networks are holding “fail fairs” or “fail fests” to learn from projects that failed. Fail fests attempt to build a culture of sharing failures so as to maximize learning and generate new ideas for improvement.<sup>592</sup> There are two types of fail fairs: internal and external. Internal fail fairs hold events solely for an organization’s failed projects, and they engage participants within that organization, rather than the public. By contrast, external fail fairs are open to the public to present or watch. When organizing a fail faire, there are a few important points to keep in mind:<sup>593</sup>

- (1) It is important to focus on celebrating taking risks—and learning from experience.
- (2) In addition to recruiting participants to speak about their risks, also recruit senior employees within the organization to speak. This can signal high-level support.

---

<sup>589</sup> ELI 2017; <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/global-wildlife-program/overview>

<sup>590</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2017/05/15/reducing-human-wildlife-conflict-and-enhancing-coexistence>

<sup>591</sup> <https://www.thegef.org/topics/technology-transfer>

<sup>592</sup> Trucano 2010.

<sup>593</sup> Ibid.; Fail Forward n.d.; Interview with NGO staff (September 2019).

- (3) Establish a “code of conduct” for participants to create a safe space (especially important if donors are in the room). This code of conduct can be short, but it is important to establish the rules of engagement.
- (4) Be cautious about sharing the presentations online. It is important to have candid discussions, and broad dissemination can restrict candor.

***A.4 The current GEF Environmental and Social Safeguards could be expanded to provide more details so that GEF projects address key conflict-sensitive considerations.***

22. The GEF has adopted Environmental and Social Safeguards that apply to all GEF-funded projects so as to “avoid, minimize and mitigate any potentially adverse environmental and social impacts.”<sup>594</sup> The Environmental and Social Safeguards provide a set of nine standards for policies, procedures, systems, and capabilities that all GEF Implementing Agencies must demonstrate that they have in place.<sup>595</sup> Additional safeguards tailored to address conflict and fragile situations could help to ensure that GEF projects both cause no harm (e.g., by exacerbating tensions or generating conflict) and continue to meet the needs of local communities in the midst of situations affected by conflict and fragility. Moreover, enshrining conflict-sensitive measures in the Environmental and Social Safeguards could help to reduce the impacts of conflict and fragility on GEF projects. As noted above, the current GEF Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards mentions conflict only once, and it lacks detail.<sup>596</sup>

23. Safeguards could, for example, ensure that GEF project documents include an analysis of conflict- and fragility-related threats to natural resources upon which communities depend, the political economy of natural resource economies related to the project, competition for or conflict over natural resources, and access to (or lack thereof) of marginalized communities to natural resources in and near the project area. Moreover, conflict sensitivity procedures, standards, and practices should extend throughout the project life cycle—not just during project design.

***A.5 The GEF Secretariat could consider revising its policies and procedures so that GEF-supported projects can better adapt to rapid and substantial changes common in fragile and conflict-affected situations.***

24. In particular, (1) the rules and procedures need to enable projects to make necessary programmatic adjustments if conflict flares up; (2) the rules governing financing of GEF projects should enable Implementing Agencies to make the necessary adjustments to reflect sudden developments on the ground; and (3) the GEF Secretariat and Implementing Agencies may consider greater flexibility in accounting for project costs to reflect the greater time and

---

<sup>594</sup> GEF 2018c, para.

<sup>595</sup> Ibid., annex I, para. 6.

<sup>596</sup> See para. 53.

resource demands associated with developing and implementing projects in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

25. **The restrictions on adjusting projects arise from procedures ensuring that the GEF exercises oversight to ensure project funds are expended in appropriate ways.** Both the GEF Council and the GEF Secretariat have oversight responsibilities. The procedures could be amended to allow the GEF Secretariat to conduct the primary oversight of proposed revisions, and inform the Council as appropriate. This would allow for more nimble adjustments.

26. **In particular, the GEF might reconsider what constitutes a change in project objectives.** One of the primary concerns voiced by key informants was that when a project seeks to change its objectives, the GEF Council must review and approve those changes. Consider, for example, a project to improve biodiversity management in a country, and particularly by training park rangers in a specific park with mountain gorillas. If rebels moved into the park and made on-the-ground work too dangerous, would efforts to train the rangers remotely be a change of objectives? Would policy work to empower the rangers? Would it be possible to move the project to another park with chimpanzees? Or a park with many endemic species but no primates? Presumably, shifting the project to another focal area would require Council review. But short of such a dramatic shift, it would be good to have guidance regarding what would constitute a change in project objectives—and to have that guidance sufficiently broad to enable projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations to adjust as necessary and to do so in a nimble manner.

27. **In addition, the GEF could consider amending the rules governing financing of GEF projects to enable Implementing Agencies to make the necessary adjustments to reflect sudden developments on the ground.** There are four key ways to do this: allowing for contingency costs, allowing for new budget lines, allowing a greater percentage of funds that a project may transfer from one budget line to another without seeking approval, and accounting for the additional costs of working in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Currently, the GEF does not allow project budgets to include a budget line for contingent costs, and new budget lines need to be approved by the GEF Council.

28. **The GEF could allow for contingent costs, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings.** A number of intergovernmental organizations allow contingency budgeting. The World Bank, UNDP, and others allow for contingency budgeting in their central budgets. More broadly, the growing interest in resilience—and funding for resilience—seems to be increasing interest in contingency reserves and contingent budgeting.<sup>597</sup>

29. **The GEF may consider allowing projects to add budget lines, with a measure of oversight.** A number of key informants reported that it was difficult, if not impossible, to add a new budget line to address needs that arose related to conflict that had not been foreseen. One staff member from an Implementing Agency reported that they started including budget

---

<sup>597</sup> See paras. 222-224.

lines for possible expenses that might arise, and then allocated \$0 to those lines.<sup>598</sup> This made it much easier to reallocate funds at a later date should that be required. This strategy is a good work-around, but it only works if the right budget lines are envisioned and included.

**30. The COVID-19 pandemic reinforces the need for substantively and financially adaptive approaches to GEF programming.** COVID-19 has not only halted current development efforts but is also reversing decades of progress toward more sustainable development. According to the UN, the world will experience its first rise in poverty since 1998 with a predicted 71 million being forced into poverty in 2020.<sup>599</sup> Per capita income is expected to decrease in the largest fraction since 1870, forcing most countries into a recession.<sup>600</sup> It is expected that the economic declines will lead to fiscal challenges, and together the economic and fiscal challenges are projected to increase state fragility.<sup>601</sup> More countries will become fragile, and already fragile and conflict-affected countries areas will become more fragile.<sup>602</sup> COVID-19 can undermine conflict resolution and crisis management mechanisms, erode social order, and overwhelm already overextended public health systems.<sup>603</sup> It will aggravate other challenges. Inequalities may be exacerbated by the spread of COVID-19, placing more pressure on vulnerable groups.<sup>604</sup>

**31. Reforming the GEF rules and procedures to allow for more nimble and adaptive programming in fragile and conflict-affected situations can make GEF programming more resilient in pandemics and other crises.** Many of the challenges are similar: the lack of security, difficulties in conducting consultations and securing evidence, changing political priorities, weakened capacity, and growing distrust of institutions. The ability to adjust the scope of the project and move money between components is essential to effective responses to COVID-19 and other pandemics. Indeed, a number of key informants working in fragile and conflict-affected countries noted that while the country had fewer resources for coping with the pandemic, the ability and frame of mind to navigate compounding crises that had been developed working in the fragile and conflict-affected settings may have improved the ability of projects to navigate the newest crisis (COVID-19).

---

<sup>598</sup> Interview with Implementing Agency staff, May 2020.

<sup>599</sup> UN 2020.

<sup>600</sup> World Bank Group 2020d.

<sup>601</sup> OECD 2020a; IMF 2020.

<sup>602</sup> Nicola et al. 2020; UNIDO 2020.

<sup>603</sup> ICG 2020.

<sup>604</sup> EUISS 2020.

## ANNEX B: WORKS CITED

Abboud, Nura A. 2018. "Environment as a Peace-building Tool." EcoMENA. Retrieved from: <https://www.ecomena.org/environment-peace/>

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project). 2018. "While Overall Violence has Declined in 2018, Conflict is Spreading." Press Release, December 21. Retrieved from: <https://acleddata.com/2018/12/21/press-release-while-overall-violence-has-declined-in-2018-conflict-is-spreading/>

Accountability Counsel and Conservation Alliance Tanawthari. 2019. "Press Release: UN Watchdog Visits Myanmar to Investigate Conservation Project Jeopardizing Indigenous Peoples Rights." 24 July. Retrieved from: <https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/2019/07/press-release-un-watchdog-visits-myanmar-to-investigate-conservation-project-jeopardizing-indigenous-peoples-rights/>

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2019. *Contingent Disaster Financing under Policy-Based Lending in Response to Natural Disasters*. Retrieved from: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/518061/disaster-financing-policy-paper.pdf>

----- . 2013a. *Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. Retrieved from: <https://www.adb.org/publications/working-differently-fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations>

----- . 2013b. *Operational Plan for Enhancing ADB's Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations*. Retrieved from: [https://books.google.com/books?id=Zc0HDAAAQBAJ&dq=adb+conflict+sensitivity&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](https://books.google.com/books?id=Zc0HDAAAQBAJ&dq=adb+conflict+sensitivity&source=gbs_navlinks_s)

----- . 2013c. *Operational Manual Bank Policies: Safeguard Policy Statement*. Retrieved from: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/31483/om-f1-20131001.pdf>

----- . 2012. *A Peacebuilding Tool for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Development: A Pilot Initiative in Nepal*. Retrieved from: <https://www.adb.org/publications/peacebuilding-tool-conflict-sensitive-approach-development-pilot-initiative-nepal>

----- . 2009. *Safeguard Policy Statement*. Retrieved from: <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32056/safeguard-policy-statement-june2009.pdf>

Adger, W. Neil, Juan M. Pulhin, Jon Barnett, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Grete K. Hovelsrud, Marc Levy, Úrsula Oswald Spring, and Colleen H. Vogel. 2014. "Human Security." In *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*, 755–791. *Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

AfDB (African Development Bank). 2018. "African Development Bank Releases New Tool to Assess Resilience and Fragility in Countries" 12 September. Retrieved from: <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/african-development-bank-releases-new-tool-to-assess-resilience-and-fragility-in-countries-18476>

----- . 2015. *Environmental and Social Assessment Procedures (ESAP)*. Retrieved from: [https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/SSS\\_%E2%80%93vol1%E2%80%93Issue4\\_-\\_Environmental\\_and\\_Social\\_Assessment\\_Procedures\\_ESAP\\_.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/SSS_%E2%80%93vol1%E2%80%93Issue4_-_Environmental_and_Social_Assessment_Procedures_ESAP_.pdf)

----- . 2013. *African Development Bank Group's Integrated Safeguards System: Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards*. Retrieved from: [https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/December\\_2013\\_-\\_AfDB%E2%80%93Integrated\\_Safeguards\\_System\\_-\\_Policy\\_Statement\\_and\\_Operational\\_Safeguards.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/December_2013_-_AfDB%E2%80%93Integrated_Safeguards_System_-_Policy_Statement_and_Operational_Safeguards.pdf)

----- . 2008. *Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States*. Retrieved from: <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/30736191-EN-STRATEGY-FOR-ENHANCED-ENGAGEMENT-IN-FRAGILES-STATES.PDF>

----- . 2002. *Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States*. Retrieved from: <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/30736191-EN-STRATEGY-FOR-ENHANCED-ENGAGEMENT-IN-FRAGILES-STATES.PDF>

Ali, Saleem H. 2019. "A Casualty of Peace? Lessons on De-militarizing Conservation in the Cordillera del Condor Corridor." In *Collateral Values*, ed. T. Lookingbill and P. Smallwood. pp. 177–188. Retrieved from: [http://doi-org-443.webvpn.fjmu.edu.cn/10.1007/978-3-030-18991-4\\_8](http://doi-org-443.webvpn.fjmu.edu.cn/10.1007/978-3-030-18991-4_8)

Akinyoade, 'Demola Victor. 2010. "Peace and Conflict Sensitive Programming." *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* 2(2): 768-793.

Altman, Stephanie, Sandra S. Nichols, and John Woods. 2012. "Leveraging High-Value Natural Resources to Restore the Rule of Law: The Role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia's Transition to Stability." In Paivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, London: Taylor & Francis, 337–365.

Armenteras, Dolores, Laura Schneider, and Liliana María Dávalos. 2018. "Fires in Protected Areas Reveal Unforeseen Costs of Colombian Peace." *Nature Ecology & Evolution* 3:20–23. Retrieved from: <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-018-0727-8>

Austin, Jay E., and Carl E. Bruch (eds.). 2000. *The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Auty, Richard M. 1993. *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*. London: Routledge.

Babatunde, Abosede Omowumi. 2020. "Oil Pollution and Water Conflicts in the Riverine Communities in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region: Challenges for and Elements of Problem-Solving Strategies." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 38 (2): 274–293. Retrieved from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589001.2020.1730310>

Babcicky, Philipp. 2013. "A Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Climate Change Adaptation." *Peace Review* 25 (4):480–488. doi:10.1080/10402659.2013.846131

Baker, Katie J.M., and Tom Warren. 2019. "A Leaked Report Shows WWF Was Warned Years Ago of "Frightening" Abuses." *Buzzfeed News*, 5 March. Retrieved from: <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/katiejmbaker/wwf-report-human-rights-abuses-rangers>.

Bannon, Ian, and Paul Collier (eds.). 2003. *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Barbut, Monique, and Sasha Alexander. 2016. "Land Degradation as a Security Threat Amplifier: The New Global Frontline." In *Land Restoration: Reclaiming Landscapes for a Sustainable Future*, edited by Ilan Chabry, Martin Frick, and Jennifer Helgesen. Waltham, MA: Academic Press, 3–12.

Barnett, Correlli. 1963. *The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War*. New York: Morrow.

Binningsbø, Helga Malmin, and Siri Aas Rustad. 2012. "Sharing the Wealth: A Pathway to Peace or a Trail to Nowhere?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29 (5): 547–566.

Blundell, Arthur G., and Emily E. Harwell. 2016. "How Do Peace Agreements Treat Natural Resources?" *Forest Trends*. Retrieved from: <https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/peace-agreement-natural-resources-formatted-final-1-19-16-pdf.pdf>



BOAD (West African Development Bank). 2015. *Operational Policies and Procedures of West African Development Bank Intervention for Environmental and Social Management in the Financing of Projects*. Retrieved from: [https://www.boad.org/wp-content/uploads/upload/ethique/po.pb\\_00\\_eng\\_boad\\_31\\_may\\_2015.pdf](https://www.boad.org/wp-content/uploads/upload/ethique/po.pb_00_eng_boad_31_may_2015.pdf)

Boone, Catherine. 2015. "Land Tenure Regimes and State Structure in Rural Africa: Implications for the Forms of Resistance to Large-Scale Land Acquisitions by Outsiders." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 33 (2): 171–190. doi:10.1080/02589001.2015.1065576

Brown, Kimberley. 2020. "The Hidden Toll of Lockdown on Rainforests." *BBC News*, 18 May. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200518-why-lockdown-is-harming-the-amazon-rainforest>

Bruch, Carl, David Jensen, Mikiyasu Nakayama, and Jon Unruh. 2019. "The Changing Nature of Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Environmental Cooperation." *Environmental Law Reporter* 49(2): 10134–10154.

Bruch, Carl, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols (eds.). 2016. *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. London: Taylor & Francis.

Bruch, Carl, Lydia Slobodian, Sandra S. Nichols, and Carroll Muffett. 2016. "Facilitating Peace or Fueling Conflict? Lessons in Post-Conflict Governance and Natural Resource Management." In *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols. London: Taylor & Francis, 953–1040.

Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. 2015. "Climate and Conflict." *Annual Review of Economics* 7:577–617.

Bush, Kenneth David. 2009. *Aid for Peace: A Handbook for Applying Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) to PEACE III Projects*. University of Ulster, INCORE, and United Nations University. Retrieved from: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/116220/Handbook-Aid\\_for\\_Peace-2009\\_Dec.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/116220/Handbook-Aid_for_Peace-2009_Dec.pdf)

----- . 1998. *A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Developing Projects in Conflict Zones*. The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative and the Evaluation Unit. Retrieved from: [https://conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Measure\\_of\\_Peace.pdf](https://conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Measure_of_Peace.pdf)

Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. 2020. "Earth Day 2020: Experts Denounce Continued Attacks against Land & Environmental Defenders, Exacerbated by COVID-19 Lockdown Measures." 22 April. Retrieved from: <https://www.business->

[humanrights.org/en/latest-news/earth-day-2020-experts-denounce-continued-attacks-against-land-environmental-defenders-exacerbated-by-covid-19-lockdown-measures/](https://www.humanrights.org/en/latest-news/earth-day-2020-experts-denounce-continued-attacks-against-land-environmental-defenders-exacerbated-by-covid-19-lockdown-measures/)

CAF (Development Bank of Latin America). 2015. *Environmental and Social Safeguards for CAF/GEF Projects: Manual*. Version 1. Retrieved from: [https://www.caf.com/media/6742/d0-7\\_s\\_e\\_safeguards\\_manual\\_to\\_caf-gef\\_projects\\_may\\_2015\\_28.pdf](https://www.caf.com/media/6742/d0-7_s_e_safeguards_manual_to_caf-gef_projects_may_2015_28.pdf)

CARE. 2020. *Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Framework for Social Analysis and Action*. Retrieved from: [https://www.care.org/sites/default/files/saa\\_mel\\_framework.2jan.pdf](https://www.care.org/sites/default/files/saa_mel_framework.2jan.pdf)

Certini, Giacomo, Riccardo Scalenghe, and William I. Woods. 2013. "The Impact of Warfare on the Soil Environment." *Earth-Science Reviews* 127:1–15.

CI (Conservation International). 2017. *Environmental Peacebuilding Training Manual*. Retrieved from: <https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/peace/home/training>

CNA (Center for Naval Analysis Corporation). 2014. *National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change*. Alexandria, VA.

CNA Military Advisory Board. 2007. *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change*. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis Corporation.

Collier, Paul, and Anthony J. Venables. (eds.). 2011. *Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. 2012. *How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity*. London: Conflict Sensitivity Consortium. Retrieved from: [https://conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/6602\\_HowToGuide\\_CSF\\_WEB\\_3.pdf](https://conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/6602_HowToGuide_CSF_WEB_3.pdf)

Cooper, Tom. 2013. *Great Lakes Conflagration: Second Congo War, 1998-2003*. Helion & Company.

Corlazzoli, Vanessa, and Jonathan White. 2013. *Back to the Basics: A Compilation of Best Practices in Design, Monitoring & Evaluation in Fragile and Conflict-affected Environments*. London: UK Department for International Development. Retrieved from: <http://www.coordinationtoolkit.org/wp-content/uploads/DFID-Back-to-Basics.pdf>

Council on Foreign Relations. 2020. "Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo." Global Conflict Tracker, updated 9 November. Retrieved from: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo>

Crawford, Alec. 2012. *Conflict-Sensitive Conservation in Nyungwe National Park: Conflict Analysis*. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

Crawford, Alec, and Johannah Bernstein. 2008. *MEAs, Conservation and Conflict: A Case Study of Virunga National Park, DRC*. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: [https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/meas\\_cons\\_conf\\_virunga.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/meas_cons_conf_virunga.pdf)

Dabelko, Geoffrey D., Lauren Herzer, Shuyler Null, Meaghan Parker, and Russell Sticklor (eds.). 2013. *Backdraft: The Conflict Potential of Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation*. Environmental Change and Security Program Report 14 (2). Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Daskin, Joshua H., and Robert M. Pringle. 2018. "Warfare and Wildlife Declines in Africa's Protected Areas." *Nature* 553:328–332.

Dawes, Marcia A. 2016. "Considerations for Determining When to Include Natural Resources in Peace Agreements Ending Internal Armed Conflicts." In *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols, 121–146. London: Routledge.

DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa). 2018. *Environmental and Social Safeguard Standards*. Retrieved from: <https://www.dbsa.org/EN/InvestorRelations/Environmental%20Appraisal%20Documents/DBSA%20Environmental%20and%20Social%20Safeguard%20Standards.pdf>

Dell'Angelo, Jampel, Paolo D'Odorico, and Maria Cristina Rulli. 2017. "Threats to Sustainable Development Posed by Land and Water Grabbing." *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability* 26–27:120–128.

DfID (UK Department for International Development). 2012. "Conflict Sensitive Screening Tool." Retrieved from: [http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/st\\_dfid.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/st_dfid.pdf)

Duffy, Rosaleen, Francis Massé, Emile Smidt, Esther Marijnen, Bram Büscher, Judith Verweijen, Maano Ramutsindela, Trishant Simlai, Laure Joanny, and Elizabeth Lunstrum. 2019. "Why We Must Question the Militarisation of Conservation." *Biological Conservation* 232:66–73. Retrieved from: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006320718313454>

EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 2019. *Environmental and Social Policy*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/policies/environmental-and-social-policy-esp.html>

EC DEVCO (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development). 2014. *DEVCO Companion to Financial and Contractual Procedures*. Retrieved from: [https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/organisation/dg-devco-dg-international-cooperation-development\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/organisation/dg-devco-dg-international-cooperation-development_en)

EcoPeace Middle East. 2012. "The WANA Forum: HIMA's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peace-building." 4 June. Retrieved from <https://ecopeaceme.wordpress.com/2012/06/04/the-wana-forum-himas-role-in-conflict-resolution-and-peace-building/>.

ELI (Environmental Law Institute). 2017. "Review of GEF Projects on Combatting Illegal Wildlife Trade." Report produced for the GEF Independent Evaluation Office. November 17.

Elliott, M., 1991. "Water Wars." *Geographical Magazine* (May):28–30.

Epremian, Levon, Päivi Lujala, and Carl Bruch. 2016. "High-Value Natural Resources Revenues and Transparency: Accounting for Revenues and Peace." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies). 2020. "From Bad to Worse: The Impact(s) of COVID-19 on Conflict Dynamics." 11 June. Retrieved from: <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/bad-worse-impacts-covid-19-conflict-dynamics>

Fail Forward. n.d. "Tips for Running a Fail Faire." <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583382786b8f5b1d0c788b9e/t/589e35208419c261c734aeab/1486763298168/Tips-for-Running-a-Fail-Faire.pdf>

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2019a. *The Programme Clinic: Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions—Facilitation Guide*. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-detail/en/c/1206211/>

----- . 2019b. *Guide to Context Analysis Informing FAO Decision-Making: Approaches to Working in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts*. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/guide-context-analysis-informing-fao-decision-making-approaches-working-fragile-and>

----- . 2018. *Corporate Framework to Support Sustainable Peace in the Context of Agenda 2030*. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/3/I9311EN/i9311en.pdf>

----- . 2016a. "Community Contingency Funds, an Agricultural Risk Insurance for Vulnerable Households." Resilience Good Practices: Natural Hazards. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5876e.pdf>

----- . 2016b. *State of the World's Forests 2016—Forests and Agriculture: Land-Use Challenges and Opportunities*. Rome. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/publications/sofo/2016/en>

----- . 2012. *Collaborative Conflict Management for Enhanced National Forest Programmes (NFPS): Training Manual*. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3101e.pdf>

----- . 2006. *Conflict Management over Natural Resources*. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/a779f3ae-6af3-5125-9159-b1009f1854d3>

----- . 2005. "Forests, War and Peace." In *State of the World's Forests*, Rome, 116–123.

----- . 2002. *Community-Based Forest Resource Conflict Management: A Training Package*. Vols. I and II. Retrieved from: <http://www.fao.org/3/y4300e/y4300e00.htm> and <http://www.fao.org/3/Y4301E/Y4301E00.htm>

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) and UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees). 2018. *Managing Forests in Displacement Settings: Guidance on the Use of Planted and Natural Forests to Supply Forest Products and Build Resilience in Displaced and Host Communities*. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/i8309en.pdf>

Fassihi, Farnaz. 2019. "Protests Incited by Gas Price Hike Grip Iran." *New York Times*, 16 November. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/world/middleeast/iran-gas-price.html>

FFI (Fauna and Flora International). 2005. "Murder of Rangers Highlights Threat to Cambodia's Forests." September 30. <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/ar-news/vbADHOcKlO8>

Filzmozer, Eva, and Pierre-Jean Brasier. 2017. "Closing a (Violent) Chapter: Santa Rita Hydro Dam Project Officially Cancelled." *Carbon Market Watch*, 30 November. Retrieved from: <https://carbonmarketwatch.org/2017/11/30/closing-violent-chapter-santa-rita-hydro-dam-project-officially-cancelled/>

The Fund for Peace. n.d. "Fragile States Index: Methodology." Retrieved from: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>

Galgallo, James, and Catherine Scott. 2010. *Report for an External Evaluation of Integrated Peace and Livelihoods Programme*. Catholic Diocese of Maralal. Retrieved from: <https://cafod.org.uk/content/download/1015/8332/file/>

GEF (Global Environment Facility). 2020. "Delivering Transformation Change: The Journey of the Global Environment Facility." Retrieved from: <https://spark.adobe.com/page/bYKIPUYoZPIZD/>

----- . 2020b. *GEF's Private Sector Engagement Strategy*. GEF/C.58/05. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF\\_C.58\\_05\\_GEFs%20Private%20Sector%20Engagement%20Strategy\\_0.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF_C.58_05_GEFs%20Private%20Sector%20Engagement%20Strategy_0.pdf)

----- . 2019a. *Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility*. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/gef\\_instrument\\_establishment\\_restructured\\_2019.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/gef_instrument_establishment_restructured_2019.pdf)

----- . 2019b. "Policy on Monitoring." GEF/C.56/03/Rev.1. 12 June. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF.C.56.03.Rev\\_.01\\_Policy\\_on\\_Monitoring.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.C.56.03.Rev_.01_Policy_on_Monitoring.pdf)

----- . 2019c. "Guidelines for Assessing GEF Agencies' Compliance with Policies on Environmental and Social Safeguards." SD/GN/03. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/20190301\\_agency\\_policy\\_compliance\\_assessment\\_guidelines.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/20190301_agency_policy_compliance_assessment_guidelines.pdf)

----- . 2018a. "GEF-7 Programming Directions." Retrieved from: <https://www.thegef.org/council-meeting-documents/gef-7-programming-directions>

----- . 2018b. *Guidance to Advance Gender Equality in GEF Projects and Programs*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/GEF%20Guidance%20on%20Gender.pdf>

----- . 2018c. *Updated Policy on Environmental and Social Safeguards*. GEF/C.55/07. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF.C.55.07\\_ES\\_Safeguards.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.C.55.07_ES_Safeguards.pdf)

----- . 2017a. "Policy on Gender Equality." SD/PL/02. Retrieved from: [http://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/Gender\\_Equality\\_Policy.pdf](http://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/Gender_Equality_Policy.pdf)

----- . 2017b. "Policy on Stakeholder Engagement." GEF/C.53/05/Rev.01. 10 November. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF.C.53.05.Rev\\_.01\\_Stakeholder\\_Policy\\_4.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.C.53.05.Rev_.01_Stakeholder_Policy_4.pdf)

----- . 2016. "How It All Began." Retrieved from: <https://www.thegef.org/news/gef-how-it-all-began>

----- . 2015. *The A to Z of the GEF: A Guide to the Global Environment Facility*. Retrieved from: <https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/GEF-A to Z 2015 CRA bl2 0.pdf>

----- . 2014. "Non-Grant Instruments." Policy FI/PL/02. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/NonGrant\\_Instruments\\_Policy-2014\\_0.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/NonGrant_Instruments_Policy-2014_0.pdf)

----- . 2012. "Global Environmental Benefits." Retrieved from: <https://www.thegef.org/documents/global-environmental-benefits>

----- . 2009. "Strategic Partnerships with GEF Implementing Agencies." GEF/C.13/9. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/GEF.C.13.9\\_5.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/GEF.C.13.9_5.pdf)

GEF IEO (Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office). 2020. *Strategic Country Cluster Evaluation (SCCE): Least Developed Countries (LDCs)*. Retrieved from: <https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/scce-ldc-2018.pdf>

----- . 2019a. *The GEF Evaluation Policy*. Retrieved from: [https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/gef-me-policy-2019\\_2.pdf](https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/gef-me-policy-2019_2.pdf)

----- . 2019b. *Evaluation of GEF Support to Biodiversity Mainstreaming*. Evaluation Report No. 134. Retrieved from: [https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/biodiversity-mainstreaming-2018\\_1.pdf](https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/biodiversity-mainstreaming-2018_1.pdf)

----- . 2018a. *Strategic Country Cluster Evaluation (SCCE): Sahel and Sudan-Guinea Savanna Biomes*. Retrieved from: <https://www.gefio.org/evaluations/african-biomes-strategic-country-cluster-evaluation-scce>

----- . 2018b. *Review of the GEF Policy on Agency Minimum Standards on Environmental and Social Safeguards*. Evaluation Report No. 116. Retrieved from: [https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/safeguards-2017\\_2.pdf](https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/safeguards-2017_2.pdf)

----- . 2018c. *Value for Money Analysis for GEF Land Degradation Projects*. Evaluation Report No. 133. Retrieved from: [https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/value-money-ld-2016\\_0.pdf](https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/value-money-ld-2016_0.pdf)

----- . 2018d. *Biodiversity Focal Area Study*. Evaluation Report 132. Retrieved from: [https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/biodiversity-study-2017\\_0.pdf](https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/files/biodiversity-study-2017_0.pdf)

----- . 2017a. *Review of GEF Support for Transformational Change*. GEF/ME/C.52/Inf.06. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF.ME\\_C.52\\_Inf.06\\_Transf\\_Change\\_May\\_2017.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.ME_C.52_Inf.06_Transf_Change_May_2017.pdf)



- . 2017b. *Land Degradation Focal Area (LDFA) Study*. Retrieved from: <http://www.gefio.org/evaluations/land-degradation-focal-area-ldfa-study-2017>
- . 2014. *OPS5: Fifth Overall Performance Study of the GEF – Final Report: At the Crossroads for Higher Impact*. Retrieved from: <https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/evaluations/ops5-final-report-eng.pdf>
- . 2012a. *The GEF in the South China Sea (SCS) and Adjacent Areas*. Retrieved from: <http://www.gefio.org/evaluations/gef-south-china-sea-scs-and-adjacent-areas>
- . 2012b. *Evaluation of the GEF Focal Area Strategies*. GEF/ME/C.43.Inf.01. Retrieved from: <https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/GEF.ME .C.43.Inf .01 Evaluation of the GEF Focal Area Strategies 5.pdf>
- GEF STAP (Global Environment Facility Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel). 2019. *Theory of Change Primer*. GEF/STAP/C-57/Inf.04. Retrieved from: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF\\_STAP\\_C.57\\_Inf.04\\_Theory%20of%20Change%20Primer\\_0.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF_STAP_C.57_Inf.04_Theory%20of%20Change%20Primer_0.pdf)
- . 2018. *Environmental Security: Dimensions and Priorities*. [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/52103%20STAP%20Report\\_WEB.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/52103%20STAP%20Report_WEB.pdf)
- Gleick, Peter. H. 1993. "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security." *International Security* 18 (1): 79–112.
- Godoy, Emilio. 2017. "Looting and Unrest Spread in Mexico over Gas Price Hike." Inter Press Service, 11 January. Retrieved from: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/01/looting-and-unrest-spread-in-mexico-over-gas-price-hike/>
- Goodhand, Jonathan. 2006. "Working 'in' and 'on' War." In *Civil Wars, Civil Peace*, edited by Helen Yanacopulos and Joseph Hanlon. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. Retrieved from: <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/working-in-and-on-war/>
- Haider, Huma. 2014. *Conflict Sensitivity: Topic Guide*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Retrieved from: [http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/gsdrc\\_cs\\_topic\\_guide.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/gsdrc_cs_topic_guide.pdf)
- Hammill, Anne, Alec Crawford, Robert Craig, Robert Malpas, and Richard Matthew. 2009. *Conflict-Sensitive Conservation: Practitioners' Manual*. International Institute for Sustainable Development. [https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/csc\\_manual.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/csc_manual.pdf)
- Hammill, Anne, and Richard Matthew. 2010. "Peacebuilding and Climate Change Adaptation." *St. Antony's International Review* 5 (2): 89–112. doi: 10.2307/26227055



Hammill, E., A.I.T. Tulloch, H.P. Possingham, N. Strange, and K.A. Wilson. 2016. "Factoring Attitudes towards Armed Conflict Risk into Selection of Protected Areas for Conservation." *Nature Communications* 7:11042. doi: 10.1038/ncomms11042

Hanson, Thor, Thomas M. Brooks, Gustavo A.B. Da Fonseca, Michael Hoffman, John F. Lamoreux, Gary Machlis, Christina Mittermeier, Russell A. Mittermeier, and John D. Pilgrim. 2009. "Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots," *Conservation Biology* 23(3): 578–87.

Harbom, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. "Appendix 2A. Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1998–2007." In *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. pp. 72–83. Retrieved from: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB08%20072%2002A.pdf>

Hardt, Judith Nora, and Jürgen Scheffran. 2019. "Environmental Peacebuilding and Climate Change: Peace and Conflict Studies at the Edge of Transformation." Tokyo: Toda Peace Institute. Retrieved from: <https://toda.org/policy-briefs-and-resources/policy-briefs/environmental-peacebuilding-and-climate-change-peace-and-conflict-studies-at-the-edge-of-transformation.html>

Hegre, Håvard, and Håvard Mogleiv Nygård. 2015. "Governance and Conflict Relapse." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (6): 984–1016.

Helman, Christopher. 2014. "Cheap Gasoline: Why Venezuela is Doomed to Collapse." *Forbes*, 20 February. Retrieved from: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/02/20/cheap-gasoline-why-venezuela-is-doomed-to-collapse/#48f6853136ba>

Hill, Hal and Jayant Menon. 2014. *Trade Policy Challenges in a Small, Open, Fragile, Postconflict Economy: Cambodia*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Retrieved from: <https://www.adb.org/publications/trade-policy-challenges-small-open-fragile-postconflict-economy-cambodia>

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1994. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." *International Security* 19 (1): 5–40.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2020. "COVID-19 and Conflict: Seven Trends to Watch." 24 March. Retrieved from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb4-covid-19-and-conflict-seven-trends-watch>

IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). 2020. *Environmental and Social Policy Framework*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Retrieved from: <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=EZSHARE-2131049523-13>

IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) and NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council). 2006. *Burundi: Still no End to Displacement, Despite Political Progress*. Retrieved from: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4455cc524.pdf>

IEG (Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank). 2012. *Liberia Country Program Evaluation: 2004–2011*. Retrieved from: [https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Liberia\\_cpe.pdf](https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/Liberia_cpe.pdf)

IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development). 2017. *Social, Environmental and Climate Assessment Procedures: Managing Risks to Create Opportunities*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ifad.org/en/document-detail/asset/39563472>

----- . 2015. *Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations – Corporate-Level Evaluation*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/ioe/evaluation/asset/39824702>

----- . 2011. *Disaster Early Recovery Guidelines*. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/ifad-guidelines-disaster-early-recovery>

----- . 2006. *IFAD Policy on Crisis Prevention and Recovery*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ifad.org/en/document-detail/asset/39500024>

IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2017. *Good Practice Handbook: Use of Security Forces: Assessing and Managing Risks and Impacts*. Retrieved from: [https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics\\_ext\\_content/ifc\\_external\\_corporate\\_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications\\_handbook\\_securityforces](https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications_handbook_securityforces)

ILO (International Labour Organization), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), and WHO (World Health Organization). 2020. “Impact of COVID-19 on People’s Livelihoods, Their Health and Our Food Systems.” Joint Statement, 13 October. Retrieved from: <https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19-on-people-s-livelihoods-their-health-and-our-food-systems>

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2020. “COVID-19 Poses Formidable Threat for Fragile States in the Middle East and North Africa.” 13 May. Retrieved from: <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/05/13/na051320-covid-19-poses-formidable-threat-for-fragile-states-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa>

----- . 2019. *Building Resilience in Developing Countries Vulnerable to Large Natural Disasters*. Retrieved from: <https://www.imf.org/~media/Files/Publications/PP/2019/PPEA2019020.ashx>

----- . 2018. *How to Manage the Fiscal Costs of Natural Disasters*. Retrieved from: [https://www.elibrary.imf.org/doc/IMF061/25227-9781484359457/25227-9781484359457/Other\\_formats/Source\\_PDF/25227-9781484381083.pdf](https://www.elibrary.imf.org/doc/IMF061/25227-9781484359457/25227-9781484359457/Other_formats/Source_PDF/25227-9781484381083.pdf)

----- . 2008. *Liberia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. IMF Country Report No. 08/219. Retrieved from: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08219.pdf>

International Alert et al. 2004. *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding—A Resource Pack*. Retrieved from: [https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Training\\_DevelopmentHumanitarianAssistancePeacebuilding\\_EN\\_2004\\_0.pdf](https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Training_DevelopmentHumanitarianAssistancePeacebuilding_EN_2004_0.pdf)

International Land Coalition, Global Witness, International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, Asian NGO Coalition, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, Natural Justice, Universal Rights Group Latin America, The Access Initiative Latin America, and Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. 2020. "COVID-19 has Increased Danger to Indigenous and Other Land and Environmental Defenders." Global Land Governance Index, 9 August. Retrieved from: <https://www.landexglobal.org/en/news/covid-has-elevated-risks-faced-indigenous-and-other-land-defenders/>

IRIN News. 2004. "Two Sudanese Refugees Killed in Refugee Camp." 23 July. Retrieved from: <http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2004/07/23/two-sudanese-refugees-killed-refugee-camp>

IRN (International Rivers Network). 2016. "Current Status of Dam Projects on the Salween River." Retrieved from: [https://www.internationalrivers.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/86/2020/07/salween\\_factsheet\\_2016.pdf](https://www.internationalrivers.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/86/2020/07/salween_factsheet_2016.pdf)

ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization). 2010. Completion Report: Management of the Emerald Triangle Protected Forests Complex to Promote Cooperation for Trans-boundary Biodiversity Conservation between Thailand, Cambodia and Laos (Phase II). Retrieved from: [https://www.itto.int/files/itto\\_project\\_db\\_input/2539/Competition/Final%20Project%20Completion%20Report%20PD%20289\\_04%20Rev.1%20\(F\)%20\\_28%20Aug10.pdf](https://www.itto.int/files/itto_project_db_input/2539/Competition/Final%20Project%20Completion%20Report%20PD%20289_04%20Rev.1%20(F)%20_28%20Aug10.pdf)

IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature). 2016. "Standard on Involuntary Resettlement and Access Restrictions." Environmental & Social Management System, ver. 2.0. Retrieved from: [https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/iucn\\_esms\\_standard\\_inv\\_resettlement\\_access\\_restrictions.pdf](https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/iucn_esms_standard_inv_resettlement_access_restrictions.pdf)

----- . 2014. Environment, Conflict, and Security – TECS Conflict Sensitive Adaptation Series. Retrieved from: <https://www.iucn.org/commissions/commission-environmental-economic-and-social-policy/resources/thematic-publications/environment-conflict-and-security>

Jensen, David, and Steve Lonergan (eds.). 2012. *Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. London: Taylor & Francis. Retrieved from:

<https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/publications/books/assessing-and-restoring-natural-resources-in-post-conflict-peacebuilding/>

Jones, Pete. 2012. "Congolese Rebels Cash in on Gorilla Tourism to Fund Insurgency." *The Guardian*, 19 October. Retrieved from:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/19/congo-rebels-gorilla-tour-insurgency>

Jongerden, Joost, Jacob van Etten, and Hugo de Vos. 2006. "Forest Burning as a Counterinsurgency Strategy in Eastern Turkey." Paper presented at the Kurdish Studies Conference, organized by the Kurdish Institute of Paris and Salahaddin University, Arbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, 6-9 September. Retrieved from:

[https://www.institutkurde.org/en/conferences/kurdish\\_studies\\_irbil\\_2006/pdf/joost\\_jongerden2.pdf](https://www.institutkurde.org/en/conferences/kurdish_studies_irbil_2006/pdf/joost_jongerden2.pdf)

Justino, Patricia. 2012. *Resilience in Protracted Crises: Exploring Coping Mechanisms and Resilience of Households, Communities and Local Institutions*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Retrieved from:

[http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs\\_high\\_level\\_forum/documents/Resilience\\_in\\_protracted\\_crises\\_PJustino\\_01.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs_high_level_forum/documents/Resilience_in_protracted_crises_PJustino_01.pdf)

Kakabadse, Yolanda, Jorge Caillaux, and Juan Dumas. 2016. "The Peru and Ecuador Peace Park: One Decade after the Peace Settlement." In *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 817-824.

Karl, Terry L. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Katz-Lavigne, Sarah. 2019. "Artisanal Copper Mining and Conflict at the Intersection of Property Rights and Corporate Strategies in the Democratic Republic of Congo." *The Extractive Industries and Society* 6 (2): 399-406.

Krampe, Florian. 2019. "Climate Change, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace." SIPRI Policy Brief. Retrieved from: [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/pb\\_1906\\_ccr\\_peacebuilding\\_2.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/pb_1906_ccr_peacebuilding_2.pdf)

Krummenacher, Heinz, and Susanne Schmeidl. 2001. *Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflict – FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning Methodology*. Working Paper No. 34. Swisspeace. Retrieved from: <https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/Old-Workingpapers/dac44cde5b/practical-2001.pdf>

Lamb, Jennifer N., Keith M. Moore, and Robert Smith. 2009. "Pursuing Community Forestry in Liberia." *Environmental Policy and Governance* 19 (5): 296-308.

Lang, Chris. 2017. "Leaked WWF Report on the Baka in Cameroon: 'Many Cases of Abuse and Human Rights Violations are Reported by the Communities.'" Conservation Watch, 26 January. Retrieved from: <https://medium.com/conservationwatch/leaked-wwf-report-on-the-baka-in-cameroon-many-cases-of-abuse-and-human-rights-violations-are-2682ca9bf975>

Le Billon, Philippe. 2013. *Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed conflicts*. London: Routledge.

Lehtonen, Matti. 2016. "Peacebuilding through Natural Resource Management: The UN Peacebuilding Commission's First Five Years." In *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols. London: Taylor & Francis, pp. 147-164.

Lujala, Päivi, and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.). 2012. *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. London: Taylor & Francis. Retrieved from: <https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/publications/books/high-value-natural-resources-and-post-conflict-peacebuilding/>

Lyons, Kristen, Carol Richards, and Peter Westoby. 2014. *The Darker Side of Green: Plantation Forestry and Carbon Violence in Uganda*. Oakland Institute. Retrieved from: [https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Report\\_DarkerSideofGreen\\_hirez.pdf](https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Report_DarkerSideofGreen_hirez.pdf).

Macinnes, Megan. 2020. "Threats against Cambodian Forest Defenders Escalate Amid COVID-19." Global Witness, 21 May. Retrieved from: <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/threats-against-cambodian-forest-defenders-escalate-amid-covid-19/>

Marc, Rockmore. 2020. "Conflict-Risk and Agricultural Portfolios: Evidence from Northern Uganda," *The Journal of Development Studies* 56 (10): 1856-1876. [doi:10.1080/00220388.2019.1703953](https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2019.1703953)

Mason, Michael, Mark Zeitoun, and Rebhy El Sheikh. 2011. "Conflict and Social Vulnerability to Climate Change: Lessons from Gaza." *Climate and Development* 3 (4): 285-297.

Mason, Simon J.A., Damiano A. Sguaitamatti, and Maria del Pilar Ramirez Gröbli. 2016. "Stepping Stones to Peace? Natural Resource Provisions in Peace Agreements." In *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols. London: Taylor & Francis, pp. 71-119. Retrieved from: <https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/assets/Documents/Volume-6-Chapter-5.pdf>

McLean, Dana. 2015. "Myanmar: Shan Villagers and the Salween Dam Fight." *The Diplomat*, 11 September. Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/myanmar-shan-villagers-and-the-salween-dam-fight/>

McNeely, Jeffrey A. 2003. "Biodiversity, War, and Tropical Forests." *Journal of Sustainable Forestry* 16 (3-4): 1-20.

MEE (Middle East Eye). 2019. "Egypt Lowers Fuel Prices following Wave of Protests." 4 October. Retrieved from: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-lowers-fuel-prices-following-spat-protests>

Menkhaus, Ken. 2004. *Impact Assessment in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Challenges and Future Directions*. Geneva: Interpeace.

Mercier, Marion, Lionel Rama, and Philip Verwimp. 2020. "Violence Exposure and Poverty: Evidence from the Burundi Civil War." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.04.005>

Metreveli, M., and D.J. Timothy. 2010. "Effects of the August 2008 War in Georgia on Tourism and Its Resources." In Omar Moufakkir and Ian Kelly (eds.), *Tourism, Progress and Peace*. CAB International, pp.

Mittal, Anuradha, and Elizabeth Fraser. 2018. *Losing the Serengeti: The Maasai Land that was to Run Forever*. The Oakland Institute. Retrieved from: <https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/tanzania-safari-businesses-maasai-losing-serengeti>

Mittermeier, Russell A., Patricio Robles Gil, Michael Hoffman, John Pilgrim, Thomas Brooks, Christina Goetsch Mittermeier, John Lamoreux, and Gustavo A.B. da Fonseca. 2004. *Hotspots Revisited: Earth's Biologically Richest and Most Endangered Ecosystems*. Cemex.

Morrow, Nathan. 2020. "Front Lines; Environmental Security Pathways for Resilience and Sustainability Investigated with Natural Language Processing and Geospatial Analysis of Global Environmental [sic] Facility Programming over 25-years in Conflict-Affected Areas," February, Preprint, Retrieved from: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339043531\\_Title\\_Front\\_Lines\\_Environmental\\_Security\\_Pathways\\_for\\_Resilience\\_and\\_Sustainability\\_Investigated\\_with\\_Natural\\_Language\\_Processing\\_and\\_Geospatial\\_Analysis\\_of\\_Global\\_Environmental\\_Facility\\_Programming\\_O](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339043531_Title_Front_Lines_Environmental_Security_Pathways_for_Resilience_and_Sustainability_Investigated_with_Natural_Language_Processing_and_Geospatial_Analysis_of_Global_Environmental_Facility_Programming_O)

----- . 2018. "Armed Conflict and Environmental Protection; Global Environment Facility Insights for Security and Sustainability." Retrieved from [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323292341\\_Armed\\_conflict\\_and\\_environmental\\_protection\\_Global\\_Environment\\_Facility\\_insights\\_for\\_security\\_and\\_sustainability](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323292341_Armed_conflict_and_environmental_protection_Global_Environment_Facility_insights_for_security_and_sustainability)

----- . n.d. "Environmental Security and the GEF: Assessing the Relationship between Armed Conflict and GEF Projects – Appendices." On file with authors.

Morrow, Nathan, and Margaret Hudson. 2017. "Assessing the Relationship between Armed Conflict and the Global Environment Facility from 1992 to 2016." Technical Report. Washington D.C.: GEF STAP. Retrieved from: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320987032>

Nanthikesan, Suppiramaniam, and Juha Uitto. 2012. "Evaluating Post-Conflict Assistance." In David Jensen and Steve Lonergan (ed.), *Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge.

National Research Council. 2013. *Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Ndi, Frankline Anum. 2017. "Land Grabbing, Land Contestation, and the Struggle for Economic Gain: Insights from Nguti Village, South West Cameroon." *SAGE Open* 7 (1).

Neslen, Arthur. 2015. "'Green' Dam Linked to Killings of Six Indigenous People in Guatemala." *The Guardian*, 26 March. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/26/santa-rita-green-dam-killings-indigenous-people-guatemala>

The New Humanitarian. 2008. "Dead Baby Trees by the Millions as Reforestation Fails." 8 April. Retrieved from: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2008/04/08/dead-baby-trees-millions-reforestation-fails>

----- . 2006. "Cabinet Resigns over Toxic Fumes Scandal." 7 September. Retrieved from: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2006/09/07/cabinet-resigns-over-toxic-fumes-scandal>

Nicola, Maria, Zaid Alsafi, Catrin Sohrabi, Ahmed Kerwan, Ahmed Al-Jabir, Christos Iosifidis, Maliha Agha, and Riaz Agha. 2020. "The Socio-Economic Implications of the Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19): A Review." *International Journal of Surgery* 78: 185-193.

Nordås, Ragnhild, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2007. "Climate Change and Conflict." *Political Geography*, 26 (6): 627-638.

NSRP (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program). 2017. *Lessons Learned: Gender and Conflict Sensitive Programming in Fragile and Conflict Affected Contexts*. Retrieved from: <http://www.nsrp-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Lessons-Learned-Conflict-and-Gender-Sensitivity-in-Conflict.pdf>



Nyein, Nyein. 2018. "Karen Villagers Protest Hatgyi Dam, Other Projects on the Salween." *The Irrawaddy*, 14 March. Retrieved from: <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/karen-villagers-protest-hatgyi-dam-projects-salween-river.html>

OECD (Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development). 2020a. *The Impact of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Crisis on Development Finance*. Retrieved from: <http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-crisis-on-development-finance-9de00b3b/>

----- . 2020b. "The Territorial Impact of COVID-19: Managing the Crisis across Levels of Government." 16 June. Retrieved from: <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/>

----- . 2018. *States of Fragility 2018*. Paris. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302075-en>

----- . 2016. *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence*. Paris. Retrieved from: <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264267213-5-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264267213-5-en>

----- . 2011. *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264074989-en.pdf>

----- . 2009. *Conflict and Fragility: Preventing Violence, War, and State Collapse*. Retrieved from: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/preventing%20violence%20war%20and%20state%20collapse.pdf>

OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee). 2007. "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations." Retrieved from: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/38368714.pdf>

----- . 2000. "Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation." Retrieved from: [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD\(2000\)20&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD(2000)20&docLanguage=En)

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2016. *Early Warning and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. Retrieved from: [https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/EarlyWarning\\_ESCR\\_2016\\_en.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/EarlyWarning_ESCR_2016_en.pdf)



----- . 2011. *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*. New York and Geneva. Retrieved from: [https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinessshr\\_en.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinessshr_en.pdf)

Parker, Gillian. 2012. "Nigeria: Fuel Protests and Islamic Violence Challenge President Goodluck Jonathan." *The World*, 17 January. Retrieved from: [www.pri.org/stories/2012-01-17/nigeria-fuel-protests-and-islamic-violence-challenge-president-goodluck-jonathan](http://www.pri.org/stories/2012-01-17/nigeria-fuel-protests-and-islamic-violence-challenge-president-goodluck-jonathan)

Patterson, Bruce D., Samuel Kasiki, Edwin Selempo, and Roland Kays. 2004. "Livestock Predation by Lions (*Panthera leo*) and Other Carnivores on Ranches Neighboring Tsavo National Parks, Kenya." *Biological Conservation* 119 (4): 507-516. Retrieved from: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222650454\\_Livestock\\_predation\\_by\\_lions\\_Panther\\_a\\_leo\\_and\\_other\\_carnivores\\_on\\_ranches\\_neighboring\\_Tsavo\\_National\\_Parks\\_Kenya](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222650454_Livestock_predation_by_lions_Panther_a_leo_and_other_carnivores_on_ranches_neighboring_Tsavo_National_Parks_Kenya)

Patton, Michael Quinn. 2020. *Blue Marble Evaluation: Premises and Principles*. New York: Guilford Press.

----- . 2010. *Developmental Evaluation: Applying Complexity Concepts to Enhance Innovation and Use*. New York: Guilford Press.

Pearson d'Estrée, Tamra. 2019a. "Facing Complexity and the Need for Reflective Practice and Communities of Inquiry." In Tamra Pearson d'Estrée (ed.), *New Directions in Peacebuilding Evaluation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

----- . 2019b. "So You Think You Know About Peacebuilding Evaluation? An Opportunity to Refresh." In Tamra Pearson d'Estrée (ed.), *New Directions in Peacebuilding Evaluation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Phaup, Marvin, and Charlotte Kirschner. 2010. "Budgeting for Disasters: Focusing on the Good Times." *OECD Journal on Budgeting* 2010 (1): 1-24.

Prem, Mounu, Santiago Saavedra, and Juan F. Vargas. 2020. "End-of-Conflict Deforestation: Evidence from Colombia's Peace Agreement." *World Development* 129:104852. Retrieved from: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X19305017>

Price, Steven V. (ed.). 2003. *War and Tropical Forests: Conservation in Areas of Armed Conflict*. CRC Press.

Price, Steven, Deanna Donovan, and Wil De Jong. 2007. "Confronting Conflict Timber." In Wil De Jong, Deanna Donovan, and Ken-Ichi Abe (eds.), *Extreme Conflict and Tropical Forests*, Springer, pp. 117-132.

Pritchard, Matthew. 2015. "From Soldiers to Park Rangers: Post-Conflict Natural Resource Management in Gorongosa National Park." In *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Helen Young and Lisa Goldman. London: Taylor and Francis. pp. 215-231.

Regan, Anthony J. 1998. "Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict." *Journal of Pacific History* 33 (3): 269-285. Retrieved from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25169410>

----- . 2017. "Bougainville: Origins of the Conflict, and Debating the Future of Large-Scale Mining." In C. Filer and P.-Y. Le Meur (eds.), *Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics*, pp. 353-414. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.

Rehrl, Annette. 2009. "Tackling Climate Change in Eastern Chad." UNHCR News, 15 December. Retrieved from: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2009/12/4b27b7039/tackling-climate-change-in-eastern-chad.html>

Rice, Xan. 2006. "Elite Rangers Take on Rebels to End the Slaughter of Congo's Hippos." 21 December. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/dec/22/congo.conservationandendangeredspecies>

Rigaud, Kanta Kumari, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Jonas Bergmann, Viviane Clement, Kayly Ober, Jacob Schewe, Susana Adamo, Brent McCusker, Silke Heuser, and Amelia Midgley. 2018. *Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461>

Rochow, K.W. James. 2016. "Concession Reviews: Liberian Experience and Prospects for Effective Internationalized Solutions." In *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra S. Nichols. London: Taylor and Francis. pp. 481-500.

Ross, Michael L. 2004. "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." *International Organization* 58 (1): 35-67.

----- . 2015. "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 18:239-259.

RRI (Rights and Resources Initiative). 2015. *Protected Areas and the Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities: Current Issues and Future Agenda*. Washington, DC. [http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/RRIReport\\_Protected-Areas-and-Land-Rights\\_web.pdf](http://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/RRIReport_Protected-Areas-and-Land-Rights_web.pdf)

Ruckstuhl, Sandra. 2009. *Renewable Natural Resources: Practical Lessons for Conflict-Sensitive Development*. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/464071468148150921/Renewable-natural-resources-practical-lessons-for-conflict-sensitive-development>

Rustad, Siri A., and Helga M. Binningsbø. 2010. "Rapid Recurrence: Natural Resources, Armed Conflict, and Peace." Working Paper. Oslo: Centre for the Study of Civil War.

Rüttinger, Lukas, Dan Smith, Gerald Stang, Dennis Tänzler, and Janani Vivekananda. 2015. *A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks*. Berlin: adelphi research. Retrieved from: <https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/#report-top>

Saumik, Paul. 2015. *Conflict, Food Security and Crop Diversification Strategies: Evidence from Cote D'Ivoire*. Japan: Institute of Developing Economies. Retrieved from: <https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Download/Vrf/pdf/492.pdf>

Sayne, Aaron, Alexandra Gillies, and Andrew Watkins. 2017. *Twelve Red Flags: Corruption Risks in the Award of Extractive Sector Licences and Contracts*. Natural Resource Governance Institute. Retrieved from: <https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/twelve-red-flags-corruption-risks-award-extractive-sector-licenses-and>

Serhal, Assad. 2019. "Hima for Peace: Actions Speak Louder than Birds." *Parks* 25 (1): 83-86.

Serneels, Pieter, and Marijke Verpoorten. 2015. "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Economic Performance: Evidence from Rwanda." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (4): 555-592.

Small, Rob. 2012. *Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in and Around Protected Areas and Critical Ecosystems Project (ASM-PACE): Liberia Case Study Report*. WWF. Retrieved from: <https://www.levinresources.com/assets/pages/ASM-Liberia-Final.pdf>

Solomon, Negasi, Emiru Birhane, Christopher Gordon, Mebrahtu Haile, Fatemeh Taheri, Hossein Azadi, and Jürgen Scheffran. 2018. "Environmental Impacts and Causes of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Review." *Earth-Science Reviews* 177:284-290.

Soto, Yadira. 2016. *The Role of the Organization of American States in Conflict-Affected States in the Americas*. Retrieved from: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-role-of-the-organization-of-american-states-in-conflict-affected-states-in-the-americas.pdf>

Sovacool, B. K., G. Walter, T. Van de Graaf, and N. Andrews. 2016. "Energy Governance, Transnational Rules, and the Resource Curse: Exploring the Effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)." *World Development* 83:179-192.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2020. "Joseph Stiglitz on Priorities for the Post-COVID Economy." World Economic Forum, 7 July. Retrieved from: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/priorities-policymakers-government-covid19-economy-green-recovery/>

Stokes, Demelza. 2016. "Fire on the Salween: Dams in Conflict Zones Could Threaten Myanmar's Fragile Peace Process." Mongabay, 1 December. Retrieved from: <https://news.mongabay.com/2016/12/fire-on-the-salween-dams-in-conflict-zones-could-threaten-myanmars-fragile-peace-process/>

Suisseya, Kimberly R. Marion. 2012. *Case Study: The Emerald Triangle Forest Complex*. University of Vermont. Retrieved from: [https://www.uvm.edu/ieds/sites/default/files/Emerald\\_Tri\\_casestudy.pdf](https://www.uvm.edu/ieds/sites/default/files/Emerald_Tri_casestudy.pdf)

Tear, Timothy H., Bradford N. Stratton, Edward T. Game, Matthew A. Brown, Colin D. Apse, and Rebecca R. Shirer. 2013. "A Return-on-Investment Framework to Identify Conservation Priorities in Africa." *Biological Conservation* 173(2014): 42-52. doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2014.01.028

Theisen, Ole Magnus. 2008. "Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited," *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (6):801-818.

Troëng, Sebastian, Edward Barbier, and Carlos Manuel Rodríguez. 2020. "The COVID-19 Pandemic is Not a Break for Nature – Let's Make Sure There is One after the Crisis." World Economic Forum, 21 May. Retrieved from: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/covid-19-coronavirus-pandemic-nature-environment-green-stimulus-biodiversity/>

UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). n.d. "UCDP Definitions." Accessed September 30, 2020. Retrieved from: [https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump\\_8040098873676595\\_2](https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#tocjump_8040098873676595_2)

Uitto, Juha I. 2019. "Sustainable Development Evaluation: Understanding the Nexus of Natural and Human Systems." In G. Julnes (ed.), *Evaluating Sustainability: Evaluative Support for Managing Processes in the Public Interest*. New Directions for Evaluation No.162, pp. 49–67. Retrieved from: [https://www.academia.edu/39716654/Sustainable\\_Development\\_Evaluation\\_Understanding\\_the\\_Nexus\\_of\\_Natural\\_and\\_Human\\_Systems](https://www.academia.edu/39716654/Sustainable_Development_Evaluation_Understanding_the_Nexus_of_Natural_and_Human_Systems)

UN (United Nations). 2020. *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2020*. Retrieved from: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2020.pdf>

----- . 2015. *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. A/RES/70/1. Retrieved from: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf>

UNCCD (UN Convention to Combat Desertification). 2020. "UNCCD is Ready to Welcome Countries to the New Peace Forest Initiative." Retrieved from: <https://www.unccd.int/news-events/unccd-ready-welcome-countries-new-peace-forest-initiative>

----- . 2018. "A Rising Africa in a Fragile Environment: The Initiative on Sustainability, Stability and Security." Retrieved from: [https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/documents/2018-07/3S\\_brochure\\_%20ENG%20-web.pdf](https://www.unccd.int/sites/default/files/documents/2018-07/3S_brochure_%20ENG%20-web.pdf)

UNDESA (United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs). 2019. *Sustainable Development Goal 16: Focus on Public Institutions*. World Public Sector Report 2019. Retrieved from: [https://read.un-ilibrary.org/democracy-and-governance/world-public-sector-report-2019\\_9f6b5dc4-en#page1](https://read.un-ilibrary.org/democracy-and-governance/world-public-sector-report-2019_9f6b5dc4-en#page1)

UNDG (United Nations Development Group). 2013. *Natural Resource Management in Transition Settings*. UNGD-ECHA Guidance Note. Retrieved from: [https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNDG-ECHA\\_NRM\\_guidance\\_Jan2013.pdf](https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNDG-ECHA_NRM_guidance_Jan2013.pdf)

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2016a. *Social and Environmental Screening Procedure*. Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/operations1/undp-social-and-environmental-screening-procedure.html>

----- . 2016b. "The Peace Promise." Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/the-peace-promise.html>

----- . 2016c. "A Principled Approach to Conflict Sensitive Do No Harm Programming in the context of Federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region." Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/principled-approach-conflict-sensitive-do-no-harm-programming-context-federal-iraq-and>

----- . 2010. UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules. Retrieved from: <http://web.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/UNDPFinRegsRules.pdf>

----- . 2003. *Conflict-Related Development Analysis (CDA)*. Retrieved from: [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/cpr/documents/prevention/CDA\\_complete.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/cpr/documents/prevention/CDA_complete.pdf)

UNDP SECU (United Nations Development Programme Social and Environmental Compliance Unit). n.d.a. Registration Card – SECU00008. "Integrated and Transboundary Conservation of Biodiversity in the Basins of the Republic of Cameroon." Complaint filed 2 August 2018. Retrieved from: <https://info.undp.org/sites/registry/secu/SECUPages/CaseDetail.aspx?ItemID=26>

----- n.d.b. Registration Card – SECU00009. “Integrated and Transboundary Conservation of Biodiversity in the Basins of the Republic of Congo.” Complaint filed 2 August 2018. Retrieved from: <https://info.undp.org/sites/registry/secu/SECUPages/CaseDetail.aspx?ItemID=27>

UNDPA (United Nations Department of Political Affairs) and UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2015. *Natural Resources and Conflict: A Guide for Mediation Practitioners*. Retrieved from: [https://peacemaker.un.org/NRC\\_MediationGuide\\_2015](https://peacemaker.un.org/NRC_MediationGuide_2015)

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2019. “Drawing Forestry Lessons from Republic of Korea to Enhance Livelihoods in Afghanistan.” *UNEP*. Retrieved from: <https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/story/drawing-forestry-lessons-republic-korea-enhance-livelihoods-afghanistan>

----- 2014. *Relationships and Resources: Environmental Governance for Peacebuilding and Resilient Livelihoods in Sudan*. Nairobi.

----- 2009. “Integrating Environment in Post-Conflict Needs Assessment.” UNEP Guidance Note. Retrieved from: <https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/report/integrating-environment-post-conflict-needs-assessments-unep-guidance-note>

----- 2005. *One Planet Many People: Atlas of Our Changing Environment*, Nairobi, Kenya.

UNFPTA (UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action). 2020. “UN Conflict Sensitivity Advanced E-Course”. Retrieved from: <https://agora.unicef.org/course/info.php?id=1288>.

----- 2012a. *Strengthening Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Natural Resource Management*. Retrieved from: [https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/GN\\_Capacity\\_Consultation.pdf](https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/GN_Capacity_Consultation.pdf)

----- 2012b. *Land and Conflict*. Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflicts. Retrieved from: [https://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN\\_Land\\_Consultation.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN_Land_Consultation.pdf)

----- 2012c. *Extractive Industries and Conflict*. Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflicts. Retrieved from: [https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/GN\\_Extractive.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/GN_Extractive.pdf)

----- 2012d. *Renewable Resources and Conflict*. Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflicts. Retrieved from: [https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/GN\\_Renew.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/GN_Renew.pdf)

----- 2012e. *Capacity Inventory*. Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflicts. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/Capacity%20Inventory.pdf>

-----, 2011. *Conflict Prevention in Resource-Rich Economies*. Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflicts. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/Resource%20Rich%20Economies.pdf>

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund). 2016. *Guide to Conflict Analysis*. Retrieved from: <https://www.eccnetwork.net/sites/default/files/media/file/Guide-to-Conflict-Analysis-UNICEF-Nov-2016.pdf>

UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). 2020. “Coronavirus: The Economic Impact – 10 July 2020.” 10 July. Retrieved from: <https://www.unido.org/stories/coronavirus-economic-impact-10-july-2020>

-----, 2017. *UNIDO Environmental and Social Safeguards Policies and Procedures*. AI/2017/04. Retrieved from: [https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/AI.2017.4\\_ESSPP\\_18July2017\\_0.pdf](https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/AI.2017.4_ESSPP_18July2017_0.pdf)

-----, 2015. *The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Achieving the Industry Related Goals and Targets*. Retrieved from: [https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2015-12/ISID\\_SDG\\_brochure\\_final\\_0.pdf](https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2015-12/ISID_SDG_brochure_final_0.pdf)

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2002. “Real-Time Evaluation: Some Frequently Asked Questions.” Retrieved from: <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/3ce372204.pdf>

UN OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2009. “Climate Change and Humanitarian Action: Key Emerging Trends and Challenges.” OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing Series No.2. Retrieved from: <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20Policy%20Brief%20Climate%20Change%202009.pdf>

Unruh, Jon, and Rhodri C. Williams. 2013. “Land: A Foundation for Peacebuilding.” In *Land and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Jon Unruh and Rhodri C. Williams. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 1-20.

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General). 2014. *Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*. A/69/399–S/2014/694. September 23. New York.

-----, 2012. *Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*. A/67/499–S/2012/746. 8 October. New York.

-----, 2010. *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*. A/64/866–S/2010/386. 16 July (reissued on August 19 for technical reasons). New York.



----- . 2009. Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. A/63/881–S/2009/304. 11 June. New York. Retrieved from: [www.unrol.org/files/pbf\\_090611\\_sg.pdf](http://www.unrol.org/files/pbf_090611_sg.pdf)

USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2015. *Livelihoods and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention*. Retrieved from: <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/livelihoods-and-conflict-a-toolkit-for-intervention/>

----- . 2014. *Water & Conflict: A Toolkit for Programming*. Retrieved from: <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/WaterConflictToolkit.pdf>

----- . 2012a. *Conflict Assessment Framework*. Revised (CAF 2.0). Retrieved from: [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pnady739.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf)

----- . 2012b. *Conflict Assessment Framework: Application Guide*. Retrieved from: [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADY740.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADY740.pdf)

----- . 2005. *Land & Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention*. Retrieved from: <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/land-and-conflict-a-toolkit-for-intervention/>

----- . 2004. *Minerals & Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention*. Retrieved from: [https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/envsec\\_minerals\\_conflict.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/envsec_minerals_conflict.pdf)

USIP (United States Institute of Peace). 2013. “Peace Events of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries.” Washington, DC: Global Peacebuilding Center, U.S. Institute of Peace. Retrieved from: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-01/Peace%20Events%20of%20the%2020th%20and%2021st%20Centuries.pdf>

van Schaik, Louise, and Rosa Dinnessen. 2014. *Terra Incognita: Land Degradation as Underestimated Threat Amplifier*. Clingendael. Retrieved from: <https://edepot.wur.nl/481424>

Veit, Peter G., and Catherine Benson. 2004. “When Parks and People Collide.” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Retrieved from: [https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2\\_11/section\\_2/4449](https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_11/section_2/4449)

Veit, Peter, and Patricia Quijano Vallejos. 2020. “COVID-19, Rising Gold Prices and Illegal Mining Threaten Indigenous Lands in the Amazon.” World Resources Institute, 8 September. Retrieved from: <https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/09/covid-19-rising-gold-prices-and-illegal-mining-threaten-indigenous-lands-amazon>

Verde, Tom. 2008. “A Tradition of Conservation.” *Aramco World* 59 (6): 10-16. Retrieved from: <https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/200806/a.tradition.of.conservation.htm>



Vidal, John. 2020. "Armed Ecoguards Funded by WWF 'Beat up Congo Tribespeople.'" *The Guardian*, 7 February. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/feb/07/armed-ecoguards-funded-by-wwf-beat-up-congo-tribespeople>

----- . 2016. "WWF Accused of Facilitating Human Rights Abuses of Tribal People in Cameroon." Buzzfeed News, 5 March. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/03/wwf-accused-of-facilitating-human-rights-abuses-of-tribal-people-in-cameroon>

NCSTE. 2009. *The Catalytic Role of the GEF – Case Study: Energy Conservation and GHG Emissions Reduction in Chinese Township and Village Enterprises in China*. GEF Evaluation Office. Retrieved from: <https://www.gefio.org/sites/default/files/ieo/documents/files/ops4-td03-catalytic-role-evaluation-china-ncste.pdf>

Walter, Barbara F. 2010. *Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace*. World Bank Development Report 2011 Background Paper. Retrieved from: [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9069/WDR2011\\_0008.pdf](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9069/WDR2011_0008.pdf)

Wambi, Michael. 2009. "Uganda: Carbon Trading Scheme Pushing People off Their Land." (2009). Interpress News Service, 25 September. Retrieved from: <http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/09/uganda-carbon-trading-scheme-pushing-people-off-their-land/>

Weinthal, Erika, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama (eds.). 2014. *Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. London: Taylor & Francis. Retrieved from: <https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/publications/books/water-and-post-conflict-peacebuilding/>

Westing, Arthur H. (ed.). 1986. *Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action*. New York: Oxford University Press.

----- . 1976. *Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

----- . 1971. "Ecological Effects of Military Defoliation on the Forests of South Vietnam." *BioScience* 21(17): 893-898

Westing, Arthur H., and E.W. Pfeiffer. 1972. "The Cratering of Indochina." *Scientific American* 226 (5): 20-29.

Westrik, Carol. 2015. "Transboundary Protected Areas: Opportunities and Challenges." In *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Helen Young and Lisa Goldman. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 145-153.

WHO (World Health Organization). 2017. Contingency Fund for Emergencies: Report of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme. Retrieved from: [https://www.who.int/emergencies/funding/contingency-fund/CFE\\_Impact\\_2017.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/emergencies/funding/contingency-fund/CFE_Impact_2017.pdf?ua=1)

Woodrow, Peter, and Isabella Jean. 2019. "Scrambling after Moving Targets: Monitoring & Evaluation Applied to Adaptive Management Approaches in Peacebuilding." In Tamra Pearson d'Estrée (ed.), *New Directions in Peacebuilding Evaluation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Woomer, Amanda. 2018. Conflict Sensitivity and Conservation: Evaluating Design, Implementation, & Practice. Doctoral dissertation at Kennesaw State University.

World Bank Group. 2020a. *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020-2025*. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/world-bank-group-strategy-for-fragility-conflict-and-violence-2020-2025>

----- . 2020b. *Fragility and Conflict: On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Poverty*. Retrieved from: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33324/9781464815409.pdf>

----- . 2020c. "Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations." 27 February. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>

----- . 2020d. "The Global Economic Outlook during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Changed World." 8 June. Retrieved from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/08/the-global-economic-outlook-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-changed-world>

----- . 2020e. *The Global Wildlife Program Knowledge Platform 2019*. Retrieved from: <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/404541590695633785/64856-GWP-Annual-Report-2020.pdf>

----- . 2020f. *Liberia Forestry Development Authority: An Institutional Capacity Assessment*. Retrieved from: <https://www.profor.info/sites/profor.info/files/Liberia-Forestry-Development-Authority-An-Institutional-Capacity-Assessment.pdf>

----- . 2018. *A Practical Handbook for Environmental Regulations and Legislators Working in Situations Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Extreme Violence (FCV)*. Retrieved from: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23772/A0practical0ha0treme0Violence00FCV0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

----- . 2017. *The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework*. Washington, DC. Retrieved from: <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/837721522762050108/Environmental-and-Social-Framework.pdf>

- . 2016. *Liberia - Forest Sector Project (English)*. Retrieved from:  
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/385131468184765418/Liberia-Forest-Sector-Project>
- . 2014. "Development Cooperation and Conflict." OP 2.30. In *The World Bank Operations Manual*. rev. July 1. Retrieved from:  
<https://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01541/WEB/IMAGES/ENTIREOM.PDF>
- . 2005. *Strategic Environmental Assessments: Capacity Building in Conflict-Affected Countries*. Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Recovery, No. 30. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Retrieved from:  
<http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/270821468135017970/pdf/349890ReplacementOversion0WP301Web.pdf>
- . n.d. "Historical Overview: The World Bank Group's Classification of Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations." Retrieved from:  
<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/373511582764863285/FCS-Historial-note.pdf>
- WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature). 2019. *WWF Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework*. Gland, Switzerland. Retrieved from:  
<https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/1249/files/original/ESSF-073119.pdf?1565364222>
- . 2015. *Environment and Social Safeguards: Integrated Policies and Procedures*. Retrieved from:  
[https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/1204/files/original/Safeguards\\_Manual.pdf?1578070066](https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/1204/files/original/Safeguards_Manual.pdf?1578070066)
- Young, Helen, and Lisa Goldman. 2015. "Managing Natural Resources for Livelihoods: Helping Post-Conflict Communities Survive and Thrive." In *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, ed. Helen Young and Lisa Goldman. London: Taylor & Francis. pp. 1-12.
- Zierler, David. 2011. *The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think About the Environment*.

ANNEX C: LIST OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS EXAMINED

Note: the dates cited for each project are from the online GEF database project information pages. In a few instances, there are discrepancies between the dates in the database and in the respective Terminal Evaluation Report (TER). For example, Project 789's GEF database page says that it was closed in 2013, but the TER says it closed in 2008. Where discrepancies were identified, the TER dates were used because the TER data has been verified by an IEO analyst.

<b>GEF ID</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Country/ies</b>	<b>GEF Implementing Agency</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Focal area(s)</b>
<b>32</b>	Mini-Hydropower Project	North Macedonia	The World Bank	1999-2004	Climate Change
<b>197</b>	Integrated Biodiversity Protection in the Sarstun-Motagua Region	Guatemala	United Nations Development Programme	1995-2005	Biodiversity
<b>216</b>	Strengthening of National Capacity and Grassroots In-Situ Conservation for Sustainable Biodiversity Protection	Lebanon	United Nations Development Programme	1995-2004	Biodiversity
<b>398</b>	Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika	Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo	United Nations Development Programme	1991-2000	International Waters
<b>534</b>	Conservation and Management of Habitats and Species, and Sustainable Community Use of Biodiversity in Dinder National Park	Sudan	United Nations Development Programme	1998-2004	Biodiversity
<b>621</b>	Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Pilot Project for the Virachey National Park	Cambodia	The World Bank	1999-2007	Biodiversity
<b>625</b>	Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the	Colombia	The World Bank	1999-2002	Biodiversity

	Western Slope of the Serrania del Baudo				
<b>774</b>	Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Andes Region	Colombia	The World Bank	2000-2008	Biodiversity
<b>789</b>	Implementation of the Strategic Action Programme (SAP) Toward Achievement of the Integrated Management of the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (LME)	Angola, Namibia, South Africa	United Nations Development Programme	2002-2008	International Waters
<b>947</b>	Integrated Silvo-Pastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management	Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica	The World Bank	2002-2008	Integrated Ecosystem Management, Biodiversity, Climate Change
<b>1020</b>	Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Mataven Forest	Colombia	The World Bank	2001-2004	Biodiversity
<b>1043</b>	Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains	Cambodia	United Nations Development Programme	2004-2012	Biodiversity
<b>1086</b>	Developing an Integrated Protected Area System for the Cardamom Mountains	Cambodia	United Nations Development Programme	2001-2007	Biodiversity
<b>1094</b>	Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project, Tranche 1	Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan,	The World Bank	2003-2010	International Waters

		Tanzania, Uganda			
<b>1152</b>	Biodiversity Conservation and Participatory Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Inner Niger Delta and its Transition Areas, Mopti Region	Mali	International Fund for Agricultural Development	2003-2013	Biodiversity
<b>1183</b>	Tonle Sap Conservation Project	Cambodia	United Nations Development Programme	2004-2011	Biodiversity
<b>1253</b>	Gourma Biodiversity Conservation Project	Mali	The World Bank	2001-2013	Biodiversity
<b>1274</b>	Household Energy and Universal Rural Access Project	Mali	The World Bank	2002-2010	Climate Change
<b>1475</b>	Establishing the Basis for Biodiversity Conservation on Sapo National Park and in South-East Liberia	Liberia	The World Bank	2005-2010	Biodiversity
<b>1907</b>	Natural Resources and Poverty Alleviation Project	Afghanistan	Asian Development Bank	2003-2007	Biodiversity
<b>2019</b>	Integrated National Adaptation Plan: High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia's Caribbean Insular Areas and Human Health (INAP)	Colombia	The World Bank	2005-2012	Climate Change
<b>2100</b>	Support to the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN)'s Program for the Rehabilitation of the DRC's National Parks Network	Democratic Republic of Congo	The World Bank	2006-2018	Biodiversity

<b>2130</b>	Restoration, Protection and Sustainable Use of the Sistan Basin	Afghanistan and I.R. Iran	United Nations Development Programme	2010-2010	International Waters
<b>2139</b>	SIP: Transboundary Agro-Ecosystem Management Programme for the Kagera River Basin (Kagera TAMP)	Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	2007-2017	Land Degradation
<b>2143</b>	DBSB Water Quality Protection Project - under WB-GEF Strategic Partnership for Nutrient Reduction in the Danube River and Black Sea	Bosnia-Herzegovina	The World Bank	2005-2017	International Waters
<b>2193</b>	Enabling Sustainable Dryland Management Through Mobile Pastoral Custodianship	Argentina, Benin, Burkina Faso, Iran, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Tajikistan	United Nations Development Programme	2005-2013	Land Degradation
<b>2357</b>	Agricultural Rehabilitation and Sustainable Land Management Project	Burundi	The World Bank	2004-2012	Land Degradation
<b>2380</b>	Sustainable Co-Management of the Natural Resources of the Air-Ténéré Complex	Niger	United Nations Development Programme	2006-2012	Land Degradation
<b>2551</b>	Colombian National Protected Areas Conservation Trust Fund	Colombia	The World Bank	2005-2015	Biodiversity
<b>2584</b>	Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (NTEAP), Phase II	Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,	United Nations Development Programme	2007-2009	International Waters

		Uganda, and Eritrea			
<b>2888</b>	Transboundary Conservation of the Greater Virunga Landscape	Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda	The World Bank	Dropped (2009)	Biodiversity
<b>2929</b>	Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Artibonite River Basin through Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme	Haiti and Dominican Republic	United Nations Development Programme	2008-2012	International Waters, Land Degradation
<b>3028</b>	SFM Safeguarding and Restoring Lebanon's Woodland Resources	Lebanon	United Nations Development Programme	2007-2014	Land Degradation
<b>3160</b>	Preparation of the POPs National Implementation Plan under the Stockholm Convention	Democratic Republic of Congo	United Nations Development Programme	2007-2011	Persistent Organic Pollutants
<b>3220</b>	Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management	Afghanistan	United Nations Development Programme	2007-2010	Land Degradation
<b>3284</b>	Consolidation of Liberia's Protected Area Network	Liberia	The World Bank	2008-2012	Biodiversity
<b>3389</b>	SIP: Sustainable Land Management for Sustainable Livelihoods in the Toker Area of East Sudan	Sudan	United Nations Development Programme	2008-2011	Land Degradation
<b>3418</b>	Mainstreaming Biodiversity Management into Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Production Processes	Lebanon	United Nations Development Programme	2009-2013	Biodiversity



<b>3430</b>	Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change	Sudan	United Nations Development Programme	2007-2015	Climate Change
<b>3474</b>	Yemen Geothermal Development Project	Yemen	United Nations Environment Programme	2008-2018	Climate Change
<b>3772</b>	CBSP Forest and Nature Conservation Project	Democratic Republic of Congo	The World Bank	2008-2015	Biodiversity
<b>3828</b>	LGGE Energy Efficiency Code in Buildings	Syria	United Nations Development Programme	2010-2013	Climate Change
<b>3837</b>	SPWA-BD: Biodiversity Conservation through Expanding the Protected Area Network in Liberia (EXPAN)	Liberia	The World Bank	2011-2015	Biodiversity
<b>3959</b>	SPWA-CC: Promoting renewable energy based mini-grids for rural electrification and productive uses	Chad	United Nations Industrial Development Organization	2009-2015	Climate Change
<b>4081</b>	SPWA-BD: Strengthening the national protected area network in Chad	Chad	United Nations Development Programme	2010-2013	Biodiversity
<b>4108</b>	PCB Management Project	Lebanon	The World Bank	2010-	Persistent Organic Pollutants
<b>4124</b>	Implementation of Phase I of a Comprehensive PCB Management System	Jordan	United Nations Development Programme	2010-2016	Persistent Organic Pollutants
<b>4133</b>	SPWA-CC: Energy Efficiency Project	Burundi	The World Bank	2010-2015	Climate Change
<b>4201</b>	Leopards and Landscapes: Using a	Yemen	The World Bank	2011-2011	Biodiversity

	Flagship Species to Strengthen Conservation in the Republic of Yemen				
<b>4227</b>	Building Adaptive Capacity and Resilience to Climate Change in Afghanistan.	Afghanistan	United Nations Environment Programme	2010-2018	Climate Change
<b>4916</b>	Conservation of Biodiversity in Landscapes Impacted by Mining in the Choco Biogeographic Region	Colombia	United Nations Development Programme	2014-2019	Biodiversity
<b>5017</b>	Developing Core Capacity for Decentralized MEA Implementation and Natural Resources Management in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	United Nations Environment Programme	2012-	Multiple
<b>5152</b>	Delivering the Transition to Energy Efficient Lighting	Yemen	United Nations Environment Programme	2013-2017	Climate Change, Persistent Organic Pollutants
<b>5202</b>	Strengthening the Resilience of Rural Livelihood Options for Afghan Communities in Panjshir, Balkh, Uruzgan and Herat Provinces to Manage Climate Change-induced Disaster Risks	Afghanistan	United Nations Development Programme	2013-	Climate Change
<b>5604</b>	Technology Transfer for Climate Resilient Flood Management in Vrbas River Basin	Bosnia-Herzegovina	United Nations Development Programme	2014-	Climate Change
<b>5723</b>	West Balkans Drina River Basin Management Project	Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia	The World Bank	2014-	Climate Change

<b>5746</b>	Scaling up and Replicating Successful Sustainable Land Management (SLM) and Agroforestry Practices in the Koulikoro Region of Mali	Mali	United Nations Environment Programme	2014-	Biodiversity, Climate Change, Land Degradation
<b>9056</b>	Promotion of Small Hydro Power (SHP) for Productive Use and Energy Services	Burundi	United Nations Industrial Development Organization	2015-	Climate Change
<b>9090</b>	Community-Based Forest Management for Biodiversity Conservation and Climate Change Mitigation in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	Dropped (2016)	Biodiversity, Climate Change Mitigation, Sustainable Forest Management
<b>9103</b>	Building Adaptive Capacity through the Scaling-up of Renewable Energy Technologies in Rural Cambodia (S-RET)	Cambodia	International Fund for Agricultural Development	2015-	Climate Change
<b>9114</b>	Capacity Development for Improved Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)	Serbia	United Nations Development Programme	2016-	Multiple
<b>9414</b>	Preparation of the Republic of Moldova's Second Biennial Update Report to UNFCCC	Moldova	United Nations Environment Programme	2016-	Climate Change
<b>9441</b>	Contributing to the Integrated Management of Biodiversity of the Pacific Region of Colombia to Build Peace	Colombia	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	2016-	Land Degradation, Biodiversity
<b>9491</b>	Mainstreaming Conservation of Migratory Soaring Birds	Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,	United Nations Development Programme	2016-	Biodiversity

	into Key Productive Sectors along the Rift Valley / Red Sea Flyway (Tranche II of GEFID 1028)	Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan			
<b>9515</b>	The Restoration Initiative, DRC child project: Improved Management and Restoration of Agro-sylvo-pastoral Resources in the Pilot Province of South-Kivu	Congo DR	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	2016-	Biodiversity, Land Degradation, Climate Change
<b>9539</b>	Enhancing Sustainability of Protected Area Systems and Stabilizing Agro-production in Adjoining Areas through Improved IAS Management	Malawi	United Nations Environment Programme	2016-	Biodiversity
<b>9578</b>	Sustainable Low Carbon Development in Colombia's Orinoquia Region	Colombia	The World Bank	2017-	Biodiversity
<b>9661</b>	Mali- Community-based Natural Resource Management that Resolves Conflict, Improves Livelihoods and Restores Ecosystems throughout the Elephant Range	Mali	United Nations Development Programme	2016-	Biodiversity, Land Degradation
<b>9663</b>	Colombia: Connectivity and Biodiversity Conservation in the Colombian Amazon	Colombia	The World Bank	2015-	Land Degradation, Climate Change, Biodiversity
<b>9670</b>	Enhancing Regional Climate Change Adaptation in the	Albania, Algeria, Libya, Morocco,	United Nations Environment Programme	2016-	Climate Change

	Mediterranean Marine and Coastal Areas	Montenegro, Tunisia			
--	---	------------------------	--	--	--

## ANNEX D: LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

### **GEF Discussion Contacts**

Grouping reflects their affiliation at the time of the project

#### GEFSEC

Steffen Hansen, Environmental Specialist, GEFSEC (July 8, 2020; Lebanon)

Astrid Hillers, Senior Environmental Specialist for International Waters, GEF Secretariat (April 17, 2020; International Waters focal area and IW:LEARN)

Fareeha Iqbal, Senior Climate Change Specialist, GEF Secretariat (April 17, 2020 and July 16, 2020; Climate Change focal area)

Katya Kuang-Idba, Climate Change Specialist, GEF Secretariat (April 17, 2020 and July 16, 2020; Special Climate Change Fund)

Sarah Wyatt, Environmental Specialist, GEF Secretariat (April 17, 2020; Biodiversity focal area)

Mark Zimsky, Biodiversity Focal Area Coordinator, GEF Secretariat (June 1, 2020; Colombia)

#### Government Agencies

Maya Abboud, Technical and Management Specialist, Water for Life Solutions, LLC; (former) Consultant, Lebanon Ministry of Environment (July 10, 2020; Lebanon)

Dusan Dobricic, Head of the Group for Participation in Strategic Planning and Management, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management (December 23, 2019; Serbia)

Bosko Kenjic, Head of Water Resources Department, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (December 16, 2019; Bosnia)

Hazima Hadzovic, Assistant Minister in the Water Sector at the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management and Forestry (June 30, 2020; Bosnia)

Mikio Ishiwatari, Senior Advisor on Disaster Management and Water Resource Management, Japan International Cooperation Agency (January 22, 2020; climate and fragility risks)

Amer Kavazovic, Head of the Department of Water Protection, Sava River Basin District Agency (December 17, 2019; Bosnia)

Nikola Maravic, GEF Focal Point, Ministry of Environmental Protection (December 19, 2019; Serbia)

Senad Oprasic, GEF Focal Point, Ministry of Trade and Economic Relations (December 18, 2019; Bosnia)

#### Civil Society Organizations

Osama Al Nouri, Regional Flyway Facility Coordinator, BirdLife International (July 3, 2020; Lebanon)

Mujtaba Bashari, Training and Capacity Officer, Wildlife Conservation Society (July 28, 2020; Afghanistan)

Amina Gabela, Junior Researcher, Forestry and Environmental Action (December 17, 2019; Bosnia)

Olivia Lazard, Mediation, Policy and European Relations, European Institute of Peace (October 2, 2019; park rangers and the Seleka in the Central African Republic anecdote)

Qais Sahar, Afghanistan Operations Director, Wildlife Conservation Society (July 28, 2020; Afghanistan)

Assad Serhal, Director General, Society for the Protection of Nature in Lebanon (July 24, 2020; Lebanon)

Garry Shea, Afghanistan Country Director, Wildlife Conservation Society (July 28, 2020; Afghanistan)

Amanda Woomeer, Associate Director for M&E, Habitat for Humanity; Chair of the M&E Interest Group, Environmental Peacebuilding Association (October 25, 2019; monitoring and evaluating interventions at the intersection of environment and peace)

#### Implementing Agencies

Paola Agostini, Lead Natural Resources Management Specialist, World Bank (May 1, 2020; Colombia and Mali)

Guy Alaerts, Lead Water Resources Specialist, World Bank (June 29, 2020; Balkans)

Ali Azimi, Former Senior Environmental Specialist at Asian Development Bank, (July 27, 2020; Afghanistan)

Christophe Besacier, Forestry Officer, FAO (June 23, 2020; Albertine Rift)

Roshan Cooke, Regional Environment and Climate Specialist, IFAD (July 8, 2020; Cambodia)

Christophe Crepin, Manager of ENB Global Practice for the South Asia Region, World Bank (May 22, 2020; Mali)

Raduska Cupac, Sector Leader Energy and Environment, UNDP (December 16, 2019; Bosnia)

Richard Damania, Global Lead Economist, World Bank (May 6, 2020; Colombia)

Garabed (Garo) Haroutunian, Area Manager for the Bekaa Region, UNDP (June 26, 2020; Lebanon)

Juergen Hierold, Chief and GEF Coordinator, UNIDO (July 7, 2020; Albertine Rift)

Olivera Jordanovic, Senior Land Administration Specialist, World Bank (December 23, 2019; Serbia)

Liza Leclerc, Lead Technical Specialist, IFAD (July 8, 2020; Cambodia)

Heng Liu, Senior Technical Advisor, UNIDO (July 7, 2020; Albertine Rift)

Kisa Mfalila, Lead Regional Environment and Climate Specialist, IFAD (July 8, 2020; Cambodia)

Darko Milutin, Disaster Risk Management Specialist, World Bank (December 23, 2019; Serbia)

Maryam Niamir-Fuller, (former) Director, Division of Global Environment Facility Coordination, UNEP (July 14, 2020; Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Mali)

Jimena Puyana, Head of Sustainable Development Unit and Programme Specialist, UNDP (July 2, 2020; Colombia)

Juan Pablo Ruiz, (former) Natural Resources Specialist, World Bank (June 11, 2020; Colombia)



Jihan Seoud, Environment Programme Analyst, UNDP (June 24, 2020; Lebanon)

Karan Sehgal, Natural Resources and Environmental Management Expert, FAO; (former) Renewable Energy Technologies Portfolio Officer, IFAD (July 8, 2020; Cambodia)

Mirko Serkovic, Natural Resource Management Specialist, World Bank (April 30, 2020; Mali)

Penny Stock, Regional Technical Advisor for Ecosystems and Biodiversity, UNDP (April 29, 2020; Mali)

#### Subject expert

John Barrett, General Manager at Garamba National Park with African Parks (August 14, 2020; Albertine Rift)

Alexander Belyakov, Consultant, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (November 13, 2019; CBD Peace and Biodiversity Initiative)

Yue Cao, Senior Research Officer, ODI (December 16, 2019; evaluating linkages between climate change, security, and conflict)

Carla de Chassy, Director of Member Affairs and Global Communications, SEEP Network (September 2019; fair fairs)

Alec Crawford, Senior Policy Advisor and Lead for Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, International Institute for Sustainable Development (October 2020; conflict-sensitive conservation, Albertine Rift)

Anne Hammill, Senior Director for Resilience, International Institute for Sustainable Development (July 2019; conflict-sensitive conservation, Albertine Rift)

Héctor Camilo Morales, Ph.D. Candidate, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (October 25, 2019; monitoring and evaluating interventions at the intersection of environment and peace)

Naftali Honig, Research and Development Director at Garamba National Park, African Parks (August 6, 2020; Albertine Rift)

Charles Kelly, Independent Consultant (April 30, 2019; conflict sensitive programming in Chad)

Julia LeMense, Principal Consultant, Legal & Disaster Management Consulting (February 21, 2020; past research on GEF programming in conflict-affected contexts)

Bancy Mati, FAO Consultant and Professor at Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (June 29, 2020; Albertine Rift)

Nathan Morrow, Research Associate Professor, Tulane University (February 21, 2020; past research on GEF programming in conflict-affected contexts)

Ada Sonnenfeld, Evaluation Specialist, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (April 3, 2020; monitoring and evaluating interventions at the intersection of environment and peace)

## ANNEX E: FRAGILITY OF STATES RECEIVING GEF FUNDING

This annex provides information on fragile states and territories, using two sources: The List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (produced by the World Bank) and the Fragile States Index (produced by the Fund for Peace), as of June 2020.

The World Bank has produced the **List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations** annually in some form since 2004. The main goal of the list is to identify at-risk countries and provide information to the World Bank and its partners on how to best address such situations (World Bank 2020). By identifying these situations, the World Bank can change how it approaches projects and alert the broader community on the situations within these countries (World Bank 2020). The list began as the Low-Income Countries Under Stress List (2004–08) and was only used internally; the 2006–08 lists were later released publicly. The list became published as the Fragile States Index with same criteria from 2009–10. The next iteration was the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations (2011–20). The list was “harmonized” because it took the scores of the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank and incorporated them into the final score (World Bank n.d.). It also includes countries that have active UN or regional peacekeeping activities. While the list has been published annually from 2006–20, the methodology and classification system used to rank the states’ fragility has been through numerous changes over the years, making it difficult to compare rankings over time.

The **Fragile States Index** was created by the Fund for Peace in 2006 to track the instability of states and compare them globally (The Fund for Peace n.d.). The methodology of the Index includes three different data streams: Content Analysis, Quantitative Data, and Qualitative Data. The three different streams are triangulated and reviewed by a team of researchers before publication. The finalized data factor into a series of internal trends within each country, allowing for a detailed comparison across nations. The dataset has been published annually since 2006. The Index’s methodology has remained consistent since its first publication.

Tables D.2 and D.3 show the fragility designations for countries that have received GEF funding, and table D.1 provides a high-level comparison. By way of comparison, there is some overlap between the countries included in the World Bank Harmonized List of Fragile Situations and the Fragile States Index, particularly with respect to the most fragile states (i.e., those listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index). Twenty-four (24) states are both listed in the World Bank’s Harmonized List and listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index. Another twelve (12) states are listed in the Harmonized List, but are not listed

predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index (either missing data or listed predominantly as “warning”). And eight (8) countries are listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index, but are not included in the Harmonized List.

**Table D.1 Table Comparing Listing of Countries in the Harmonized List and the Fragile States Index**

<b>States both listed in the Harmonized List and listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index</b>	<b>States listed in the Harmonized List, but not listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index</b>	<b>States listed predominantly as “alert” in the Fragile States Index, but not in the Harmonized List</b>
Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe	Burkina Faso, Comoros, Federated States of Micronesia, Gambia, Kiribati, Kosovo, Lebanon, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, West Bank and Gaza (territory), Solomon Islands, Tuvalu	Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Uganda

Source: ELI and GEF IEO based on The Fund for Peace (n.d.) and World Bank Group (2020c).

**Table D.2 Fragility Designations for Countries and Territories Receiving GEF Funding, per the World Bank’s List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (2006–20)**

GEF Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
Afghanistan	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	Core	2.763	2.733	2.74	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.75	2.75	2.73	High-Intensity Conflict
Albania	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Algeria	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Angola	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.979	2.979	2.95	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Antigua and Barbuda	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Argentina	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Armenia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Azerbaijan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bahamas	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bahrain	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bangladesh	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Barbados	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Belarus	medium income	medium income	medium income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m incom e	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Belize	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Benin	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bhutan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bolivia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bosnia- Herzegovin a	/	/	/	/	mediu m incom e	3.70 8	3.70 8	3.6 4	3.6	/	/	/	/	/	/
Botswana	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Brazil	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Bulgaria	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Burkina Faso	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	Medium- Intensity Conflict
Burundi	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	3.03 8	3.02 9	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.1 5	3.0 4	3.01	Medium- Intensity Conflict
Cabo Verde	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Cambodia	/	Margin al	Margin al	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Cameroon	/	/	/	Margin al	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	Medium- Intensity Conflict

Central African Republic	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	Core	2.77 5	2.85	2.8 4	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.4 2	2.4 5	2.48	High-Intensity Conflict
Chad	Marginal	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.79 2	2.74 2	2.8	2.9	2.9	3	3.0 2	2.9 9	2.94	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Chile	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
China	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Colombia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Comoros	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	/	2.49 6	/	2.5 5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5 4	2.4 9	2.46	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Congo, Rep	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	3.01 7	2.81 3	3.1 7	3.2	/	/	/	3.0 7	2.99	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Congo DR	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.75 8	3.07 1	2.8 5	3	3.1	3.1	3.1 6	3.0 8	3.04	Medium-Intensity Conflict
Cook Islands	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Costa Rica	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Cote d'Ivoire	Core	Severe	Core	Core	Core	2.86 7	2.84 2	2.8 5	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.4 6	3.5 3	3.54	/

Croatia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Cuba	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Czech Republic	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Djibouti	Core	Margin al	Margin al	Margin al	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.16	3.13	3.13	/
Dominica	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Dominican Republic	mediu m income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Ecuador	/	mediu m income	mediu m income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Egypt	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
El Salvador	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Equatorial Guinea	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Eritrea	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.283	2.271	2.15	2	2	2.1	2.02	1.99	1.99	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Estonia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Eswatini	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Ethiopia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Fiji	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/



Gabon	medium income	medium income	medium income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Gambia	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	/	/	/	/	/	3.2	3.02	2.93	2.95	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Georgia	/	/	/	/	medium income	4.433	4.488	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Ghana	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Grenada	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Guatemala	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Guinea	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.979	3.05	3.08	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Guinea-Bissau	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.85	2.95	3.04	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.54	2.54	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Guyana	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Haiti	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.925	2.925	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.88	2.88	High Institutional and Social Fragility

Honduras	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Hungary	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
India	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Indonesia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Iran	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Iraq	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m incom e	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	Medium- Intensity Conflict
Jamaica	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Jordan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Kazakhstan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Kenya	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Kiribati	/	/	Margin al	Margin al	Core	2.95	2.88 3	2.8 6	2.9	2.9	3	3	2.9 5	2.97	High Institutio nal and Social Fragility
Korea DPR	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Kosovo	Core	Core	Core	Core	3	3.43 3	3.43 3	3.4 3	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5 3	3.5 7	3.57	High Institutio nal and Social Fragility
Kuwait	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Kyrgyz Republic	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Lao PDR	Core	Core	Margin al	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

Latvia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Lebanon	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m incom e	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	High Institio nal and Social Fragility
Lesotho	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Liberia	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	Core	3.23 2	3.27 1	3.3 8	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.2 8	3.2 3	3.24	High Institio nal and Social Fragility
Libya	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	High- Intensity Conflict
Lithuania	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Madagasca r	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1 5	/	/	/
Malawi	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.2	/	/	/	/	/	/
Malaysia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Maldives	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Mali	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5 3	3.5 5	3.57	Medium- Intensity Conflict
Malta	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Marshall Islands	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m incom e	/	/	/	2.74 2	2.7 5	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.7 5	2.7 4	2.74	High Institio nal and

															Social Fragility
Mauritania	/	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Mauritius	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Mexico	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Micronesia	/	mediu m income	mediu m incom e	/	/	/	2.72 9	2.7 2	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8 6	2.8 2	2.82	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Moldova	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Mongolia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Montenegro	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Morocco	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Mozambique	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.2	3.16	/
Myanmar	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	Core	/	/	/	no score	3	3.1	3.1	3.1 9	3	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Namibia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Nauru	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.15	/
Nepal	/	/	/	/	mediu m incom e	3.66 3	3.64 6	3.6 9	3.7	/	/	/	/	/	/

Nicaragua	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Nigeria	Core	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	Medium- Intensity Conflict
Niger	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	Medium- Intensity Conflict
Niue	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
North Macedonia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Oman	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Pakistan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Palau	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Panama	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Papau New Guinea	Margin al	Margin al	Margin al	/	mediu m incom e	/	/	/	/	/	/	3.1 3	2.9 3	2.91	High Institutio nal and Social Fragility
Paraguay	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Peru	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Philippines	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Poland	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Republic of Korea	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Romania	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Russian Federation	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Rwanda	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

Samoa	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Sao Tome and Principe	Marginal	Marginal	Core	Core	Core	3.154	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Saudi Arabia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Senegal	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Serbia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Seychelles	/	/	medium income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Sierra Leone	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	Marginal	3.334	3.312	3.33	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.29	3.28	/	/
Slovak Republic	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Slovenia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Solomon Islands	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.967	3.017	3.11	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.08	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Somalia	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	Core	1.217	/	1.13	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.11	1.47	no score	High-Intensity Conflict
South Africa	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

South Sudan	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9 2	1.7 2	1.69	High-Intensity Conflict
Sri Lanka	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
St. Kitts & Nevis	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
St. Lucia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
St. Vincent & Grenadines	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Sudan	Core	Core	Core	Core	Core	2.51 3	2.52 5	2.4 8	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4 9	2.5 1	2.47	Medium-Intensity Conflict
Suriname	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Syria	/	/	medium income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	High-Intensity Conflict
Tajikistan	Marginal	/	/	/	Marginal	3.30 9	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Tanzania	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Thailand	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Timor Leste	Core	Core	Severe	Core	Core	2.93 3	2.95 8	3.1 6	3.2	3.2	3.2	/	/	3.15	High Institutional and Social Fragility

Togo	Core	Severe	Core	Core	Core	2.913	2.971	2.94	3.1	3	3.1	3.1	3.11	3.16	/
Tokelau	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Tonga	Core	Core	Severe	Core	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Trinidad and Tobago	/	/	Severe	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Tunisia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Turkey	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Turkmenistan	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m income	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Tuvalu	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.92	2.94	2.96	High Institutional and Social Fragility
Uganda	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Ukraine	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Uruguay	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Uzbekistan	Margin al	Core	Core	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Vanuatu	Core	Margin al	Margin al	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Venezuela	mediu m income	mediu m income	mediu m	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	High Institutional and



			income													Social Fragility
Vietnam	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Yemen	/	/	/	Marginal	Marginal	3.15	3.16	2.9	3	3	3	2.6	2.3	2.11		High-Intensity Conflict
Zambia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Zimbabwe	Severe	Severe	Core	Core	Core	1.88	1.95	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.72		High Institutional and Social Fragility

Notes: "/" indicates that the country was not included in the list for that particular year. Not all countries on the list received GEF funding every year.

**Table D.3 Fragility Designations for Countries and Territories Receiving GEF Funding Per the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index (2006-2020)**

Key:

*Sustainable = very stable*

*Stable = mostly stable*

*Warning = of concern*

*Alert = very fragile*

GEF Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Afghanistan	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Albania	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable
Algeria	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Angola	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning
Antigua and Barbuda	/	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Argentina	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Armenia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable
Azerbaijan	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Bahamas	/	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Bahrain	/	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Warning	Stable
Bangladesh	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Warning	Warning

Barbados	/	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Belarus	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Belize	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable
Benin	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Bhutan	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Bolivia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Botswana	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable
Brazil	Warning	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Bulgaria	Warning	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Alert	Stable
Burkina Faso	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Burundi	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Cabo Verde	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Cambodia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Cameroon	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert
Central African Republic	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Chad	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Chile	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable

China	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Colombia	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Comoros	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Congo, Rep.	/	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Congo DR	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Cook Islands	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Costa Rica	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Cote d'Ivoire	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Warning
Croatia	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Cuba	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable
Czech Republic	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Djibouti	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Dominica	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Dominican Republic	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Ecuador	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Egypt	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
El Salvador	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Equatorial Guinea	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning

Eritrea	Alert	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Estonia	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Eswatini	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Ethiopia	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Fiji	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Gabon	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Gambia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Georgia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Ghana	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Grenada	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable
Guatemala	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Guinea	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Guinea-Bissau	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Guyana	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable
Haiti	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Honduras	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Hungary	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable
India	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Indonesia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning

Iran	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Iraq	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Jamaica	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Jordan	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Kazakhstan	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable
Kenya	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Kiribati	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Korea DPR	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	/
Kosovo	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Kuwait	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Kyrgyz Republic	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Lao PDR	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Latvia	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Stable	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Lebanon	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Lesotho	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Liberia	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Libya	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Lithuania	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Madagascar	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Malawi	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning

Malaysia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable
Maldives	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Mali	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Alert
Malta	/	Stable	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Marshall Islands	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Mauritania	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning
Mauritius	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Mexico	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Micronesia	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Moldova	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Mongolia	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Montenegro	/	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Morocco	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Mozambique	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert
Myanmar	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Namibia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Nauru	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Nepal	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning

Nicaragua	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Nigeria	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Niger	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Niue	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
North Macedonia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Oman	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Pakistan	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Palau	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Panama	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Papua New Guinea	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Paraguay	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Peru	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Philippines	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Poland	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Republic of Korea	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Romania	Warning	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Russian Federation	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Rwanda	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning
Samoa	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning



Sao Tome and Principe	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Saudi Arabia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Senegal	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Serbia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Seychelles	No score	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Sierra Leone	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Slovak Republic	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Slovenia	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Sustainable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Sustainable
Solomon Islands	/	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Somalia	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
South Africa	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
South Sudan	No score	No Score	No Score	No Score	No Score	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Sri Lanka	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
St. Kitts & Nevis	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
St. Lucia	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
St. Vincent & Grenadines	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Sudan	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert

Suriname	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Syria	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Tajikistan	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Tanzania	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Thailand	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Timor Leste	/	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning
Togo	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Tokelau	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Tonga	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Trinidad and Tobago	/	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Warning	Warning	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Tunisia	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Turkey	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Turkmenistan	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Tuvalu	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Uganda	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Ukraine	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Uruguay	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable	Stable
Uzbekistan	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning	Warning
Vanuatu	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

Venezuela	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warning	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warning	Alert
Vietnam	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warning	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warning	Warni ng
Yemen	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert
Zambia	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warning	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warni ng	Warning	Warni ng
Zimbabwe	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Warning	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert	Alert

## REFERENCES:

The Fund for Peace. n.d. "Fragile States Index: Methodology." The Fund for Peace, Washington, DC. Accessed April 13, 2020.

<https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>

World Bank Group. 2020c. "Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations." World Bank, Washington, DC.. Updated Feb 27, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>

----- n.d. "Historical Overview: The World Bank Group's Classification of Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations." World Bank, Washington, DC. Accessed April 5, 2020. <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/373511582764863285/FCS-Historial-note.pdf>

## ANNEX F: SITUATION-LEVEL TEXTUAL REVIEW TALLIES

As one measure of the extent to which GEF-supported projects considered the conflict context, the evaluation team tallied the frequency with which 16 terms appeared within the text of project documents. The terms included: conflict, war, stabil\*, peace, crisis, arm/s/ed, dispute, violence, fragil\*, combat, tension, unrest, reconcil\*, rebel, and guerrilla. The \* indicates that the root is the search object (searching for “fragil” to capture “fragile” and “fragility”).

The following table displays the total number of times each term appears in a relevant context in the project documents for a given situation.

Each of the seven situations was selected according to the methodology described in section 1 of this report. For each situation, the team reviewed every project from the Pilot Phase through May 2019. For each of these projects, the team examined every project-related document that was available (as of spring 2020) at [www.thegef.org/projects](http://www.thegef.org/projects), noting that not all project documents were available.

These words were found by searching the documents for the selected word, or its root without a suffix, for the number of instances it appeared in the document. These instances were then checked to ensure the word used was in a conflict context within the document. These counts were then compiled by document, and then by project, to find the overall number of times the word was used in context in a given situation.

These data allow the reader to compare the frequency with which conflict related topics were discussed within each situation and between situations.

Situation	# of projects	conflict	security	war	stabil*	arm/s/ed	dispute	fragil*	peace	rebel	reconcil*	combat	unrest	violence	tension	crisis	guerrilla
Afghanistan	30	315	194	10	29	4	5	21	19	2	0	13	0	0	2	5	0
Albertine Rift	303	1005	812	532	366	124	45	68	286	43	37	14	74	71	45	180	2

Balkans	134	236	233	204	113	6	26	10	32	2	10	2	0	57	11	10	0
Cambodia	99	626	810	86	154	154	113	25	32	8	26	113	11	11	41	40	2
Colombia	27	324	233	2	105	45	27	119	81	0	10	68	38	105	9	144	7
Lebanon	72	217	269	66	124	2	66	3	6	0	1	0	2	13	27	16	0
Mali	85	965	392	18	0	60	41	9	50	27	12	0	39	9	47	19	0

## ANNEX G: RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT IN SELECTED GEF PROJECTS

The following tables highlight whether the documentation leading up to project approval (including the Project Identification Form, Project Document, and related materials) included a discussion of (1) risks, (2) conflict-related risks, (3) conflict mitigation measures, and (4) measures to mitigate conflict-related risks. Sometimes these were included in the running text; sometimes they were included in tables (for example, “Project Risk Assessment and Mitigation Measures”).

The results are provided for seven situations affected by conflict and fragility (see paragraph 82 for a discussion of the selection of the situations). For each situation, at least seven projects were selected for in-depth analysis (see paragraph 83). The results below correspond to the selected projects.

### Afghanistan

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk management	Conflict risk management measures
1907	Biodiversity	Asian Development Bank	2003	YES	YES	YES	YES
3220	Land Degradation	UNDP	2007	YES	YES	NO	NO
2130	International Waters	UNDP	2008	YES	NO	YES	NO
4227	Climate Change	UNEP	2010	YES	YES	YES	YES
5017	Multiple	UNEP	2014	YES	YES	YES	YES
5202	Climate Change	UNDP	2014	YES	YES	YES	YES
9531	Climate Change, Biodiversity	UNDP	2018	YES	YES	YES	YES

### Albertine Rift

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk management	Conflict risk management measures
----------------	---------------	---------------------	---------------	---------------------	-------------------------------	-----------------	-----------------------------------

398	International Waters	UNDP	1992	YES	YES	YES	YES
1094	International Waters	World Bank	2002	NO	NO	NO	NO
2357	Land Degradation	World Bank	2004	YES	YES	YES	YES
2888	Biodiversity	World Bank	2005	YES	YES	YES	YES
2100	Biodiversity	World Bank	2007	YES	YES	YES	YES
2139	Land Degradation	FAO	2007	YES	YES	YES	YES
2584	International Waters	UNDP	2008	YES	YES	YES	NO
3772	Biodiversity	World Bank	2009	YES	YES	YES	YES
4133	Climate Change	World Bank	2010	NO	NO	NO	NO
4990	Climate change	UNDP	2013	YES	YES	YES	YES
9056	Climate Change	UNIDO	2016	YES	YES	YES	YES
9515	Biodiversity, Land Degradation, Climate Change	FAO	2016	YES	YES	YES	YES

## Balkans

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk mitigation	Conflict risk management measures
32	Climate Change	World Bank	2000	YES	YES	YES	YES
2141	International Waters	World Bank	2005	YES	NO	YES	NO
2143	International Waters	World Bank	2005	YES	NO	NO	NO
2372	Biodiversity	World Bank	2006	YES	NO	YES	NO
5604	Climate Change	UNDP	2014	YES	NO	YES	NO
5723	Climate Change	World Bank	2014	YES	NO	YES	NO
9114	Multifocal Area	UNDP	2017	YES	YES	YES	NO
9607	International Waters, Biodiversity, Chemical and Waste	UNEP	2017	YES	NO	YES	NO
9670	Climate Change	UNEP	2017	YES	NO	YES	NO



### Cambodia

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk management	Conflict risk management measures
615	International Waters	World Bank	1999	YES	NO	YES	NO
621	Biodiversity	World Bank	1999	YES	NO	YES	NO
885	International Waters	UNEP	2001	YES	YES	YES	YES
1086	Biodiversity	UNDP	2002	YES	YES	YES	YES
1183	Biodiversity	UNDP	2003	YES	YES	YES	YES
1043	Biodiversity	UNDP	2004	YES	YES	YES	YES
9103	Climate Change	IFAD	2015	YES	NO	YES	NO

### Colombia

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk management	Conflict risk management measures
773	Biodiversity	World Bank	2000	YES	NO	YES	NO
774	Biodiversity	World Bank	2000	YES	YES	YES	YES
794	Biodiversity	World Bank	2000	YES	NO	NO	NO
947	Multifocal	World Bank	2001	YES	YES	YES	YES
1020	Biodiversity	World Bank	2001	YES	YES	YES	YES
2019	Climate Change	World Bank	2006	YES	NO	YES	NO
2551	Biodiversity	World Bank	2006	YES	YES	YES	YES
9663	Biodiversity, Climate Change, Land Degradation	World Bank	2016	YES	YES	YES	YES

9441	Land Degradation, Biodiversity	Food and Agriculture Organization	2017	YES	YES	YES	NO
9578	Biodiversity	World Bank	2018	NO	NO	NO	NO

## Lebanon

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk management	Conflict risk management measures
216	Biodiversity	UNDP	1995	YES	NO	YES	NO
400	Biodiversity	UNDP	1998	YES	NO	YES	NO
410	Biodiversity	UNDP	1997	YES	NO	YES	NO
1707	Biodiversity	UNEP	2003	YES	YES	YES	NO
2600	POPs, International Waters	UNEP	2007	YES	YES	YES	YES
3028	Land Degradation	UNDP	2008	YES	YES	YES	NO
3418	Biodiversity	UNDP	2008	YES	YES	YES	YES

## Mali

Project number	Focal area(s)	Implementing Agency	Year approved	Risk identification	Conflict identified as a risk	Risk management	Conflict risk management measures
1152	Biodiversity	IFAD	2004	YES	YES	YES	YES
1253	Biodiversity	World Bank	2002	YES	YES	YES	YES
1348	Persistent Organic Pollutants	World Bank	2003	YES	NO	YES	NO
2193	Land Degradation	UNDP	2005	YES	YES	YES	YES
2469	Land Degradation	World Bank	2004	YES	NO	YES	NO

3699	Climate Change	UNDP	2010	YES	YES	YES	YES
4569	Persistent Organic Pollutants	UNIDO	2012	YES	NO	YES	NO
5535	International Waters	UNDP	2014	YES	YES	YES	YES
5746	Biodiversity, Climate Change, Land Degradation	UNEP	2014	YES	YES	YES	YES
9661	Biodiversity, Land Degradation	UNDP	2015	YES	YES	YES	YES

## ANNEX H: GEF REGIONAL STATISTICS RESULTS

To understand the impacts of major armed conflict on GEF projects, a set of statistical tests were performed on country-level data for GEF projects in four regions: Africa, Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>605</sup> Specifically, to assess whether GEF project outcomes differed between countries classified as conflict (i.e., affected by major armed conflict since 1989) and non-conflict (i.e., not affected by major armed conflict since 1989), a two-sample test of proportions was performed on Terminal Evaluation Review (TER) binary scores and dropped or cancelled projects data, and a two-sample t-test and a Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test were performed on project delays data.

This quantitative analysis features some limitations. TERs are available only for full-sized projects (FSPs), but not for most medium-sized projects and for no enabling activities. Moreover, TERs were not available for all FSPs.

Though the details vary for each region, the analysis of TER binary scores at the regional level reveals that major armed conflict can have a statistically significant effect (or almost statistically significant effect) on projects in five ways: sustainability, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, M&E Implementation, Overall, and the likelihood that a project will be dropped or cancelled. For the Africa and Asia regions, the analysis showed a statistically significant difference in TER Sustainability binary scores between conflict and non-conflict countries. For the Latin America and the Caribbean region, results showed TER M&E Design and M&E Implementation binary scores between conflict and non-conflict countries were statistically significantly different. Although not technically statistically significant, for Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean regions, TER Overall and Sustainability binary scores were close to being statistically significantly different between conflict and non-conflict countries, respectively. No statistically significant difference was shown for TER binary scores for the Europe and Central Asia region. Additionally, the Asia region exhibited a statistically significant difference in dropped or cancelled projects between conflict and non-conflict countries. In contrast to dropped and cancelled projects, the analysis showed no statistically significant difference in project delays between conflict and non-conflict countries. The Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test confirmed this conclusion.

To assess the relationship between a country's conflict classification and project implementation and outcomes, a Pearson's chi-squared test of independence was performed on TER binary scores and dropped or cancelled projects data, and a logistic regression was performed on dropped or cancelled projects data. Conclusions of significance from the

---

<sup>605</sup> Countries in the Europe and Central Asia region reflect the World Bank categorization. See: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca>

Pearson's chi-squared test of independence for TER binary scores and dropped and cancelled projects mirrored those from the two-sample test of proportions, the two-sample t-test, and Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions test. Results from the logistic regression revealed a statistically significant relationship between a country's conflict classification and dropped or cancelled projects for the Asia region only.

The findings from the statistical analysis may be constrained by data limitations and challenges related to concentrating on major armed conflict. The analysis sometimes, but not always, found a statistically significant impact of major armed conflict on GEF projects. The data used for the analysis were limited by the availability of TER scores for projects within each region. First, the data from each region used for the statistical analysis included TER scores only for those FSPs with TERs and excludes FSPs without TERs, as well as medium-sized projects and enabling activities. Because of this data limitation, the results of the statistical analysis are capturing the relationship between conflict and project outcomes for a subset of projects. In principle, statistical analyses conducted on a larger and more representative sample size of GEF projects may reveal statistically significant relationships that were unable to be identified in this analysis. Secondly, the results of the statistical analysis may be affected by its focus on major armed conflict (i.e., countries experiencing more than 1,000 battle deaths). In many cases, "non-conflict" countries receiving GEF funding experience armed conflict (with fewer than 1,000 battle deaths), social conflicts, and/or fragility. Indeed, most GEF countries are fragile in any particular year.<sup>606</sup> As such, "conflict" and "non-conflict" countries may not be as different vis-à-vis conflict and fragility as their designations suggest, and comparisons of project results may not indicate significant differences in outcomes.

Notwithstanding difficulties with limited data and definitional boundaries, there are statistically significant effects of major armed conflict on project outcomes for Sustainability, M&E Design, and M&E Implementation, as well as project completion. Additional statistical analysis performed with a larger sample and broader definition of conflict may signal statistical significance for additional project outcomes.

---

<sup>606</sup> See paras. 91-96.

**Table G.1: Terminal Evaluation Report Results for the Africa Region**

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
	For all variables, Level = Country								
TER Outcome	N	0.738	0.71	324	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.53	0.594	-	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	Y	0.542	0.389	311	2-sample Test of Proportions	2.57	0.01	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	N	0.602	0.513	314	2-sample Test of Proportions	1.52	0.127	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	N	0.54	0.533	294	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.1	0.917	-	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	0.719	0.726	284	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.13	0.894	-	Binary scores
TER Execution	N	0.76	0.733	288	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.49	0.621	-	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	0.838	0.754	324	2-sample Test of Proportions	1.83	0.067	-	Binary scores
TER Outcome	N	-	-	324	Pearson's chi-squared	0.28	0.594	0.603	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	Y	-	-	311	Pearson's chi-squared	6.6	0.01	0.012	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	N	-	-	314	Pearson's chi-squared	2.32	0.127	0.154	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	N	-	-	294	Pearson's chi-squared	0.01	0.917	1	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	-	-	284	Pearson's chi-squared	0.02	0.894	1	Binary scores

TER Execution	N	-	-	288	Pearson's chi-squared	0.24	0.621	0.672	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	-	-	324	Pearson's chi-squared	3.35	0.067	0.077	Binary scores
Delays	N	1.95	2.55	459	T-Test with Equal Variances	-1.11	0.267		
Delays	N			459	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.367	0.544		



**Table G.2: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Africa Region**

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05  
 Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
Dropped/Cancelled	N	0.923	0.887	344	2-sample Test of Proportions	1.14	0.254	-	
Dropped/Cancelled	N	-	-	344	Pearson's chi-squared	1.3	0.254	0.267	

Logistic Regressions on Drop/Cancelled Projects	n (Sample Size)	Odds Ratio	R <sup>2</sup>	z-Statistic	p-Value	Significant (Y/N)
C (Africa region, country projects)	344	0.719	0.006	-1.13	0.257	N

**Table G.3: TER Results for the Asia Region**

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05  
 Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
TER Outcome	N	0.841	0.788	351	2-sample Test of Proportions	1.27	0.205	-	Binary scores

TER Sustainability	Y	0.726	0.577	335	2-sample Test of Proportions	2.85	0.004	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	N	0.679	0.646	331	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.64	0.525	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	N	0.629	0.627	304	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.05	0.964	-	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	0.835	0.832	301	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.07	0.94	-	Binary scores
TER Execution	N	0.845	0.826	306	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.45	0.655	-	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	0.872	0.867	353	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.13	0.896	-	Binary scores
TER Outcome	N	-	-	351	Pearson's chi-squared	1.61	0.205	0.214	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	Y	-	-	335	Pearson's chi-squared	8.14	0.004	0.005	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	N	-	-	331	Pearson's chi-squared	0.41	0.525	0.558	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	N	-	-	304	Pearson's chi-squared	0.002	0.964	1	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	-	-	301	Pearson's chi-squared	0.0056	0.94	1	Binary scores
TER Execution	N	-	-	306	Pearson's chi-squared	0.2	0.655	0.755	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	-	-	353	Pearson's chi-squared	0.17	0.896	1	Binary scores
Delays	N	1.81	2.17	385	T-Test with Equal Variances	-0.56	0.577		
Delays	N			385	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.473	0.491		

**Table G.4: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Asia Region**

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
Dropped/Cancelled	Y	0.947	0.84	350	2-sample Test of Proportions	2.96	0.003	-	
Dropped/Cancelled	Y	-	-	350	Pearson's chi-squared	8.78	0.003	0.003	

Logistic Regressions on Dropped/Cancelled Projects	n (Sample Size)	Odds Ratio	R <sup>2</sup>	z-Statistic	p-Value	Significant (Y/N)
C (Asia region, country projects)	350	0.545	0.038	-2.82	0.005	Y

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05

Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

**Table G.5: TER Results for the Europe and Central Asia Region**

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05  
 Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
TER Outcome	N	0.841	0.802	239	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.77	0.439	-	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	N	0.657	0.677	233	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.32	0.749	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	N	0.711	0.687	234	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.4	0.689	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	N	0.775	0.796	213	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.36	0.716	-	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	0.832	0.837	217	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.1	0.923	-	Binary scores
TER Execution	N	0.837	0.793	215	2-sample Test of Proportions	0.83	0.408	-	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	0.914	0.931	241	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.5	0.614	-	Binary scores
TER Outcome	N	-	-	239	Pearson's chi-squared	0.6	0.439	0.493	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	N	-	-	233	Pearson's chi-squared	0.1	0.749	0.78	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	N	-	-	234	Pearson's chi-squared	0.16	0.689	0.773	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	N	-	-	213	Pearson's chi-squared	0.13	0.716	0.74	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	-	-	217	Pearson's chi-squared	0.01	0.923	1	Binary scores

TER Execution	N	-	-	215	Pearson's chi-squared	0.68	0.408	0.475	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	-	-	241	Pearson's chi-squared	0.25	0.614	0.81	Binary scores
Delays	N	1.41	1.43	283	T-Test with Equal Variances	-0.07	0.9414		
Delays	N			283	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.27	0.605		

**Table G.6: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Europe and Central Asia Region**

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05  
 Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
Dropped/Cancelled	N	0.88	0.938	213	2-sample Test of Proportions	-1.42	0.155	-	
Dropped/Cancelled	N	-	-	213	Pearson's chi-squared	2.02	0.155	0.237	

Logistic Regressions on Dropped/Cancelled Projects	n (Sample Size)	Odds Ratio	R <sup>2</sup>	z-Statistic	p-Value	Significant (Y/N)
C (Central and East Asia region, country projects)	213	1.428	0.0158	1.4	0.162	N

**Table G.7: TER Results for the Latin America and Caribbean Region**

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05  
 Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
TER Outcome	N	0.78	0.797	273	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.29	0.773	-	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	N	0.703	0.587	258	2-sample Test of Proportions	1.7	0.09	-	Binary scores

TER M&E Design	Y	0.662	0.864	257	2-sample Test of Proportions	-3.01	0.003	-	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	Y	0.667	0.833	243	2-sample Test of Proportions	-2.46	0.014	-	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	0.797	0.868	230	2-sample Test of Proportions	-1.17	0.243	-	Binary scores
TER Execution	N	0.799	0.873	234	2-sample Test of Proportions	-1.24	0.216	-	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	0.773	0.8	276	2-sample Test of Proportions	-0.47	0.641	-	Binary scores
TER Outcome	N	-	-	273	Pearson's chi-squared	0.08	0.773	0.863	Binary scores
TER Sustainability	N	-	-	258	Pearson's chi-squared	0.29	0.09	0.121	Binary scores
TER M&E Design	Y	-	-	257	Pearson's chi-squared	9.05	0.003	0.003	Binary scores
TER M&E Implementation	Y	-	-	243	Pearson's chi-squared	6.07	0.014	0.014	Binary scores
TER Implementation Quality	N	-	-	230	Pearson's chi-squared	1.36	0.243	0.316	Binary scores
TER Execution	N	-	-	234	Pearson's chi-squared	1.53	0.216	0.24	Binary scores
TER Overall	N	-	-	276	Pearson's chi-squared	0.22	0.641	0.734	Binary scores
Delays	N	2.139	1.856	319	T-Test with Equal Variances	0.61	0.539		
Delays	N			319	Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-Proportions Rank Test	0.28	0.596		

**Table G.8: Dropped/Cancelled Project Results for the Latin America and Caribbean Region**

Significant at an alpha level of 0.05  
 Close to significant at an alpha level of 0.05

For all variables, Level = Country

Variable	Significant (Y/N) alpha=0.05	Non-conflict Average	Conflict Average	n (Sample Size)	Statistical Test Performed	Test Statistic	p-Value	Fisher's Exact	NOTES
Dropped/Cancelled	N	0.912	0.837	242	2-sample Test of Proportions	1.54	0.123	-	
Dropped/Cancelled	N	-	-	242	Pearson's chi-squared	2.38	0.123	0.185	



## ANNEX I: EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMING

Sensitivity analysis is a way of evaluating risk. In international development, conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization or project to understand the context in which they are operating and to recognize how their intervention might interact with this context.<sup>607</sup> In this way, conflict-sensitive programming can avoid the potential negative impacts of a project while maximizing the project's benefits. Although the idea of conflict sensitivity originated in the humanitarian field, it has spread to others, including environmental programming and academic research. Conflict-sensitive environmental programming has since evolved in academic research and in practice in a number of ways. This annex surveys that evolution.

### ***A short history of conflict sensitivity***

Conflict sensitivity first emerged in the humanitarian field as a way of helping actors achieve positive outcomes and understand the unintended consequences of aid.<sup>608</sup> The first well-known example of aid exacerbating conflict is from the 1994 Rwandan genocide: genocidaires exploited humanitarian relief to launch attacks, and development agencies aggravated tensions between social groups by recruiting primarily Tutsi local staff.<sup>609</sup> After this, international development agencies acknowledged that aid is not necessarily neutral. Aid interventions came to be understood as part of the context, and even in certain circumstances as part of the conflict.<sup>610</sup>

Jonathan Goodhand describes three approaches taken by development agencies dealing with conflict: “working around war,” which is seen as a conflict-blind approach that avoids conflict-affected areas and treats war as a barrier to development; “working in war,” which acknowledges war and tries to minimize potential negative effects of programs on armed conflict while also mitigating risks related to armed conflict; and “working on war,” which explicitly focuses on human rights issues, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution during armed conflict.<sup>611</sup> Conflict-sensitive programming avoids the “working around war” approach and instead focuses on the working “in” and “on” war approaches.

Since the 1990s, three major conflict-sensitive approaches have emerged: Do No Harm, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), and Aid for Peace.<sup>612</sup> Do No Harm, which connects issues and actors to address the underlying causes of conflict (rather than exacerbate it), was the most prominent approach in the field in the mid-1990s.<sup>613</sup> In 1998, Kenneth Bush developed PCIA, a methodology for anticipating and evaluating the impacts of development

---

<sup>607</sup> Haider 2014.

<sup>608</sup> Ibid.

<sup>609</sup> Ibid.

<sup>610</sup> Ibid.

<sup>611</sup> Goodhand 2006.

<sup>612</sup> Haider 2014.

<sup>613</sup> Ibid.

projects similar in function to environmental and social impact assessments.<sup>614</sup> PCIA's seek to mainstream peace and conflict issues in development work.<sup>615</sup> Finally, the Aid for Peace approach, developed by Bush in 2003, builds on the PCIA model and focuses on the peacebuilding opportunities of the given context.<sup>616</sup>

### ***Conflict sensitivity in environmental programming***

By the mid- to late 2000s, conflict sensitivity concepts had been widely adopted in the development field and championed by the peacebuilding community. Although research on the linkages between environment and conflict has been developing since the end of the Cold War,<sup>617</sup> a major change in recent peacebuilding discourse has been the inclusion of environmental issues, particularly climate change.<sup>618</sup> Since the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, international declarations and other soft law instruments such as the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 2000 Earth Charter, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (adopted in 2015) have mainstreamed the linkages between environmental sustainability and peace.

In the early 2000s, the international community strengthened its commitments to prevent and reduce armed violence, particularly in the context of development. The UN established the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005,<sup>619</sup> and states adopted the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2006.<sup>620</sup> With this heightened interest in conflict prevention and environmental programming's strong connections to international development, environmental programming began to incorporate conflict sensitivity in a more deliberate and serious manner. By 2010, conflict-sensitive environmental programming was starting to be more broadly recognized and understood in the international environmental community. Initially, conflict-sensitive environmental programming focused on considering conflict-related risks in the design and implementation of environmental programming.<sup>621</sup> For example, a 2009 World Bank paper explored how a conflict-sensitive framework in project assessment and implementation could lead to sustainable development in the long term.<sup>622</sup> The paper recognizes that renewable resources like forests, land, and water—in addition to non-renewable resources—can be sources of conflict as well as conflict multipliers.

In the past decade, conservation programs and sustainable development have increasingly incorporated conflict-sensitive approaches. For example, the Wildlife Conservation Society

---

<sup>614</sup> Bush 1998.

<sup>615</sup> Ibid.

<sup>616</sup> Bush 2009.

<sup>617</sup> Bruch et al. 2019.

<sup>618</sup> Hardt and Scheffran 2019.

<sup>619</sup> Lehtonen 2016.

<sup>620</sup> USIP 2013.

<sup>621</sup> Haider 2014.

<sup>622</sup> Ruckstuhl 2009.

(WCS) and International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) carried out a two-year project on conflict-sensitive conservation in Rwanda's Nyungwe National Park. According to a subsequent report, a variety of conservation-related conflicts affected, or have the potential to affect, Nyungwe National Park.<sup>623</sup> The researchers selected three conflict types—resource access conflicts, wildlife-human conflicts, and buffer zone management conflicts—for further analysis based on discussions with stakeholders. They found that the major drivers of resource access conflicts in the park were poverty, demand for bamboo products and traditional medicines, the need for food, and population pressures; and the results of resource access conflicts were biodiversity loss, tourism revenue declines, more poverty, increased risk of injury, and increased atmospheric pollution. Major drivers of wildlife-human conflicts included crop choice, population pressures, and crop raiding, while effects of these conflicts included decreased crop yields, increased poverty and food insecurity, negative attitudes towards the park, and injuries and deaths to park fauna and human populations. Finally, buffer zone conflicts were found to be primarily driven by the lack of community consultation in the decision-making process, unclear boundaries, disputes over land ownership, and illegal mining, and effects of this conflict included illegal activities, a lack of community trust, loss of livelihoods, and environmental degradation. By highlighting the causes and effects of conflict in the park, the report was able to highlight potential solutions and make monitoring recommendations, showing that incorporating conflict sensitivity in analysis and tangible decisions for programming.

Following the 2005 adoption of the Kyoto Protocol—an international agreement in which states pledged to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions—climate change became a more prevalent issue not only in general environmental programming but also in development and peacebuilding efforts. In 2010, for example, Anne Hammill and Richard Matthew examined conflict sensitivity in the context of climate change adaptation.<sup>624</sup> They present a systematic climate change adaptation scheme that factors peacebuilding into a series of possible responses to the adverse impacts of and opportunities resulting from climate change. They also noted that peacebuilding has evolved over the past 20 years to promote sustainable development in conflict-affected places, with climate change being the most recent environmental issue linked to security.

Climate-induced conflict does not always come from climate change directly; it can also come from how human beings themselves react to climate change.<sup>625</sup> For example, the transition to renewable energy in response to climate change could result in destabilization and social tensions in oil-dependent states, while water security adaptation measures that lack a conflict-sensitive approach could lead to an escalation of water conflicts.<sup>626</sup> Philipp Babcicky argues that successful adaptation projects understand the context in which they operate and should use theories from conflict sensitivity, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution for conflict

---

<sup>623</sup> Crawford 2012.

<sup>624</sup> Hammill and Matthew 2010.

<sup>625</sup> Babcicky 2013.

<sup>626</sup> See, e.g., Dabelko et al. 2013.

mitigation.<sup>627</sup> Conflict prevention measures include assessing the political, social, or economic situation of a country; determining conflict causes; and identifying and implementing preventative measures that could contribute to conflict-sensitive responses to climate change. Conflict resolution consists of tackling underlying causes of conflict to achieve long-lasting peace. It is argued that these measures should be implemented across all phases of a project, rather than in just the design phase.

Conflict sensitivity in environmental research has been increasingly studied using a method called return on investment (ROI). ROIs are a type of economic cost-effectiveness analysis in which conservation benefits and the probability of project success are weighed against project cost. Risks and uncertainties are often included in these analyses, because they can influence the probability of the success of the conservation intervention. Assessing strategies for protected area planning, Hammill et al. found that ignoring conflict risk resulted in the lowest ROI, while choosing to completely avoid conflict-prone regions resulted in only limited improvements and could lead to species receiving no protection.<sup>628</sup> Moreover, they found that in taking conflict into account by protecting additional areas to offset the impacts of armed conflicts, the ROI increased, although upfront conservation costs also increased. Taking conflict into account in volatile regions and using local-scale data would thus help achieve biodiversity targets but would require greater initial investment.

While conflict-sensitivity has become much more integrated into environmental programming, risk-sensitivity analyses in conservation and environmental programming do not always specifically include conflict, though they can indirectly allude to it. For example, Timothy Tear et al. present an ROI approach to conservation priority setting for Africa.<sup>629</sup> Their analysis combined conservation priorities that factored in biodiversity value, habitat quality, and conservation management investments in different types of environments across the African continent. Using their methodology, they identified seven regions with high ROI values that would support future investment. When estimating the probability of conservation success, the study used an index that covered the sociopolitical and economic context of the countries. This index accounted for safety and rule of law, human rights and participation, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Thus, while they did consider risks, neither conflict nor conflict sensitivity was not directly taken into account.

In conclusion, conflict sensitivity has emerged as a concept in environmental programming, peacebuilding, and research, although there are still many cases in which it is ignored or not directly considered. It has been particularly prevalent in studies that compare management strategies for biodiversity conservation and climate change adaptation. Although it is clear that conflict sensitivity holds an important place in programming, it has not been consistently applied at the policy and organizational levels, throughout the project life cycle, and between

---

<sup>627</sup> Babcock 2013.

<sup>628</sup> Hammill et al. 2016.

<sup>629</sup> Tear et al. 2013

agencies largely because of a lack of coordination between actors.<sup>630</sup> And, while research and programming plans allude to the importance of conflict-sensitive approaches, there can be difficulties in actually integrating findings into programming on the ground.<sup>631</sup> In short, conflict-sensitive environmental programming has come a long way since the 1990s, but it still has some way to go.

---

<sup>630</sup> Haider 2014.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid.

## ANNEX J: LINKAGES BETWEEN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

This annex summarizes linkages between the various goals and targets comprising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that (1) support environmental peacebuilding, and (2) are supported by environmental peacebuilding. “Environmental peacebuilding” includes a range of activities to prevent, mitigate, end, and recover from conflict. This annex was developed by the Environmental Law Institute, drawing upon staff experience, peer-reviewed literature, and gray literature.

	Goal	Target	SDG supports EP	EP supports SDG
End poverty in all its forms everywhere	1		Yes	Maybe
By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day	1	1	Yes	Yes
By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions	1	2	Yes	Yes
Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable	1	3	No	No
By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance	1	4	Yes	Yes
By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters	1	5	Yes	Yes

Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions	1	a	Yes	Yes
Create sound policy frameworks at the national, regional and international levels, based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies, to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication actions	1	b	Yes	Yes
End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture	2		Yes	Yes
By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round	2	1	Yes	Yes
By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons	2	2	Yes	Yes
By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment	2	3	Yes	Yes
By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather,	2	4	Yes	Yes

drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality				
By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional and international levels, and promote access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as internationally agreed	2	5	No	No
Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries	2	a	Yes	Yes
Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round	2	b	No	No
Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility	2	c	Yes	No
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	3		Yes	Yes
By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births	3	1	No	No



By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1,000 live births	3	2	No	No
By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases	3	3	Yes	Yes
By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being	3	4	No	No
Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol	3	5	No	No
By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents	3	6	No	No
By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes	3	7	No	No
Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all	3	8	No	No
By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination	3	9	Yes	Yes
Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate	3	a	No	No

Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all	3	b	No	No
Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States	3	c	No	No
Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks	3	d	No	No
Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all	4		No	No
By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes	4	1	No	No
By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education	4	2	No	No
By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university	4	3	Yes	No
By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical	4	4	Yes	Yes

and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship				
By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations	4	5	Yes	Yes
By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy	4	6	No	No
By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development	4	7	Yes	Yes
Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all	4	a	No	No
By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries	4	b	No	No
By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing States	4	c	No	No

Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	5		Yes	Yes
End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere	5	1	Yes	Yes
Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation	5	2	Yes	Yes
Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation	5	3	No	No
Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate	5	4	No	No
Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life	5	5	Yes	Yes
Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences	5	6	No	No
Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws	5	a	Yes	Yes
Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women	5	b	Yes	Yes
Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels	5	c	Yes	Yes

Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	6		Yes	Yes
By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all	6	1	Yes	Yes
By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations	6	2	Yes	Yes
By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally	6	3	Yes	Yes
By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity	6	4	Yes	Yes
By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate	6	5	Yes	Yes
By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes	6	6	Yes	Yes
By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programmes, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies	6	a	Yes	Yes
Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management	6	b	Yes	Yes
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all	7		Yes	Yes

By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services	7	1	Yes	Yes
By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix	7	2	Yes	Yes
By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency	7	3	No	No
By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology	7	a	Yes	Yes
By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States, and land-locked developing countries, in accordance with their respective programmes of support	7	b	Yes	Yes
Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	8		Yes	Yes
Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries	8	1	Yes	Yes
Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors	8	2	Yes	Yes
Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services	8	3	Yes	Yes

Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in accordance with the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, with developed countries taking the lead	8	4	No	No
By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value	8	5	Yes	Yes
By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training	8	6	Yes	Yes
Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms	8	7	No	No
Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment	8	8	No	No
By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products	8	9	Yes	Yes
Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all	8	10	No	No
Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, including through the Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries	8	a	No	No

By 2020, develop and operationalize a global strategy for youth employment and implement the Global Jobs Pact of the International Labour Organization	8	b	No	No
Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation	9		Yes	Yes
Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all	9	1	Yes	Yes
Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries	9	2	No	No
Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets	9	3	Yes	No
By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities	9	4	Yes	Yes
Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending	9	5	No	No
Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development in developing countries through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, least developed	9	a	Yes	Yes



countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States				
Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities	9	b	Yes	No
Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020	9	c	Yes	No
Reduce inequality within and among countries	10		Yes	Yes
By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average	10	1	Yes	Yes
By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status	10	2	Yes	Yes
Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard	10	3	Yes	Yes
Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality	10	4	No	No
Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations	10	5	No	No
Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions	10	6	No	No

Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	10	7	Yes	Yes
Implement the principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in accordance with World Trade Organization agreements	10	a	No	No
Encourage official development assistance and financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest, in particular least developed countries, African countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, in accordance with their national plans and programmes	10	b	Yes	Yes
By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent	10	c	No	No
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	11		Yes	Yes
By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums	11	1	Yes	Yes
By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons	11	2	No	No
By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries	11	3	Yes	Yes
Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world's cultural and natural heritage	11	4	Yes	Yes

By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations	11	5	Yes	Yes
By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management	11	6	Yes	Yes
By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities	11	7	No	No
Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning	11	a	Yes	Yes
By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels	11	b	Yes	Yes
Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials	11	c	Yes	Yes
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	12		Yes	Yes
Implement the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, all countries taking action, with developed countries taking the	12	1	No	No

lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries				
By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources	12	2	Yes	Yes
By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains, including post-harvest losses	12	3	No	No
By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment	12	4	Yes	Yes
By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse	12	5	No	No
Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle	12	6	Yes	Yes
Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities	12	7	No	No
By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature	12	8	Yes	Yes
Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production	12	a	No	No
Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products	12	b	Yes	Yes

Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities	12	c	No	No
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	13		Yes	Yes
Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries	13	1	Yes	Yes
Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning	13	2	Yes	Yes
Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning	13	3	Yes	Yes
Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly \$100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its capitalization as soon as possible	13	a	Yes	Yes
Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities	13	b	Yes	Yes
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development	14		Yes	Yes

By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution	14	1	Yes	Yes
By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans	14	2	Yes	Yes
Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels	14	3	No	No
By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics	14	4	Yes	Yes
By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information	14	5	Yes	Yes
By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation	14	6	Yes	Yes
By 2030, increase the economic benefits to Small Island Developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism	14	7	Yes	Yes

Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, in particular small island developing States and least developed countries	14	a	No	No
Provide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets	14	b	Yes	Yes
Enhance the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in UNCLOS, which provides the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources, as recalled in paragraph 158 of The Future We Want	14	c	Yes	Yes
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss	15		Yes	Yes
By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements	15	1	Yes	Yes
By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally	15	2	Yes	Yes
By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world	15	3	Yes	Yes
By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to	15	4	Yes	Yes

enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development				
Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species	15	5	Yes	Yes
Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed	15	6	No	No
Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products	15	7	Yes	Yes
By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species	15	8	No	No
By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts	15	9	Yes	Yes
Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems	15	a	Yes	Yes
Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation	15	b	Yes	Yes
Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities	15	c	Yes	Yes
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for	16		Yes	Yes



all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels				
Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere	16	1	Yes	Yes
End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	16	2	No	No
Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all	16	3	Yes	Yes
By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime	16	4	Yes	Yes
Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms	16	5	Yes	Yes
Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels	16	6	Yes	Yes
Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	16	7	Yes	Yes
Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance	16	8	No	No
By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration	16	9	No	No
Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements	16	10	Yes	Yes
Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime	16	a	Yes	Yes
Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development	16	b	Yes	Yes

Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	17		Yes	Yes
Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection	17	1	Yes	Yes
Developed countries to implement fully their official development assistance commitments, including the commitment by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of ODA/GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries; ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to provide at least 0.20 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries	17	2	No	No
Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources	17	3	No	No
Assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief and debt restructuring, as appropriate, and address the external debt of highly indebted poor countries to reduce debt distress	17	4	No	No
Adopt and implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries	17	5	No	No
Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism	17	6	No	No

Promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed	17	7	Yes	Yes
Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology	17	8	Yes	Yes
Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation	17	9	Yes	Yes
Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda	17	10	No	No
Significantly increase the exports of developing countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed countries' share of global exports by 2020	17	11	Yes	Yes
Realize timely implementation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed countries, consistent with World Trade Organization decisions, including by ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from least developed countries are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating market access	17	12	No	No
Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence	17	13	Yes	No
Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development	17	14	Yes	Yes

Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development	17	15	Yes	Yes
Enhance the global partnership for sustainable development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries	17	16	Yes	Yes
Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships	17	17	Yes	Yes
By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts	17	18	No	No
By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries	17	19	No	No